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Abstract 
The sheer amount of content on the Internet poses a number of challenges for 
content providers and users alike. The providers want to classify and identify user 
downloads for market research, advertising and legal purposes. From the user’s 
perspective it is increasingly difficult to find interesting content online, hence 
content personalisation and media recommendation is expected by the public. An 
especially important (and also technically challenging) case is when a 
downloadable item has no supporting description or meta-data, as in the case of 
(normally illegal) torrent downloads, which comprise 10 to 30 percent of the global 
traffic depending on the region. In this case, apart from its size, we have to rely 
entirely on the filename – which is often deliberately obfuscated – to identify or 
classify what the file really is. 
The Hollywood movie industry is sufficiently motivated by this problem that it 
has invested significant research – through its company MovieLabs – to help 
understand more precisely what material is being illegally downloaded in order 
both to combat piracy and exploit the extraordinary opportunities for future sales 
and marketing. This thesis was inspired, and partly supported, by MovieLabs who 
recognised the limitations of their current purely data-driven algorithmic 
approach. 
The research hypothesis is that, by extending state-of-the-art information retrieval 
(IR) algorithms and by developing an underlying causal Bayesian Network (BN) 
incorporating expert judgment and data, it is possible to improve on the accuracy 
of MovieLabs’s benchmark algorithm for identifying and classifying torrent 
names. In addition to identification and standard classification (such as whether 
the file is Movie, Soundtrack, Book, etc.) we consider the crucial orthogonal 
classifications of pornography and malware. The work in the thesis provides a 
number of novel extensions to the generic problem of classifying and personalising 
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internet content based on minimal data and on validating the results in the absence 
of a genuine ‘oracle’. 
The system developed in the thesis (called Toran) is extensively validated using a 
sample of torrents classified by a panel of 3 human experts and the MovieLabs 
system, divided into knowledge and validation sets of 2,500 and 479 records 
respectively. In the absence of an automated classification oracle, we established 
manually the true classification for the test set of 121 records in order to be able to 
compare Toran, the human panel (HP) and the MovieLabs system (MVL). The 
results show that Toran performs better than MVL for the key medium categories 
that contain most items, such as music, software, movies, TVs and other videos. 
Toran also has the ability to assess the risk of fakes and malware prior to 
download, and is on par or even surpasses human experts in this capability. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
This chapter covers the motivation and gives the necessary introduction to the 
application domain, defines the research hypothesis and research objectives and 
explains the structure of this document. 
1.1. Motivation 
The relentless growth of the Internet and its resources (Qmee 2013; Internet World 
Stats 2014; Cisco 2015a) continues to pose novel challenges. Content and service 
providers strive to monitor the data consumption in order to serve personalised 
advertising and perform market research, while Internet users often benefit from 
receiving automated recommendations based on their preferences and tastes. 
Indeed, personalisation of online content is now so pervasive that users are 
conditioned to expect such recommendations wherever they go online. Among the 
examples of such personalisation are: 
 targeted ads provided by big advertisement networks that monitor general 
activity of a person online and serve ads based on this activity; 
 search engine results that are often also tailored to reflect the user interests, 
so that the same request will produce different results to different people; 
 item recommendations by online shops that are based on previous 
purchases or product page visits; 
 local news and weather forecasts showed by news portals based on visitor’s 
location; 
 online video streaming services recommending titles to watch based on the 
history of past items and ratings the user had left; etc. 
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Cisco estimated the global Internet traffic at 59.9 Exabytes per month in 2014 and 
that 80-90% of all Internet traffic was primarily video transfer, and that 67% of all 
traffic was caused specifically by digital TV, video on demand and streaming 
(Cisco 2015a). According to YouTube, 300 hours of video are uploaded to YouTube 
every minute (Youtube Press 2015), and in 2012 the number of videos watched per 
day reached 4 billion (YouTube 2012). 
Netflix stated in their Q1 2015 shareholders report (Hastings & Wells 2015) that 
users streamed a total of 10 billion hours of content through their services in the 
first quarter of 2015. They do not, however, provide a break down in terms of 
movies, TV series or other types of video; and nor do they supply an actual number 
of items watched. Given an average length of a movie around 2 hours and an 
average length of a TV episode of 40 minutes, this is equivalent to over 55 million 
movies or over 165 million TV episodes watched per day. 
An especially important class of downloadable content – and one which is a major 
focus of this thesis – is referred to as BitTorrent (Cohen 2011; BitTorrent 2015a), or 
just torrent. A combined estimate provided by Cisco (Cisco 2015b) and Sandvine 
(Sandvine 2014) indicates that BitTorrent traffic accounts for between 5% to 35% of 
household and mobile traffic, depending on the region. 
A BitTorrent file is a shorthand for a file created by Internet users for sharing 
images, videos, software and other content legally or illegally; and the mechanism 
for this is provided by a peer-to-peer (P2P) networking architecture where 
individual nodes, such as users’ computers, communicate with each other without 
a complete reliance on a central server, as opposed to a client-server architecture 
(Schollmeier 2001). 
In many cases the torrents have no conventional metadata or naming standard, so 
it is very difficult to adequately analyse and classify such items reliably and 
autonomously. 
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Torrent files are mostly posted on the Internet by individuals, as opposed to 
companies, and this makes them very difficult to account for in any terms other 
than traffic volume. Classically, these files are available on multitudes of websites, 
called trackers. Zhang et al reported in 2011 that the total number of trackers they 
discovered was approaching 39,000 although only 728 were operating actively 
(Zhang et al. 2011). The total number of torrent files collected was over 8.5 million, 
out of which almost 3 million were actively shared by users. With an exception of 
a handful of extremely large projects, an average number of torrents served by a 
tracker was around 10,000. 
In 2011 a report by Envisional commissioned by NBCUniversal, a large media and 
entertainment company, claimed that two thirds of BitTorrent traffic were 
infringing content (Envisional 2011). In 2014 a report by Tru Optik claimed that the 
global monetary value of content downloaded from torrent networks amounted to 
more than £520 billion in 2014 (Tru Optik 2014). This figure, however, assumes that 
everything that was downloaded and presumably watched would otherwise be 
purchased via official distribution channels. Such an assumption may be indicative 
of bias in Tru Optik’s claims, and ignores the fact that some people may have 
financial, geographical or language-related barriers to accessing material legally. 
With regards to the type of content, Tru Optik claim in the same report that in a 
typical day people download over 12 million TV episodes and complete seasons, 
14 million movies and movie collections, 4 million songs and albums, 7 million 
games, 4 million software programmes and 7 million pornographic videos; as well 
as over 9.64 million pieces of content produced by TV networks CBS, ABC, Fox, 
CW, HBO, FX, NBC, AMC, Showtime and. They do not, however, specify how the 
classification or identification was made, and nor does Envisional in their 2011 
report. 
It is crucial to note that companies such as Tru Optik and Envisional may have a 
strong vested interest in overestimating the volume and value of downloaded 
28 
 
copyrighted content. There is an obvious demand for being able to identify and 
classify such downloads automatically in a transparent and coherent way, such 
that unbiased statistical data can be obtained. In fact, this thesis was partly 
motivated by exactly such a demand by MovieLabs (properly introduced in 
Section 2.1), a private research lab funded by several major Hollywood studios and 
heavily involved with developing new methods to analyse torrent traffic. 
An important drawback of such reports as the ones produced by Tru Optik and 
Envisional is the assumption that all BitTorrent content, or even all downloaded 
content, is illegal, which is a fallacy dismissed by the International Federation of 
the Phonographic Industry (IFPI), which is an organisation RIAA often turns to for 
statistics. In their 2015 report IFPI suggest that in 2014 revenue from digital sales, 
i.e. legal downloads, reached the same figures as revenue from physical sales (IFPI 
2015), which demonstrates well the importance of providing better quality 
statistics about the content being downloaded from the Internet. 
Regardless of validity of the claims like the ones by Tru Optik and Envisional, large 
potential loss of revenue is often a major cause for legal battles between rights 
holders (and their agencies), such as Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA) or Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), and popular BitTorrent 
trackers, who operate websites primarily used for providing downloads of such 
content.  A prominent example was the Swedish court case #B 13301-06 (Stockholm 
District Court 2009; Stockholms Tingsrätt 2009) against the creators of The Pirate 
Bay, which was a very popular torrent tracker and served in excess of 10 times 
more downloads than the second biggest tracker in 2011 (Zhang et al. 2011). 
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An analogy to help understand the legal BitTorrent concept was provided in a 
ruling of the Federal Court of Australia: 
 ‘…the file being shared in the swarm is the treasure, the BitTorrent client is 
the ship, the .torrent file is the treasure map, The Pirate Bay provides 
treasure maps free of charge and the tracker is the wise old man that needs 
to be consulted to understand the treasure map.’  
In addition to this analogy, it has to be noted that the treasure never actually leaves 
the place where it was found, and rather self-replicates into the pocket of the one 
who found it, thus leaving no one deprived of the access to the treasure, but 
nonetheless raising an issue of opportunity cost to publishers who argue they lost 
profits because a free alternative was available (Siwek 2006; Dejean 2009). 
Although the nature of P2P technology is such that it is often used for illegal file 
sharing, it is not solely used for piracy. Legal applications of P2P include free 
software and game distribution, e.g. distributing famous open-source software 
such as OpenOffice and Ubuntu (OpenOffice 2015; Ubuntu 2015) and others; client 
distribution for commercial software relying on client-server architecture, such as 
online game clients, which may also include BitTorrent and other P2P elements 
e.g. (Enigmax 2008; Meritt 2010; Wikia 2015; CCP Games 2015); crypto-currencies 
(Nakamoto 2008); file storage sync services (BitTorrent 2015c); internal corporate 
data transfer (Paul 2012) etc. P2P technology is also used for censorship 
circumvention as part of virtual private network architectures (Wolinsky et al. 
2010). 
Some artists and bands release promotional packages on BitTorrent to get the 
public involved (BitTorrent 2015b). There are over 10 million items available as 
torrent downloads at the Internet Archive who collect items that are legally 
available for free to the public (Internet Archive 2016), and an additional catalogue 
of resources hosting free and legal torrent downloads is maintained (Gizmo’s 
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Freeware 2015). There is also an argument that online piracy is motivated to a great 
degree by the lack of a legal and convenient alternatives online (Masnick 2015), 
and that the impact of piracy is overestimated (Milot 2014) or may even be a 
positive factor for the industry (Smith & Telang 2009). 
An additional benefit to automatic torrent classification and identification may 
come in the domain of cyber-security and involve early malware detection. Big 
movie studios or companies operating on behalf of Hollywood studios, such as 
MediaDefender (Wikipedia 2016), attempt to combat piracy by employing a range 
of tactics aimed at disrupting file sharing networks. One prominent method is to 
flood the network with multiple fakes aimed at particular titles that are deemed 
high interest, for example, titles of recently released Hollywood blockbuster 
movies, which are highly anticipated. By maintaining a high number of fake 
downloads the anti-piracy entities reduce the chances of a common user 
downloading an actual movie. Once the user downloads a fake, they will normally 
remove it from their machine, thus limiting the fake’s potency, which is why this 
tactic is only employed for a particular title for a short period of time while the 
movie is considered to be the most relevant. This minimises losses by tackling the 
free downloads at the time most critical for cinema ticket sales. 
Fakes are also often posted by other malicious actors such as hackers. Most fakes 
are either trailers or broken videos. A considerable proportion of such items, 
however, also either contain an infected executable file or a link to a malicious web 
page employing social engineering methods to coerce an unsuspecting user into 
enabling an attacker to infect their machine with malware or bot-net inclusion. 
While most of these items are disguised as movies, this is also relevant to a lesser 
extent to other medium categories, such as music, in which case an advertisement 
video may be flooded into the file sharing network masquerading as a live concert 
recording (Angwin et al. 2006). 
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Claimed Benefits 
Corporations can benefit from exploiting the market research, including but not 
limited to: 
 evaluating brand and title popularity unaffected by monetary aspects of 
the market; 
 estimating potential losses due to piracy with a greater degree of 
accuracy; 
 matching real world events, such as movie releases or announcements, 
to the download activity; 
 identifying market niches where legal alternatives are lacking e.g. 
providing an official dubbing or subtitles in languages where no formal 
alternative exists for certain movies or TV series, despite the title’s 
popularity; 
 attempting to relate user buying patterns with their download 
preferences. 
The individual users, however, may also find a benefit from automatic tools being 
able to: 
 estimate the risk that a file is a fake and does not contain what the file 
name advertises; 
 predict the risk of the file containing malware based purely on its 
properties (name, size, source etc.)  before any download is attempted; 
 provide tailored recommendations of downloads or products based on 
the download profile of the user. 
Uncertainty lies at the heart of classification, even when undertaken by humans 
who sometimes find it difficult to classify an item fully into a single category, and 
may be more comfortable to use a number of weighted categories to describe that 
item. The issue is especially problematic for media content available online, 
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because it is ultimately impossible to conclusively determine its true identity until 
the file is completely downloaded and analysed in full. So it is natural to express 
an uncertain belief in the likely category instead of trying to use a hard 
classification. Bayes’ theorem (see Section 3.1 for a detailed introduction) is 
especially suitable for expressing a probability of an ultimately unobserved 
hypothesis (e.g. true state of the item), given some factual evidence. The potential 
of this theorem is fully realised in Bayesian network (BN) modelling (see Section 
3.2), which allows construction of a network of related variables or events and 
makes it possible to model their relationships. Crucially, we can incorporate our 
prior beliefs and expertise into the model and achieve accurate results when data 
are scarce or even unavailable. 
Data scarcity is especially pertinent for the torrent identification and classification 
problem since, in most cases, the only ‘data’ available to us on an individual torrent 
are those which can be extracted from the torrent name. 
{www.scenetime.com}Law.and.Order.SVU.S13E10.480p.WEB-DL.x264-mSD.exe 
Figure 1: Example of a Torrent Name 
Figure 1 presents an example of such torrent name, and Table 1 provides a 
breakdown of the name into meaningful pieces of data. 
Data Meaning 
www.scenetime.com Tracker website 
Law.and.Order.SVU TV series ‘Law & Order: Special Victims Unit’ 
S13E10 Season 13 episode 10 
480p Video resolution 
WEB-DL Video capture source type 
x264 Video encoding 
-mSD Distributor signature 
exe File type extension – software 
Table 1: Data Meaning of Torrent Name Example from Figure 1 
All inference has to be based on the file name along with some prior knowledge, 
which is why we believe that it must be addressed from a Bayesian probabilistic 
perspective. For example, we can also give a prediction with a particular degree of 
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certainty whether a file is pornographic (‘porn’ onwards), fake or malware; and 
supply extra information about the evidence retrieved from the file name, which 
can explain why a particular prediction was made. Combining all this information 
into a well-structured format is the ultimate way to enable further analysis as 
indicated above, benefitting both the end users and the service providers. By 
solving the problem of torrent classification and identification we would also be 
able to define a coherent method and provide a range of tools for solving similar 
problems. A basic example of a similar problem is on-line recommendation that 
holds item classification to be a pre-requisite. A more advanced example is 
identifying a shopping category by analysing a search request string typed by an 
online shopper. 
In contrast to the work on network traffic classification, such as in (Moore & Zuev 
2005; Charalampos et al. 2010; Bashir et al. 2013), where the network behaviour or 
actual network packet-related data are analysed directly, this thesis is only 
concerned with analysing file name and size which describe a torrent item. 
1.2. Research Hypothesis and Objectives 
The main research hypothesis of this thesis is that it is possible to achieve 
quantifiable improvements to the accuracy and utility of the current state-of-the-
art of automated classification and identification of downloadable media content 
based on minimal data. The focus is on deriving an underlying probabilistic model 
that incorporates expert judgement along with data, which also enables us to 
perform further rich analysis on the post-processed data. The hypothesis is 
underpinned by the following objectives: 
1. To develop an automated classification system, based on a probabilistic 
model that can deliver accurate and rich probabilistic classification of files 
without the need to maintain any media database and using minimal input 
such as file name and size. 
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2. To show that, when the system in 1) employs (as, for example, the 
MovieLabs system does) to a database of item titles, it is possible to provide 
improved probabilistic classification and identification, including 
estimation of probability of fakes and malware. 
3. To develop a general and rigorous metric-based framework for assessing 
the accuracy of systems that perform media classification and identification 
– even in the absence of an oracle for determining the ‘true’ state of content 
– so that the performance of the proposed new system can be formally 
compared against alternatives such as the MovieLabs system and human 
judges when presented with the same input data. 
4. To perform extensive empirical validation of the system based on the 
framework established in 3). 
1.3. Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 introduces the MovieLabs benchmark system and our alternative 
prototype system. It explains the data we used, and how we obtained, analysed 
and processed them. It defines the classification hierarchy and covers the data 
samples we collected. A literature review and an overview of the methods and 
technologies used in the thesis are also provided. 
Chapter 3 covers other underlying topics which form the theoretical basis for the 
thesis, namely, Bayesian networks and modelling, and describes the novel BN we 
use to model the uncertainty of classification predictions. 
Chapter 4 explains how we define and capture the evidence used as input for our 
BN model. The two most important pieces of evidence to consider are observations 
related to file size and medium type signatures detected in a file name or any 
possible title matches in that file name. 
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In Chapter 5 we define the framework for comparing classification results 
produced by different agents, and propose an evaluation metric that extends 
classical metrics and enables adequate analysis of classification performance on a 
multi-level hierarchy of categories with varying number of classes in each 
category. 
In Chapter 6 we compare and contrast the results achieved by humans, the 
benchmark and our prototype systems. 
We conclude the thesis in Chapter 7 and summarise the contribution from the 
previous chapters and discuss possible future work and direction of the research. 
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Chapter 2  
Background and Data 
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of data used and collected throughout 
this research project, introduces the MovieLabs benchmark system and our 
alternative prototype system, in addition to reviewing state-of-the-art of the topics, 
relevant to data processing, namely, information retrieval, classification and 
classifier evaluation. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 briefly introduces the benchmark 
system and our prototype. Section 2.2 explains the primary input data e.g. torrent 
information. Section 2.3 defines the category hierarchy used for classification. 
Section 2.4 outlines the import procedures for auxiliary input data e.g. titles. 
Section 2.5 covers the data samples. Section 2.6 covers the relevant theory in fields 
of classification and classifier evaluation. Section 2.7 introduces string alignment 
which is relevant for title identification. 
The material in Sections 2.1 to 2.5 is, to the best of our knowledge, a novel 
contribution and is focused on our approach to the problem domain. 
2.1. The Benchmark and Prototype Systems 
a) Benchmark 
Among the organisations especially interested in solving the torrent identification 
and classification problem are the big Hollywood movie studios since they not 
only provide the most significant investment in the original movie content, but are 
most at risk from Internet piracy. MovieLabs is a private research lab that is funded 
by six major US Hollywood studios to accelerate the development of technologies 
essential to the distribution and use of consumer media (MovieLabs 2016). 
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MovieLabs conduct continuous in-depth research of the material posted on torrent 
networks. They develop and maintain a proprietary system, which we shall 
subsequently call MVL that allows them to capture, organise and analyse a very 
large collection of torrent files posted on multiple online platforms throughout the 
Internet. The primary target of the MovieLabs system is to detect torrents that 
contain movies published by the main Hollywood studios, but they also try to 
capture items of other categories. 
We believe that the MVL system represents a viable benchmark, against which a 
new automated approach can be tested. MovieLabs recognised that, given the 
complexity of torrent names and obfuscation involved, it is increasingly difficult 
for automated systems like theirs to achieve good results with a deterministic 
approach (MovieLabs 2012). 
While the details of the MVL classification engine are proprietary, it is known that 
it is a rule-based approach that does not address uncertainty while analysing the 
data, and is only capable of making hard classification or identification decisions 
with no regard to the uncertainty of the outcome (MovieLabs 2014). Hence, the 
classification decisions are non-probabilistic and are based mostly on running 
regular expression matching against a list of titles that they are seeking to detect, 
and then looking at a limited number of keywords associated with a particular 
category. The MVL system also attempts to retrieve meta-data from other online 
platforms that store torrent classifications, and hence relies to a degree on other 
black-box systems. 
In order to compare our method to MVL, we picked a limited number of items 
from the MovieLabs’ database of torrents and separated it into several data sets, 
covered in more detail in Section 2.5. 
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We extend the keyword system, originally used by MovieLabs, in Chapter 4 to 
build a more flexible architecture that allows coherent encoding of expertise from 
multiple sources, agents or experts. 
b) Prototype 
We developed a prototype classifier system called Toran (Torrent Analyser), which 
is written in Java and uses the AgenaRisk API (Agena 2016a) to perform Bayesian 
computations. Toran takes in torrent name and file size as parameters and returns 
a number of probabilistic predictions where each variable’s state is assigned a 
predicted probability. 
The Toran output is a report in XML format (Extensible Markup Language), 
described in (W3C 2008). The XML schema of the report can be found in Appendix 
A  and a few examples of torrents processed into this format can be found in 
Appendix Figures A.1, A.2 and A.3. Appendix B provides an example of a 
complete Toran’s XML report. 
The report contains multiple torrent records, and each record specifies: 
 original properties: 
o torrent hash code identifier 
o torrent name string 
o file size 
 observations extracted from the filename: 
o sub-strings associated with medium categories 
o title matches 
 filtered file name (after all known removable signatures are filtered out) 
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 variable predictions (as a map of states and corresponding probability 
values): 
o porn 
o risk of fake 
o risk of malware 
o medium category 
Subsequent chapters explain in detail the Bayesian model and Toran configuration. 
The information included into the report makes it possible to explain how Toran 
arrived at its predictions and allows further analysis. 
2.2. File Data 
MovieLabs provided us with a large database of torrent files they collected over 
several years, as well as a feed that prints newly detected and processed items in 
real time. The following primary pieces of data were reliably available: 
a) Hash Code is a pseudo-unique torrent identifier, which takes into account 
both the torrent name and its content. A particular torrent always resolves 
to the same hash code. We use the hash code as item identifier when 
processing torrents. 
b) Torrent Name, also called file name, is always defined by the user who is 
posting the torrent, and does not necessarily follow any naming notation 
(see Table 2 for examples). Even though in most cases such names are 
descriptive of the content, torrents exist with names either giving false 
information (e.g. malware masked as a popular movie, see Table 2 #2), or 
just being unreadable or corrupt (e.g. ����). In other cases information 
contained in the string is too little or ambiguous to perform any analysis 
(e.g. 000143288_250), or it could be in a foreign language (e.g. 사랑과 
도주의 나날.zip). 
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# File Name String 
1 How.I.Met.Your.Mother.S07E24E25.HDTV.XviD-NYDIC 
2 Cpasbien_The_Interview_(2014)_FANSUB_XviD_downloader.exe 
3 Carcedo - Un espanol frente al holocausto [8473] (r1.1).epub 
4 Kim Kardashian Playboy Pics 
5 [ www.torrent.com ] - Million.Dollar.Listing.S07E07.x264-YesTV 
6 Plebs.S02E03.PDTV.x264-RiVER 
7 House Of Anubis S02e71-90 
8 PAW.Patrol.S01.HDTVRip.x264.960x(semen_52-TNC) 
9 Revenge - Temporada 4 [HDTV][Cap.402][V.O.Sub. Español] 
Table 2: Torrent Name Examples 
c) File Size: bytes, kilobytes (KB), megabytes (MB) or gigabytes (GB); as most 
files fall into the range between 1 MB and 1 GB we convert size to MB for 
uniformity. When little information is available the file size can provide at 
least some possibilities for classification because it is the piece of evidence 
that we always have available. 
d) A number of other attributes provided by the MovieLabs database are not 
used by the current method, but could be incorporated in the model as 
explained in Future Work Section 7.3. 
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2.3. Class Taxonomy 
The class taxonomy used by MovieLabs can be seen in Table 3. 
Category Level 1 Category Level 2 Category Level 3 
Video 
Movie Trailer 
TV Anime 
Adult  
Audio 
Music Soundtrack 
Podcast  
Software 
Application 
PC 
Mobile 
Game 
Console 
PC 
Mobile 
Update  
Image   
Text 
Magazine  
Book Comic 
Unknown  
 Table 3: MovieLabs Classification Taxonomy 
To achieve the objectives set out in Chapter 1, it was crucial to develop a refined 
version of the class taxonomy because of a number of obvious weaknesses in the 
original in Table 3.  For example: 
 There is non-orthogonality in how “Adult” is a sub-category of video, 
although almost any form of media may feature adult content. 
 There are no provisions in MVL to attempt to detect fakes or malware. 
 Due to the deterministic nature of MVL it is unable to express uncertainty 
and hence has to fall back on the catch-all “Unknown” class when it does 
not have enough information.  
To address these issues, while retaining the core MovieLabs classification 
requirements, we adopted the revised taxonomy in Table 4, which also illustrates 
how classes from MovieLabs can be translated into the new hierarchy. 
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Super- 
Category 
Sub- 
Category 
MovieLabs 
Category Equivalent 
Audio 
Audio: Music Audio: Music 
Audio: OST* Audio: Music: Soundtrack 
Audio: Other Audio: Podcast 
Image Image 
Mixed N/A 
Software 
Software: Game Software: Game 
Software: Other Software: Application 
Text 
Text: Book Text: Book 
Text: Magazine Text: Magazine 
Text: Other N/A 
Video 
Video: Movie Video: Movie 
Video: Other 
Video: Movie: Trailer 
Video: Adult 
Video: TV Video: TV 
Table 4: Our Classification Taxonomy (* Original Sound Track) 
The key points to note are: 
 There is no “Unknown” category since the major objective of our Bayesian 
probabilistic approach is that every item’s uncertainty is characterised by 
probability values associated with each category. 
 We simplified the classification by reducing it to two levels of abstraction 
for practical reasons explained in more detail in Section 3.5.  
 “Audio: Soundtrack” is a separate class from “Audio: Music” that is needed 
because it is common for a torrent that is the soundtrack of a movie to have 
the same (or very similar) title as a torrent that is the movie, making the 
classification especially challenging. 
 We added the “Mixed” category for rare cases when a torrent contains a 
mixture of different types of files (e.g. a movie with soundtrack and 
additional materials; or a collection of movies, games, comics etc. that 
belong to the same franchise) and it is impossible even for a human expert 
to reliably decide on a single category classification. 
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 From a consultation with MovieLabs we concluded that items they 
classified as “Video: Adult” are normally short porn videos, which fall 
under “Video: Other” category in our classification. 
In relation to the hierarchy in Table 4, elsewhere in the thesis the terms ‘partial’ or 
‘full’ classifications refer to cases where only super-category or the actual sub-
category were identified respectively. So, for example, for a movie item, its partial 
classification is “Video” and its full classification is “Video: Movie”. 
2.4. Title and Names Databases 
In order to attempt identification of files as movies, TVs or games we require an 
extensive list of titles against which to match the file names. The plain text data 
files provided by the Internet Movie Database (IMDb 2016) suit our purpose well 
enough as a proof of concept. We used the IMDbPY framework (IMDbPY 2015) to 
import the data into a MySQL database (MySQL 2015). The composition of the 
original IMDb data is quite complex, so we only cover the parts relevant for this 
thesis. 
The most significant information for us was: 
 the title itself;  
 its production year, which is very important as it normally appears in file 
names and also helps distinguish between same titles released at different 
times;  
 the category of the item translated into our taxonomy;  
 whether the title is an episode and of which TV series or show.  
Movie titles in the database also contain some porn movies, which is useful for 
porn detection, but the list is very limited. Table 5 outlines an estimated 
distribution of content titles found in the original IMDb data, which is polluted to 
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a degree by the imperfect import method that produced a number of duplicates 
and some broken relations between items. 
In addition to a large list of TV shows, episodes and movies, the data set included 
a limited number of gaming titles and even some alternative names to capture 
cases such as when the same movie was released under different titles around the 
world including official translations into other languages. It is important to note, 
however, that this list is not comprehensive, and contains a lot of noise produced 
by the IMDbPY import procedure. 
We attempted to improve the database by removing duplicates and very 
ambiguous titles as the IMDb seems to store some impractical data e.g. titles ‘2’ 
(IMDb 2015b), ‘01’ (IMDb 2015a), ‘Air’ (IMDb 2015c) etc., which are entries for 
abandoned projects, works in progress, place holders or other unreleased items 
that may be subject to change in future. We also filtered out some erroneous data 
imported from IMDb plain text files by IMDbPY. The basic filtering rule in both 
these cases was a missing production year, which accounts for 14.42% of the total 
number from Table 5. We decided to import only those titles from IMDb which 
had been previously rated by their visitors. 
Additionally, the following Boolean criteria were applied to each title item: 
 not an episode;  
 not a short video (but can be a series comprised of short episodes);  
 has production year.  
The rationale is to limit the data to significant items only and reduce the chance of 
a false positive identification, which inevitably increases with a bigger vocabulary 
of longer titles. We also decided to ignore TV episode names because they were 
observed extremely rarely in torrent names (1 out of 2500 in one of the data sets), 
yet required a lot of processing time to match, and contributed to many false 
positives. 
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Title Category Original Count Filtered Count 
TV Episode 1,812,676 0 
Movie 1,018,507 344,176 
Game 14,125 6,169 
TV Series and Shows 110,796 43,033 
Alternative titles 389,549 233,529 
Total 3,345,653 626,907 
Table 5: Original and Filtered Count of Titles per Category in the Title Database 
While importing the titles, apart from mapping them into our taxonomy, we 
introduced a property ‘stripped’ that represents the title string with sequences of 
any non-alphanumeric Unicode characters replaced by a space. This new attribute 
is used later to compare a title item to a torrent name. After importing titles and 
their alternative naming we found a large number of duplicate entries in the 
‘stripped’ column. This was caused by three different cases:  
1. multiple same titles released in the same year;  
2. original titles clashing with alternative naming from other titles;  
3. multiple same alternative naming for one or more titles; so we had to prune 
these as well. 
Final title data can be found in Appendix Section C.1. Chapter 4 explains in detail 
how we use the titles to improve classification. There are many limitations to the 
ways we exploit title data and they are highlighted in the Future Work Section 7.3 
along with some suggestions for improvement. 
To enable porn detection we captured some of the names of porn actresses from 
Adult Film Database (Adult Film Database 2015) since they appear very often in 
porn file names. Extracting suitable names requires filtering to prevent a large 
number of false positive identifications due to some actors’ names being either too 
short or too common. We restricted the list to actresses only, because names of 
male actors rarely appear in file names. We set the career starting year filter to 1980 
because older actors appeared in a tiny number of file names. We then limited this 
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list (see Appendix Section C.2) to unique names only and filtered out names where 
either the name or the surname were shorter than 3 characters long, or the whole 
name was shorter than 9 characters long. While this approach provided a starting 
ground for improved porn detection, a more appropriate data set is in the long 
term improvement plans. We expanded this information by a short list of porn 
studios (see Appendix Section C.3), which can also be sometimes detected in the 
torrent name. 
2.5. Data Samples 
As indicated earlier, torrent names are formed voluntarily and freely by their 
individual publishers and therefore do not abide by any specific naming rules, 
formats or convention. This leads to names that can be inaccurate or plainly 
misleading. Some names are obfuscated either by mistake, or intentionally, to 
disable automatic detection of illegal or malicious content. Hence, often the torrent 
file name may provide little insight into its true contents. The only way to truly 
identify and classify a torrent is to download it and run it all the way through – an 
impossible task for anything other than a small sample. There have been very small 
samples analysed manually for legal and research purposes (MovieLabs 2012), but 
most research is based on analysis of aggregated statistics as indicated in (Smith & 
Telang 2012). 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (Amazon Mechanical Turk 2015) is an online 
crowdsourcing platform that enables, for example, researchers to contract human 
participants to perform experiments, such as torrent identification and 
classification given a particular taxonomy. An attempt was made to develop a 
‘ground truth’ sample of 2500 items classified and identified by human 
participants of the Amazon Mechanical Turk in (Tonkin et al. 2013). This study 
demonstrated that the performance of untrained participants was poor and unfit 
to qualify as a reliable sample for baseline comparison. 
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In an attempt to address this issue we hired and trained three individuals (called 
later HP for ‘human panel’) to provide us with classifications and identifications 
for our own sample set. The original set of items collected (DS2500) formed our 
own basis for domain knowledge, which was incorporated into Toran together 
with MovieLabs’ expertise and title database. However, when we attempted to 
verify the true contents of the items in this set, it became apparent that it was 
impossible due to the majority of items being non-downloadable. 
We proceeded to collect another set of items from recently captured torrents and 
gathered 600 items out of which 121 items were successfully verified. 
Consequently, we divided this collection into DS120 (the set of 121 verified items) 
and DS480 (the remaining 479 items) such that the latter would be the validation 
set and the former would serve as the ultimate test set with truly known 
classifications and identities of items. 
The human classifiers were of European origin, two males and a female, in their 
twenties. Two of them have higher education and they all speak English and 
Russian fluently, which is important since these languages are the top two used in 
torrent naming. All humans classified items independently from each other, at 
their own pace during multiple sessions. Although the same copy of the data set 
was issued to the classifiers, they did not always process items in the order given. 
It is possible that their accuracy was declining within each session due to fatigue, 
but they were free to design their own schedule for processing items. 
The classifiers were instructed to choose the category that they felt could best be 
associated with each item. If in doubt, they were supposed to either select the most 
likely category, or choose ‘unknown’ if truly unsure. In addition to selecting 
medium category they also classified items as ‘porn’ or ‘not porn’ with a possibility 
to fall back to ‘unknown’ in the uncertain cases. 
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Figure 2: Composition of Data Sets according to Human Classifiers 
The category distributions given by human classifiers, including the proportion of 
‘unknown’ verdicts, for DS2500, DS480 and DS120 is shown in Figure 2. 
Some items were classified by humans into different categories, be it in error or 
resulting from a different understanding of the class taxonomy. In order to choose 
a single human classification we employed a majority vote strategy, such that a 
category is selected for an item if it has at least 2 out of 3 votes. This classification 
can then be used to compare against a prediction made by an automated classifier. 
If, however, a classification could not be established by majority vote or it was 
‘unknown’, the item would not be used to estimate performance of automated 
classifiers. 
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
P
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
DS2500 DS480 DS120
49 
 
 
Figure 3: DS2500 and DS480 Composition according to Average and Majority Voting 
Figure 3 compares class distribution in DS2500 and DS480 according to average 
voting versus majority voting. Note that this strategy is irrelevant for DS120 
because it contains verified items and predictions made by automated agents are 
evaluated against the real state of items, rather than against the human 
approximation of the true state. 
a) DS2500: Knowledge Set 
We could not use items from (Tonkin et al. 2013) data set as they did not include 
item hash identifiers, so we collected a sample of the same size from the MovieLabs 
database. The collection method relies on requesting a limited number of items 
from the database by supplying a portion of a hash code as prefix. It is unclear 
whether the MVL attempts to return a representative sub-sample as a response to 
such query. Tonkin et al. compared a few such sets and concluded that they share 
a similar category (as classified by MVL) spread and torrent discovery date spread. 
Using Bayesian inference (assuming uniform priors for the different categories), 
we have calculated the posterior population distributions for each category, based 
on observed frequency (by majority vote) of categories in DS2500. 
Table 6 shows the mean and 95 percentile ranges for these posterior distributions 
(in classical statistical terms these correspond essentially to the 95% confidence 
intervals, although strictly – and more usefully - what they tell is that there is a 
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90% chance that the true value lies between the stated range, e.g. 14.56 to 17.02 for 
the true percentage of items in the category “Audio: Music”).  
  
 Population Estimate 
Margin Percentile 
Category 
DS2500 
Count 
Estimated 
Mean % Value 
Lower (5%) Upper (95%) 
Audio: Music 321 15.78 14.56 17.02 
Audio: OST 9 0.50 0.26 0.79 
Audio: Other 10 0.54 0.30 0.84 
Image 55 2.74 2.17 3.36 
Mixed 0 0.05 0.00 0.15 
Software: Game 87 4.31 3.61 5.06 
Software: Other 193 9.50 8.50 10.54 
Text: Book 85 4.21 3.51 4.95 
Text: Magazine 23 1.17 0.81 1.59 
Text: Other 4 0.25 0.10 0.45 
Video: Movie 562 27.60 26.16 29.06 
Video: Other 295 14.50 13.31 15.71 
Video: TV 385 18.91 17.62 20.23 
Table 6: Population Estimate based on DS2500 with Margins 
We may draw a general impression of the population based on composition of 
DS2500, subject to the margins of error in Table 6. 
While some of the categories are poorly represented in the sample (and hence 
require larger proportional confidence intervals), it is important to note that this 
research concerns a knowledge-based approach to classification, and is focused 
primarily on such categories as video and software. With regards to DS2500 we 
were aiming to learn what kind of items are posted as torrents, and incorporate a 
generalised version of this knowledge into the bigger classification framework. 
Apart from acquiring domain knowledge from DS2500 we also used it for tuning 
the Toran prototype and compared its performance against the MVL system. Once 
we achieved a considerable improvement over MVL, we went on to test Toran on 
other data sets. When evaluating predictions on DS2500 we have to assume the 
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human classifications as the actual state of the items, because the ultimate true state 
is unknown to us. 
Full results of Toran and MVL versus human approximation of the item 
classifications are given in Sections 6.1 and 6.3 and the complete data set is 
available in Appendix Section D.1. 
b) DS480: Validation Set 
DS480 is not a part of DS2500 and consists of 479 items collected from a live stream 
of recently discovered torrents, but is similar in that its items are not verified and 
we only have human classifications to take as the approximation of the true item 
state. We did not incorporate any knowledge from this set into the Toran 
configuration to ensure that it provided us with a clear idea of the method’s 
performance. 
MVL and Toran are compared on this set against human classifications in Chapter 
6 and the complete data set is available in Appendix Section D.2. 
c) DS120: Test Set 
DS120 contains 121 items collected, similarly to DS480, from a live stream of 
recently discovered torrents. However, in contrast to DS480, in this set we were 
able to verify contents of all files. It is different from DS2500 and DS480 in that it 
allows us to evaluate performance of human classifiers as well as automated 
classifier agents. 
We recognise that the size of DS120 is lower than preferable to provide a very 
reliable assessment of accuracy. However, obtaining a fully verified set even of this 
size was a major challenge, since to verify the contents of a torrent requires us to 
fully download and inspect/play it in its entirety.  Moreover, there are a number 
of practical challenges that limited our ability to download and verify items. For 
example: 
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 Many torrents fail to start downloading or become unavailable 
prematurely, even if discovered recently. 
 Torrents often maintain a low or unreliable download speed while taking 
up space in the download queue. 
 When torrents are downloaded, precautions must be made to avoid 
malware while verifying content. 
The sheer volume of traffic makes real verification a remarkably difficult task. For 
example, the data contained in torrents from DS120, DS480 and DS2500 alone 
amount to 4.6 terabytes, which is over 250 hours of continuous download on a full-
speed average Internet connection (Ofcom Communications 2013). 
Also, due to the nature of file sharing systems, the full speed download is not 
guaranteed; many torrents quickly become unavailable and in many cases full 
verification is impossible.  
Figure 4 shows the actual medium class distribution in DS120. 
  
Figure 4: Verified Composition of DS120 
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We compare humans, MVL and Toran predictions to the verified classifications, 
estimate their accuracy on actual data and provide a confidence interval in Chapter 
6. The complete data set is available in appendix Section D.3. 
d) Fakes and Malware Data Set (DSFM): Test Set 
One of our core research objectives was to design a coherent framework which can 
improve detection of high risk files such as fakes and malware. We consider a torrent 
to be a fake if it was created to mislead the public rather than share its supposed 
original content. For example, the torrent from Figure 1 contains the name of a TV 
series and some information about the video quality and encoding, so it clearly 
attempts to communicate that the torrent contains a video file. Yet, if the torrent 
actually contains a malicious executable file, which in this particular case is given 
away by the ‘.exe’ file extension, it is then a fake. Note that the same name can be 
used by a fake and a legitimate torrent, for example, ‘Gone Girl (2014) HDRIP AVI’ 
may be a broken video in the former case and the actual movie in the latter. 
Torrents with encrypted names that aim to avoid automatic detection are not 
considered fake in this context. Another interesting case are items named like ‘San 
Andreas AVI’. Such a torrent may contain the movie ‘San Andreas’ (2015), or a 
holiday video made by somebody who spent a weekend in San Andreas and 
wanted to share it with their friends. In both cases it would not be a fake, because 
it does not claim to be (or not be) the movie, specifically. 
Some torrents also contain malware e.g. malicious executable code of undeclared 
purpose. Most commonly, malware is correlated with fakes but, in theory, any 
piece of software can be infected with malware that piggybacks on the actual 
advertised functionality of the application. 
We attempted to establish whether humans, who are specifically instructed to be 
alert and suspicious, are able to identify fakes. We then compared their results to 
Toran’s performance. 
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We also gained some insight into how humans perform this task. The reasoning 
provided by human participants suggests that, apart from intuition, humans 
evaluate the risk of a fake by checking whether: 
 they see any unrecognised keywords in the file name 
 the file size is lower than expected 
 the movie was released at the moment of classification, and whether it was 
released in a digital format specifically 
We downloaded and verified 100 items that looked like movie torrents from a live 
feed of items recently discovered by the MovieLabs torrent tracker. None of these 
items appear in any of our other data sets. 
We presented the human participants with a choice of three options per item: 
 Fake – item is not the movie it claims to be 
 Malware – not only the item is a fake, but it also is (contains) malware 
 None – the item is actually the movie it claims to be 
Class Count 
Fake and Malware 23 
Fake not Malware 23 
None 54 
Total 100 
Table 7: Fakes and Malware Distribution in DSFM 
Table 7 shows class distribution in DSFM. While again we would have preferred a 
larger test set, it provides grounds for establishing the feasibility of our method. 
The complete data set, including the verdicts given by individual human 
participants, is available in appendix Section D.4. Comparison between human 
and Toran’s performance are given in Chapter 6. 
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e) Bitsnoop Data Set (DSBS): Test Set 
A classification system that is supposed to be autonomous should be tested in a 
live environment outside of the lab conditions under which it was developed. For 
such a test we gathered, over the course of several weeks, torrents from a live feed 
of a popular tracker (BitSnoop 2015) that claims to index more than 24 million 
torrents from more than 350 other. BitSnoop seems to focus on items that are music, 
games, software applications, books, movies and TV programmes. This means that 
many categories that are available to Toran for selection are actually absent from 
the set of true categories, leading to potentially higher error rate and increased 
number of false positives. It also means that our prior expectations about the 
distribution of medium across the item collection is only partially suitable for this 
data set. 
Bitsnoop Category Toran Medium 
Audio Audio 
Audio » Lossless Audio: Music 
Audio » Music Audio: Music 
Games Software: Game 
Games » Mac Software: Game 
Games » PC Software: Game 
Games » Playstation Software: Game 
Games » PSP Software: Game 
Games » X-Box Software: Game 
Other N/A 
Other » Comics Text: Book 
Other » Ebooks Text: Book 
Other » Pictures Image 
Software Software: Other 
Software » Mac Software: Other 
Software » Mobile Software: Other 
Software » PC Software: Other 
Software » Unix Software: Other 
Video Video 
Video » Anime Video: TV 
Video » Movies Video: Movie 
Video » Music Video: Other 
Video » TV Video: TV 
Table 8: Categories in the BitSnoop Data Set and Mapping to Toran Taxonomy 
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Table 8 demonstrates the categories found in the BitSnoop data set and how we 
map them into our own taxonomy.  
We do not know exactly how BitSnoop populate their database and what is the 
classification procedure (if any), but we do know that it is quite different from the 
one followed by MovieLabs. Our attempts to contact BitSnoop for clarification 
were ignored, so we consider this experiment at face value. Crucially, some items 
at BitSnoop are misclassified or only partially classified. 
VA - Finding Neverland (The Album) [2015] [OST] [CDRiP] [MP3-VBR] [GloDLS] 
Figure 5: Example of a Partially Classified Item in BitSnoop Data Set 
For example, the torrent in Figure 5 of size 100MB is listed at BitSnoop as “Audio”; 
however, we can clearly see that it is, in fact, “Audio: Soundtrack” for the movie 
‘Finding Neverland’ (2004). 
Дядя Деда / Uncle Grandpa [35 серий из ?] (2013) SATRip от New-Team | D 
Figure 6: Example of a Misclassified Item in BitSnoop Data Set 
Another example of a misclassified item is presented in Figure 6, which is 5,680MB 
and is listed as “Video: Movie”, while it actually is a “Video: TV”. 
In order to provide a coherent comparison, we attempted to obtain MVL 
classifications for items collected from BitSnoop. However, since MVL does not 
index all of BitSnoop items, we had to limit the data set only to include torrents 
that had a full classification provided by BitSnoop while at the same time indexed 
by MVL.  
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Figure 7: Composition of DSBS According to BitSnoop 
The final size of DSBS is 45,209 items. Figure 7 shows the class distribution in DSBS 
according to full categories translated from classifications provided by BitSnoop. 
The complete data set is available in Appendix Section D.5. The results and 
comparison between Toran and MVL performance are given in Section 6.4. 
2.6. Classification and Evaluation Methods 
This thesis is ultimately concerned with classification of generic ill-formed media 
items in order to process them into an organised data structure. Automated 
classification was pioneered as text classification, also called text categorisation 
(TC), which is an important area of research dating back more than half a century 
(Maron 1961; Borko & Bernick 1963). The most common uses for TC currently 
include automatic indexing or tagging, multimedia categorisation, author 
identification, language identification, text filtering (e.g. document relevance or 
spam filters), word sense disambiguation etc. TC essentially relies on breaking up 
a document into words, phrases or fragments (normally called terms) and working 
out the document category based on the term it contains. A torrent name is a text 
string (i.e. ‘document’) and consists of keywords and titles (i.e. ‘terms’), which is 
why we consider TC relevant to our work. 
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A classical approach to classification employs knowledge engineering (Studer et 
al. 1998) practices such that a domain expert defines a set of membership rules for 
each category or class, and the items that satisfy the criteria are assigned to the 
relevant category automatically. While allowing for accurate definition and 
adjustment of conditions to achieve very good results (Hayes et al. 1990), such 
systems have a major drawback in the form of knowledge acquisition bottleneck, 
meaning that every amendment to the classification scheme requires intervention 
of a domain expert to define or fix the membership rules. 
In the past 20 years the newly emerged field of machine learning (Mitchell 1996) 
became increasingly focused on automated TC (Sebastiani 2002). The main idea 
behind this approach is to use sets of pre-classified documents called training sets, 
to allow a machine learning (ML) algorithm to devise a strategy for categorising 
the documents in such a way that they logically fall into defined categories, and 
then extrapolate this strategy and apply it for future classification. 
Ultimately, a categorisation decision can be either Boolean (also ‘hard’) or ranked. 
The former specifies whether an item is assigned to a category or not, while the 
latter computes the rank of each possible assignment. Boolean classification is 
widely used in automated systems, while ranked systems are extremely useful for 
providing viable decision support in terms of categorisation options to a human 
operator who makes the final classification decision. 
One of the benefits of ML over KE in classification is the ability to devise 
classification rules automatically with little or no knowledge specifically encoded 
into the process, based simply on correlations within the training set. However, 
this also is a drawback because it provides no coherent way of recognising the 
difference between correlation and causation, and requires a sufficiently large set 
of verified training data. 
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 Brief Introduction to Document Classification 
A typical classification algorithm has to transform a document into a compact 
representation of its content before it can interpret it. A popular way to model a 
document is to process it into a vector of term weights (Salton et al. 1975). 
Depending on the algorithm, a term can be defined as either a word or a phrase. 
Furthermore, a phrase can be motivated either syntactically (Lewis 1992) (i.e. 
according to the language grammar), or statistically (Caropreso et al. 2001) (i.e. as 
a set or a sequence of words which form patterns statistically significant in the 
document). There are many ways to calculate the weights of each term, as long as 
they accurately denote the significance of the term within the document. 
The term frequency / inverse document frequency (TF-IDF) (Salton 1989) is a classical 
measure used for specifying word weights. According to this technique, each 
document 𝑑𝑗 is defined by a vector of TF-IDF weights for the top K most significant 
keywords in the item. For document classification, K was found to be optimal 
around 100 (Pazzani et al. 1996; Balabanović 1997). Each such weight for keyword 
𝑘𝑖 is defined as a product of term frequency of 𝑘𝑖 in 𝑑𝑗 and inverse document frequency 
for 𝑘𝑖: 
𝑤𝑖 = 𝑇𝐹𝑖,𝑗 × 𝐼𝐷𝐹𝑖 (1) 
𝑇𝐹𝑖,𝑗 is the measure of relevance of the keyword in the document, while 𝐼𝐷𝐹𝑖 is 
inversely proportional to relevance of the keyword to the whole document 
collection. When documents are compared, words frequently found in the 
collection as a whole are considered to be less important than the rarer terms. 
Normalisation is then performed to remove bias towards longer documents. 
Before calculating the term weights, in most cases function words are removed (e.g. 
conjunctions, prepositions, articles etc). Then stemming (Lovins 1968; Porter 1980) 
is applied, which reduces all words to their morphological roots e.g. reducing 
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‘arguing’, ‘argue’, ‘argus’, ‘argued’ and ‘argues’ to the stem ‘argu’, which itself is 
not a vocabulary word. Sometimes, however, it is more sensible to leave the text 
unchanged before performing classification, for example, to establish authorship 
of a disputed document. In such case a particular importance may lie with the 
frequency of words e.g. ‘because’ or ‘though’ used by the author. 
The term categorisation status value (CSV) is used in ranked inductive classifiers and 
is defined as a number between 0 and 1. It represents a degree to which a document 
belongs to a category, and which is returned by the CSV function. The CSV 
function can be defined in a number of ways, but among the most popular is the 
naïve Bayes approach. In case of Boolean categorisation, the CSV function can 
return a true or false value. Alternatively, it may be derived from a ranked function  
by using a threshold to automatically make a decision whether the rank implies 
true or false, which is similar to how a human expert might reason. The threshold 
can be defined either analytically or statistically. The former includes probability 
membership estimations and decision-theoretic measures (e.g. utility, or the 
benefit). The latter involves testing different values of the threshold on a validation 
set in order to optimise it. This approach is called thresholding and includes two 
additional variants: proportional thresholding which is based on the assumption that 
the number of documents assigned to a category from the training set is 
proportional to that of the test set; and fixed thresholding which adjusts the 
threshold in a way that every document is assigned to a fixed number of categories. 
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 Naïve Bayesian Classifiers 
While Bayes’ theorem and Bayesian networks are covered in Chapter 3, this sub-
section briefly introduces the context for its use with regards to this thesis. 
Capturing the essential uncertainty about an item belonging to a particular 
category is possible in the framework of probabilistic classification, such as with a 
Bayesian classifier. 
In this case the CSV function can be defined as: 
𝐶𝑆𝑉(𝑑) = 𝑃(𝑐|𝑑) (2) 
where it returns a probability 𝑃(𝑐|𝑑) that an arbitrary item 𝑑, which is represented 
by a vector of weights 𝑑 belongs to a particular category 𝑐. Probability 𝑃(𝑐|𝑑) also 
depends on related probabilities 𝑃(𝑐), which is the probability that an arbitrarily 
selected item belongs to the category 𝑐; 𝑃(𝑑), which is the probability that an 
arbitrarily selected item is described by the vector of weights 𝑑; and 𝑃(𝑑|𝑐), which 
is the probability that an arbitrary item from category 𝑐 is described by the vector 
𝑑, according to: 
𝑃(𝑐|𝑑) =  
𝑃(𝑐) 𝑃(𝑑|𝑐)
𝑃(𝑑)
 (3) 
Calculating 𝑃(𝑑|𝑐), however, is problematic due to the large number of possible 
terms and their weights. 
  
Figure 8: Naïve Bayes Illustration 
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One of the ways of resolving this problem is by using the principle of naïve Bayes 
(Duda & Hart 1973; Lewis 1998), which is illustrated in Figure 8 where an item 𝑑 
is described by a vector 𝑑 = {𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑛} where 𝑤1 through 𝑤𝑛 are term weights 
and 𝑛 is the total number of terms in the document vector. In fact, most Bayesian 
classifiers or recommender systems are ultimately based on the idea of a naïve 
Bayesian learning approach that assumes event independence i.e. that attributes 
(e.g. terms) appear in a document completely independently. Although this is 
logically wrong, such classifiers were proven to be very effective (Langley et al. 
1992; Sahami 1996; Friedman 1997; Friedman et al. 1997), especially for text-based 
classification. Once the independence is assumed, it becomes possible to link terms 
to categories directly: 
𝑃(𝑑|𝑐) =  ∏𝑃(𝑤𝑖|𝑐)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 (4) 
where probability 𝑃(𝑑|𝑐) is the product of probabilities of individual weights 
observed within the category 𝑐. 
Considering the example torrent from Figure 1 and its ‘terms’ given in Table 1, we 
may encode the item according to the semantic type of its terms. For simplicity, we 
may express this as {TV title, season and episode, video information, executable 
extension}. Each of these terms would have a particular probability of appearing 
for a given category, such as, for example, ‘TV title’ and ‘season and episode’ are 
very likely for items in the “Video: TV” category and unlikely for other categories, 
while ‘executable extension’ is likely for “Software” and unlikely for others. 
Term 
Weight for 
“Video: TV” 
Weight for 
“Software” 
TV title 0.90 0.001 
Season and episode 0.85 0.001 
Video information 0.90 0.001 
Executable extension 0.0001 0.9 
Table 9: Term Weights Illustration for Example in Table 1 
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We calculate 𝑃(𝑑|𝑐) for each category according to Equation 4 and compare them: 
𝑃(𝑑|𝑐 = "𝑉𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜: 𝑇𝑉") =  0.9 × 0.85 × 0.9 × 0.0001 ≈ 2.52 × 10−5 
𝑃(𝑑|𝑐 = "𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒") =  0.001 × 0.001 × 0.001 × 0.9 ≈ 9.00 × 10−7 
(5) 
where “Video: TV” ends up being the more likely category. 
As we will explain in Chapter 3 the Toran system is an extension of a Bayesian 
classifier, but with a richer causal structure and without many of the unrealistic 
term independence assumptions (the necessary model is a Bayesian network).  The 
necessary Bayesian inference calculations required are much more complex than 
those of a naïve Bayesian classifier, but can be performed using Bayesian network 
tools. 
 Terms of Accuracy 
Multiple methods exist to measure the quality of classification results that can be 
assessed either analytically or experimentally. The analytical evaluation normally 
implies a proof that a system is complete and correct, which may be difficult to 
define and prove. In the case of multiple and subjective categories, it is argued in 
(Sebastiani 2002) that the problem cannot be properly formalised. Hence, 
evaluation is usually performed experimentally, often with an accent on 
effectiveness of the system (i.e. the degree of correctness of the classifier) rather 
than its efficiency. 
Binary (e.g. Boolean) classification results are often measured in terms of true 
positives (TP), true negatives (TN), false positives (FP) and false negatives (FN). Table 
10 illustrates these terms of accuracy given possible combinations of predicted and 
actual states. 
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  Actual State 
  False True 
Predicted State 
False TN FN 
True FP TP 
Table 10: Terms of Accuracy 
Among the most popular metrics are precision 𝜋 and recall 𝜌 (also known as 
sensitivity), which are classical measures in IR, and can be naturally applied to 
classification. 
In general, precision 𝜋 of a system (also called positive predictive value) on a given 
set of items is equal to the proportion of correct instances of classification out of 
the whole set of positive decisions performed: 
𝜋 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 +  𝐹𝑃
, 0 ≤ 𝜋 ≤ 1 (6) 
Recall 𝜌, also called sensitivity, is the number of correct positive classifications out 
of the number of actual positives: 
𝜌 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 +  𝐹𝑁
, 0 ≤ 𝜌 ≤ 1 (7) 
Two different variations for calculating recall and precision are possible: 
macroaveraging where individual category values are calculated and then an overall 
category average is taken; or microaveraging where all classifications from all 
categories are averaged. 
Specificity 𝛾 is a measure of how well a system is able to detect negative results, 
which is similar to recall/sensitivity, which is concerned with how well a system is 
able to detect positive results. 
𝛾 =
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 +  𝐹𝑃
, 0 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1 (8) 
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The above metrics are combined by the f-measure (also 𝐹1 score), which is the 
harmonic mean of precision and recall and is more tolerant to outliers than other 
means: 
𝐹1 = 2 ×
𝜋 × 𝜌
𝜋 + 𝜌
, 0 ≤ 𝐹1 ≤ 1 (9) 
The 𝐹𝛽 variant provides an ability to weight precision or recall higher than the other 
by adjusting the value of 𝛽: 
𝐹𝛽 = (1 + 𝛽
2) ×
𝜋 × 𝜌
𝛽2 × 𝜋 + 𝜌
, 0 ≤ 𝐹𝛽 ≤ 1 (10) 
In essence, recall is 𝛽 times more important than precision. 
The above measures were criticised in (Powers 2011) for not using the false negatives 
and hence being susceptible to manipulation by biased predictions. Matthews 
correlation coefficient (MCC) (Matthews 1975) is a metric which utilises all results 
of the classification and is generally considered to be more balanced and suitable 
even if classes vary highly in size. 
𝑀𝐶𝐶 =
𝑇𝑃 × 𝑇𝑁 − 𝐹𝑃 × 𝐹𝑁
√(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃)(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)(𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃)(𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁)
,−1 ≤ 𝑀𝐶𝐶 ≤ 1 (11) 
MCC returns a value from -1 to 1, where 1 means perfectly correct classification, 0 
is neither better nor worse than random and -1 is complete disagreement with the 
true state. 
An additional evaluation criteria is accuracy  𝛼, which measures how well a binary 
classifier categorises all items, implying that not pairing  𝑑 to 𝑐 requires a specific 
choice not to; and is defined as: 
𝛼 =
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 +  𝐹𝑁
, 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1 (12) 
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 Probabilistic Prediction Metrics 
Probabilistic predictions are made in the form of a prediction vector, which is 
composed of probabilities assigned to each of the possible classes, such that all of 
them add up to 1. We introduce here several scoring rules, which we apply to our 
method in Chapter 5. 
We define the actual state of an item as: 
𝑆𝑅 = {𝑆𝑐1
𝑅 , … , 𝑆𝑐𝑘
𝑅 },      
𝑐 ∈  𝐶
𝑘 = |𝐶|
 (13) 
where 𝑆𝑅 is a set of weights assigned to each state 𝑐 of the item’s actual 
classification, 𝐶 is the set of all possible states, and 𝑘 is the size of 𝐶. To illustrate, 
let there be 4 possible states: “Video”, “Audio”, “Software” and “Text”. An item 
that is, in fact, a “Video”, would be encoded as a vector by assigning a value of 1 
to “Video” and values of 0 to all other categories: 
𝑆𝑅1 = { 
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑉𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜) = 1.0
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑜) = 0.0
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒) = 0.0
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡) = 0.0
 (14) 
A prediction vector 𝑆𝑃 is the same as 𝑆𝑅, and 𝑆𝑐
𝑃 denotes the predicted weight of 
category 𝑐 in the item’s classification. To illustrate how accuracy is compared let 
𝑆𝑃1, 𝑆𝑃2 and 𝑆𝑃3 be different predictions expressed by vectors: 
𝑆𝑃1 = { 
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑉𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜) = 0.75
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑜) = 0.05
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒) = 0.10
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡) = 0.10
 
𝑆𝑃2 = { 
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑉𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜) = 0.25
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑜) = 0.25
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒) = 0.25
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡) = 0.25
 
𝑆𝑃3 = { 
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑉𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜) = 0.25
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑜) = 0.65
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒) = 0.05
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡) = 0.05
 
(15) 
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Brier score (BS) was introduced in (Brier 1950) and is one of the most popular 
metrics. It is equal to the sum of squared differences between predicted and actual 
probability values for each class or state: 
𝐵𝑆(𝑆𝑅 , 𝑆𝑃) = ∑(𝑆𝑐
𝑃 − 𝑆𝑐
𝑅)2
𝑐 ∈ 𝐶
,     0 ≤  𝐵𝑆 ≤ 2 (16) 
Where 𝐵𝑆(𝑆𝑅, 𝑆𝑃) is the Brier score, calculated for a pair of probability vectors, 𝐶 is 
the set of possible classes, 𝑐 is a particular class such that 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶, 𝑆𝑐
𝑅 is the true state 
proportion of the item within category 𝑐 (e.g. 𝑆𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜
𝑅 = 1 and 𝑆𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑜
𝑅 = 0) and 𝑆𝑐
𝑃 is 
the predicted proportion of the item within 𝑐. Higher values of BS correspond to 
worse predictions, because it is an error metric, while 𝐵𝑆 = 0 is indicative of a 
perfect prediction. 
𝐵𝑆(𝑆𝑅 , 𝑆𝑃1) = 𝑠𝑢𝑚
{
 
 
(0.75 − 1)2
(0.05 − 0)2
(0.10 − 0)2
(0.10 − 0)2}
 
 
≈ 0.02
𝐵𝑆(𝑆𝑅 , 𝑆𝑃2) = 𝑠𝑢𝑚
{
 
 
(0.25 − 1)2
(0.25 − 0)2
(0.25 − 0)2
(0.25 − 0)2}
 
 
= 0.75
𝐵𝑆(𝑆𝑅 , 𝑆𝑃3) = 𝑠𝑢𝑚
{
 
 
(0.25 − 1)2
(0.65 − 0)2
(0.05 − 0)2
(0.05 − 0)2}
 
 
= 0.99
 (17) 
Equation 17 illustrates how BS is calculated for different prediction vectors from 
example above. Note that average Brier score over the whole data set is equal to 
mean squared error, and when there are only 2 possible classes, i.e. classification is 
binary, BS is also equal to error rate. 
Absolute error (AE) (Armstrong 2001; Hyndman & Koehler 2006) considers only 
the absolute difference between the prediction and the actual state. When the true 
state is a single category, AE is equal to the difference between 1 and the predicted 
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probability of the item to belong to the correct category, hence 0 denotes a perfect 
match while 1 means a complete mismatch. 
𝐴𝐸(𝑆𝑅 , 𝑆𝑃) = 1 − 𝑃(𝑆𝑐𝐴
𝑃 = 𝑆𝑐𝐴
𝑅 ),    0 ≤  𝐴𝐸 ≤ 1 (18) 
where 𝑐𝐴 denotes the actual category of the item. Equation 19 shows AE calculated 
for all three predictions from the example above. Note that AE does not 
discriminate between wrong predictions that spread the probability over multiple 
classes, and strong erroneous predictions of a single class. 
𝐴𝐸(𝑆𝑅 , 𝑆𝑃1) = 1 − 0.75 = 0.25
𝐴𝐸(𝑆𝑅 , 𝑆𝑃2) = 1 − 0.25 = 0.75
𝐴𝐸(𝑆𝑅 , 𝑆𝑃3) = 1 − 0.25 = 0.75
 (19) 
Average AE over a set of multiple items is called mean average (percentage) error 
(MAE). Over the set of examples in Equation 19 MAE is 0.58. 
Quadratic scoring rule (QS) (Brier 1950) is defined as the sum of squares of each 
predicted class subtracted from twice the correct portion of prediction 𝑆𝑐𝐴
𝑃 : 
𝑄𝑆(𝑆𝑅, 𝑆𝑃) = 2 × 𝑆𝑐𝐴
𝑃 − ∑(𝑆𝑐
𝑃)2
𝑐 ∈ 𝐶
,    − 1 ≤  𝑄𝑆 ≤ 1 (20) 
We can apply this metric to the examples above and arrive at the set of results: 
𝑄𝑆(𝑆𝑅, 𝑆𝑃1) = 2 × 0.75 − (0.752 + 0.052 + 0.12 + 0.12) ≈ 1.5 − 0.58 ≈ 0.92
𝑄𝑆(𝑆𝑅, 𝑆𝑃2) = 2 × 0.25 − (0.252 + 0.252 + 0.252 + 0.252) = 0.5 − 0.25 = 0.25
𝑄𝑆(𝑆𝑅, 𝑆𝑃3) = 2 × 0.25 − (0.252 + 0.652 + 0.052 + 0.052) = 0.5 − 0.49 = 0.01
 (21) 
Unlike BS or AE, a higher QS value is indicative of a better prediction. 
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Spherical scoring rule (SS) (Roby 1964) is defined as the correct portion of 
prediction 𝑆𝑐𝐴
𝑃  over the magnitude of the prediction vector ‖𝑆𝑃‖: 
𝑆𝑆(𝑆𝑅 , 𝑆𝑃) =
𝑆𝑐𝐴
𝑃
‖𝑆𝑃‖
=
𝑆𝑐𝐴
𝑃
√∑ (𝑆𝑐
𝑃)2𝑐 ∈ 𝐶
,    0 ≤  𝑆𝑆 ≤ 1 (22) 
Applied to examples above, 
𝑆𝑆(𝑆𝑅 , 𝑆𝑃1) =
0.75
√0.585
≈ 0.98
𝑆𝑆(𝑆𝑅 , 𝑆𝑃2) =
0.25
√0.25
= 0.50
𝑆𝑆(𝑆𝑅 , 𝑆𝑃3) =
0.25
√0.49
≈ 0.36
 (23) 
Similarly to QS, a higher SS means better prediction. Note how BS, QS and SS are 
sensitive to the confidence of the wrong predictions, issuing a higher penalty to 
prediction vectors with erroneous predictions of bigger magnitude. 
Logarithmic scoring (LS) (Toda 1963; Shuford et al. 1966) rule is defined as a 
logarithm of the correct portion of the prediction 𝑆𝑐𝐴
𝑃  to an arbitrary base 𝑛: 
𝐿𝑆(𝑆𝑅 , 𝑆𝑃) = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛(𝑆𝑐𝐴
𝑃 ),      
−∞ ≤  𝐿𝑆 ≤ 0
𝑛 > 0
 (24) 
Applied to examples above, 
𝐿𝑆(𝑆𝑅, 𝑆𝑃1) = log(0.75) ≈ −0.13
𝐿𝑆(𝑆𝑅, 𝑆𝑃2) = log(0.25) ≈ −0.60
𝐿𝑆(𝑆𝑅, 𝑆𝑃3) = log(0.25) ≈ −0.60
 (25) 
Higher LS also expresses better prediction, however there are several differences 
from the metrics above: 
 The worst prediction will get a score of −∞ which means that it may be 
impossible to calculate average LS for a sample 
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 LS only accounts for the correct portion of the prediction, completely 
discarding any information about how the incorrect portion of the 
prediction was distributed among classes 
 LS is able to return a score even when the actual state is a mixture of classes 
(e.g. a musical video may be classed as 50% music and 50% video), in which 
case it is extended according as follows: 
𝐿𝑆(𝑆𝑅 , 𝑆𝑃) =∑𝑃(𝑆𝑐
𝑅) 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑃(𝑆𝑐
𝑅 = 𝑆𝑐
𝑃))
𝑐∈𝐶
 (26) 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (PCC) (Bravais 1846; Pearson 
1896) can be used in cases when the true state of the item is also spread across 
multiple classes. PCC is defined as a cross product of two vectors ?̅?1 and ?̅?2 divided 
by a product of their magnitudes: 
𝑃𝐶𝐶(?̅?1, ?̅?2) =
?̅?1 × ?̅?2
‖?̅?1‖ × ‖?̅?2‖
, −1 ≤ 𝑃𝐶𝐶 ≤ 1 (27) 
Where 𝑃𝐶𝐶 = 0 denotes complete absence of correlation, 𝑃𝐶𝐶 = 1 is complete 
positive correlation and 𝑃𝐶𝐶 = −1 is total negative correlation. It is possible to 
express a prediction and the true state as vectors, so this formula is also applicable 
to estimating prediction accuracy. Similarly to LS, PCC can handle situations 
where the true state itself is a mixture of categories. 
Imagine a musical video represented by the following true state distribution: 
𝑆𝑅 =
{
 
 
 
 
 
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑉𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜) = 2 3⁄
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑜) = 1 3⁄
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒) = 0    
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡) = 0    
 (28) 
An effectively uncertain true state makes Brier, quadratic and spherical scores 
inappropriate. On the other hand, translating both true state and predicted state 
into corresponding vectors 𝑆𝑅{2 3⁄ ,
1
3⁄ , 0, 0} and 𝑆
𝑃{0.75, 0.05, 0.1, 0.1} allows using 
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cosine similarity metric CS which is equal in this case to the Pearson correlation 
coefficient: 
𝐶𝑆(𝑆𝑅, 𝑆𝑃) =
𝑆𝑅 × 𝑆𝑃
‖𝑆𝑅‖ × ‖𝑆𝑃‖
≈ 0.91 (29) 
The metric CS is defined in the range from -1 to 1, where a complete mismatch 
results in -1, value of 0 denotes random chance and 1 means a complete match. 
 Applying Accuracy Metrics in the Project 
In this section we assess the suitability of the accuracy metrics described above to 
assess predictions made by a probabilistic system such as Toran. Many commonly 
used accuracy metrics have their drawbacks, such as high sensitivity to outliers, 
ability to return undefined or infinite values, inability to properly handle non-
binary outcomes that are not equally different from one another, etc.; and are 
summarised in (Hyndman & Koehler 2006; Constantinou & Fenton 2012). 
We compare performance of these metrics on a few synthetic prediction examples, 
each defined as a probability vector in Table 11. 
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 Examples 
Category 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Audio: Music 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.33 0.00 
Audio: OST 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 
Audio: Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 
Image 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 
Mixed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 
Software: Game 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 
Software: Other 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.33 1.00 
Text: Book 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.33 0.00 
Text: Magazine 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 
Text: Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 
Video: Movie 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.36 0.38 0.33 0.08 0.00 0.00 
Video: Other 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.36 0.05 0.33 0.08 0.00 0.00 
Video: TV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.33 0.08 0.00 0.00 
Table 11: Example Predictions for Item that is “Video: Movie” 
These predictions could be derived, for example, from a combination of 3 votes 
according to Figure 9. We expect that accuracy metrics rank these predictions in 
the order they are presented in the Table 11 (except for #8 and #9 for reasons 
discussed below). 
1 Video: Movie 2 Video: Movie 3 Video: Movie 
 Video: Movie  Video: Movie  Video: Movie 
 Video: Movie  Video: Other  Software: Other 
4 Video: Movie 5 Video: Movie 6 Video 
 Video: Other  Unknown  Video 
 Unknown  Unknown  Video 
7 Unknown 8 Audio: Music 9 Software: Other 
 Unknown  Software: Other  Software: Other 
 Unknown  Text: Book  Software: Other 
Figure 9: Possible Votes that Produce Distributions in Table 11 
Example #1 is a simple case of a unanimously correct classification. In #2 and #3 
there are 2 out of 3 correct votes, but the crucial difference is that the third vote in 
former case is a related sub-category, while in the latter case it is an unrelated 
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category. Compared to example #3, in the example #4 one of the votes is 
‘Unknown’, while one correct vote is replaced by a vote for a related video 
category. Example #5 features two ‘Unknown’ votes and one correct vote, making 
the collective prediction more uncertain. We prefer to rank example #6 lower than 
#5 because it does not contain a certain vote for a correct category at all and rather 
has three weak votes for the video super-category in general. It is possible however 
that #4, #5, #6 and #7 receive similar scores depending on how “Unknown” is 
interpreted. For example, if an agent uses a prior distribution for “Unknown” 
cases, and in that distribution chance of “Video: Other” is 0.33, then #4 is virtually 
the same as #5. This is why we reason about the examples in this section assuming 
“Unknown” represents ignorance and an equal distribution across categories. 
However, when performance of actual agents is confirmed further in the thesis, 
they are allowed to use their prior category distributions for the “Unknown” 
interpretation. In this case the requirement is that each of the examples #3-7 
receives either the same or worse score than the previous example. 
Example #7 is completely uncertain, while #8 is a range of wrong answers. 
Prediction #9 is a strong wrong prediction in a particular sub-category, which is 
marginally worse than #8 because the latter at least shows some uncertainty about 
the category, while #9 is completely confident and wrong. It may be argued that 
there could be no difference between #8 and #9 or that it is not necessary to 
distinguish these examples for assessing the ability to make correct predictions. 
However, the distinction may still be important for analysing the nature of 
incorrect predictions. 
We apply metrics, such as absolute error AE, quadratic score QS, Brier score BS, 
logarithmic score LS and spherical score SS, to the examples from Table 11, and the 
calculated scores can be found in Table 12. 
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Ex. AE BS LS QS SS 
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
2 0.33 0.22 -0.18 0.78 0.89 
3 0.33 0.22 -0.18 0.78 0.89 
4 0.64 0.55 -0.44 0.45 0.70 
5 0.62 0.41 -0.41 0.59 0.91 
6 0.67 0.67 -0.48 0.33 0.58 
7 0.92 0.92 -1.11 0.08 0.28 
8 1.00 1.33  -∞ -0.33 0.00 
9 1.00 2.00  -∞ -1.00 0.00 
Table 12: Accuracy Metrics Calculated for Examples from Table 11 
While we do observe the general expected trend of best score in the top and a 
gradual transition to the worst case in the bottom for all of the metrics, they turn 
out to be inappropriate for assessing predictions where sub-categories are not 
equally distant from each other. This is demonstrated in Table 12. Notably, 
examples #2 and #3 should result in a different score, while example #5 should 
score less than or equal to #4. As suggested in (Constantinou & Fenton 2012) most 
metrics normally used under similar conditions do not respect the fact that labels 
can be related, which raises the question of the evaluation quality itself. They give 
an example of predicting football match results where possible outcomes are 
‘home win’, ‘draw’ or ‘away win’, and all of the metrics covered consider these 
options to be equally unrelated. However, Constantinou and Fenton argue that 
‘home win’ is closer to ‘draw’ than to ‘away win’, and vice versa, which means that 
most studies fail to recognise the importance of possible relations between 
category labels and subsequently can lead to wrong evaluation results. 
We conclude that none of the above classical metrics are fully appropriate for our 
study because they fail to rank predictions made within the correct super-category 
higher than those in a completely different super-category. The logarithmic 
scoring rule, in addition to this, returns a negative infinity as the worst score, which 
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hampers its suitability for average performance assessment. We discuss a possible 
solution to address this issue in chapter Section 5.5. 
2.7. String Comparison 
One of the aims of this research is to develop a framework which combines a 
Bayesian approach to classification with an external knowledge source in a way 
that the former can perform autonomously and adequately while the latter 
requires manual maintenance but improves the final results delivered by the 
method. Apart from classifying media items by analysing various file type 
signatures in the file name, a major challenge lies in the attempt to individually 
identify media files as particular movie titles and detect whether there are risks 
associated with these titles at the given time. To accomplish this task, we use a 
collection of movie, TV series and video game titles as specified in Section 2.4. 
There are several reasons for attempting to detect a title in the name string: 
a) There may be no information about medium present in the file name, in 
which case it may be sensible to assume the item is a movie, given its file 
size and the fact a title was detected. 
b) Some titles (e.g. movies prior to their digital release) can be associated with 
higher risks of fakes or malware, and the fact of detecting such a title must 
impact the medium type of the prediction. 
c) Porn detection can also be improved for files which have no regular porn 
markers such as signatures, actors or studios, by detecting a title of a porn 
movie. 
Detecting a title in a noisy file name string is, in essence, a problem of finding the 
longest common sub-sequences, while at the same time allowing some degree of 
mismatch between the sequences that should be matched as similar. The sheer 
number of titles in the database makes identification a non-trivial task, and the fact 
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that it has to be performed for multiple files as quickly as possible, only adds to 
the complexity. 
The field of bio-informatics provides a range of approaches to this problem. It is a 
very common activity to align two genome sequences in order to establish if there 
are similarities that may hint at functional, evolutionary or structural relationships 
between them. 
The essential purpose of the alignment is to capture regions which are either the 
same or similar (e.g. where particular characters may be swapped without losing 
the overall meaning of the sequence). 
Movie The Bourne Legacy (2012) 
Torrent Jason Bourne 04 - La peur dans la peau - L’héritage [ATG 2012] 720p.mp4 
Table 13: Example of a Movie Title and Torrent Name for Alignment 
Consider the torrent name and the movie title from Table 13 aligned in Figure 10. 
The pairs of the same characters are marked with an asterisk below them; and 
whenever a mismatch occurs, a gap is inserted in one of the sequences, which is 
denoted by a dash. A sequence alignment function is also able to produce a 
particular score that denotes the degree of similarity. It is configurable in terms of 
how subsequent matches or mismatches should be treated, or which characters are 
interchangeable and to what degree. 
The------ Bourne -----L---eg----acy-- (--------------------------2012)---------- 
----Jason Bourne 04 - La pe-ur da--ns -la peau - L’héritage [ATG 2012-] 720p.mp4 
          ******      *   *     *                                **** 
Figure 10: Torrent Name and Movie Title Aligned 
One of the first widely adopted methods for sequence alignment is the 
Needleman–Wunsch algorithm (Needleman & Wunsch 1970), which is an example 
of dynamic programming, whereby a complex problem is broken up into smaller 
sub-problems and solved gradually. It computes a matrix 𝐹𝑚,𝑛, where 𝑚 and 𝑛 are 
the lengths of the sequences, and calculates a score of all possible global alignments 
(i.e. total resulting sequence), and then finds the most optimal alignment. A 
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variation of the Needleman–Wunsch method is the Smith–Waterman (SW) 
algorithm (Smith & Waterman 1981), which is more concerned with local 
alignments (i.e. alignment of sub-sequences) by comparing segments of all 
possible alignments and optimising the resulting similarity measure. The SW 
variation is more relevant to this thesis as it specifically addresses partial 
alignments, which may provide additional evidence for the classification model. 
BLAST (Altschul et al. 1990) is one of the most widely used tools for sequence 
alignment in bioinformatics (Casey 2005), and features a heuristic algorithm based 
on matching sequences of n-grams, an n-gram being a sequence of 𝑛 characters. 
Using such a technique provides an opportunity for a much shorter processing 
time with a subsequent detailed alignment where applicable. 
Table 14 provides an example of breaking up a movie title ‘Matrix’ into 3-grams: 
Original MATRIX 
3-Grams MAT ATR TRI RIX 
Table 14: 3-Gram Example of ‘Matrix’ 
Matching strings as n-grams is faster than sequence alignment and provides a 
quick method of establishing whether it is even worth it to attempt sequence 
alignment. 
Most sequence alignment algorithms share a very important feature, allowing us 
to define a substitution matrix e.g. BLOSUM (Henikoff & Henikoff 1992), which 
specifies a degree of similarity between each pair of amino acids. For example, it 
may specify that matching amino acids C and A should result in a higher score than 
C and P. Ultimately, a substitution matrix allows for identifying similar sub-
sequences even after they were affected by mutations (e.g. where not all characters 
match exactly). 
Additional tuning is possible via implementing a particular scoring policy, which 
can dramatically impact the resulting alignment. A gap occurs when the algorithm 
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decides that it is more expensive score-wise to match two incompatible characters 
than to shift one of the sequences to the right or left by inserting a gap. Gap starters 
and gap extenders can be treated differently and some gapping policies may 
favour long gaps over a lot of small gaps by making a gap starter expensive and a 
gap extender cheap. Table 15 illustrates how different gapping and scoring rules 
can impact the final alignment. The scoring rules used in our approach are 
explained further in Section 4.4. 
Movie Title The Matrix (1999) 
Torrent Name (TheNeo) Mediatrix (Into the matrix) [2011] 
Alignment 
Rule Set 1 
-The---- M---atrix (1999---------------)------- 
(TheNeo) Mediatrix (----Into the matrix) [2011] 
 ***     *   *******                   * 
Alignment 
Rule Set 2 
-------------------------The Matrix- (---1999)-- 
(TheNeo) Mediatrix (Into the matrix) -[201----1] 
                         **********      * 
Table 15: Alignment Example under Different Rules 
We briefly cover the Smith-Waterman algorithm as it is relatively simple to 
implement and provides a sufficient insight into the string alignment theory. In a 
classical implementation a matrix 𝑀𝑛+1,𝑚+1is constructed where 𝑚 and 𝑛 are the 
lengths of the two strings being aligned. Alignment of ‘Mediatrix’ and ‘Matrix’ 
results in a 10 by 7 matrix. 
The matrix is filled according to the scoring rules, which in this example are: 
 match same characters: 2 
 match different characters: -1 
 gap: 0 
This means that positioning the same characters opposite each other bears a score 
of 2, different characters opposite each other result in a score of negative 1 and 
simply shifting either string one position is a zero score. The top-left cell is always 
a 0, and all other cell scores are calculated using the formula: 
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𝑀𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥
{
 
 
 
 0                                         
𝑀𝑖−1,𝑗−1 +  𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ(𝑖, 𝑗)
𝑀𝑖,𝑗−1 + 𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑗)             
𝑀𝑖−1,𝑗 + 𝑔𝑎𝑝(𝑖)             
 (30) 
Top and left rows will be hence filled with zeroes, representing an entry point 
before any characters were matched. The remaining matrix is then eventually filled 
with scores as in Table 16. 
Mediatrix 
M---atrix 
 - M E D I A T R I X 
- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
M 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
A 0 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 
T 0 2 2 2 2 4 6 6 6 6 
R 0 2 2 2 2 4 6 8 8 8 
I 0 2 2 2 4 4 6 8 10 10 
X 0 2 2 2 4 4 6 8 10 12 
Table 16: Example of Alignment and Score Matrix 
Whenever we move diagonally, this means that characters were matched, and 
horizontal or vertical movement is a result of inserting a gap. Once all the scores 
are calculated, the algorithm backtracks the alignment from the last cell which had 
the best score. It then moves backwards building up the final alignment strings by 
selecting a cell that bears the least score loss compared to the current cell, 
preferring the diagonal movement if multiple cells have the same score record. In 
many cases two strings can be aligned in multiple ways with the same final score. 
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2.8. Summary 
In this chapter we introduced a commercial benchmark system MVL developed by 
MovieLabs that provided results for comparison to our prototype classifier Toran. 
We explained the input data, which is a list of basic torrent information, such as 
unique identifier, download’s name and file size. It is supplemented with a 
database of movie, TV series and game titles, as well as a limited set of names of 
porn actors and studios. 
We explained the classification taxonomy originally used by MVL and highlighted 
its drawbacks, and introduced the Toran classifier system which we used to test 
the application of our methodology. 
As part of our study we used human participants to help us construct data samples 
and manually classify and identify several thousand torrent files. A small subset 
of these items was also fully downloaded and its content verified. Other data sets 
were also developed to evaluate prediction of fakes and malware, and to provide 
confident results about medium classification on an independent test set. These 
data, together with benchmark classifications, were separated into four data sets 
which are explained in this section and can be found in Appendix D. 
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Chapter 3  
Torrent Name Bayesian Network Model 
This chapter directly addresses Research objective 1 (from Section 1.2) by 
providing a novel BN model that lies at the heart of the torrent identification and 
classification system Toran. It was developed using a combination of data and 
expert domain knowledge, rather than a straight ML approach for reasons 
explained further in this chapter. 
The chapter first provides relevant theory about Bayes’ theorem and Bayesian 
modelling in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. It then gives a brief overview of the whole 
model in Section 3.4 and explains every part in more detail in Sections 3.5 to 3.12, 
also providing judgement for the conditional probability definitions of any 
relevant nodes, and how various concepts within the model evolved over time. 
While some evidence observed in the model is trivial, such as ‘file size’, other 
evidence is captured through a complex process, which is explained in Chapter 4. 
Elsewhere in this chapter relevant references are provided pointing to evidence 
capturing procedures. Section 3.13 outlines our ideas for possible extensions of our 
model and the procedure to be followed. 
The material in Sections 3.4 to 3.13 and application specific examples in Sections 
3.1 to 3.3 are, to the best of our knowledge, a novel contribution. 
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3.1. Bayes’ Theorem 
Bayes’ Theorem (Bayes & Price 1763; McGrayne 2011; Fenton & Neil 2012b; Barber 
2012) is named after Thomas Bayes who, in 1763 showed how initial beliefs can be 
updated by new evidence. It describes the relation of prior probability before 
evidence and the posterior probability once some evidence is observed. Formally, 
it describes the probability of some unknown event 𝐻 given evidence 𝐸: 
𝑃(𝐻|𝐸) =
𝑃(𝐸|𝐻) 𝑃(𝐻)
𝑃(𝐸)
 (31) 
where 𝑃(𝐻) is the prior probability of 𝐻, 𝑃(𝐸|𝐻) is the likelihood and 𝑃(𝐻|𝐸) is the 
posterior probability of 𝐻. When 𝑃(𝐸) = 0, 𝑃(𝐻|𝐸) is not defined. When 𝐻 is a set 
of 𝑛 mutually exclusive and exhaustive events, we can express the probability of 
the evidence by the law of total probability (Zwillinger & Kokoska 2000) as: 
𝑃(𝐸) =∑𝑃(𝐸|𝐻𝑖) 𝑃(𝐻𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=0
 (32) 
A practical example that is relevant to the problem domain, considers fake items. 
We know that highly anticipated titles or those that have been released recently 
are most at risk of being faked on the file sharing networks. Some of these fakes 
could be broken videos, while others could contain malware. Therefore, it is 
important to assess the risk that a downloadable item is in the risk group, a fake 
and subsequently – concealed malware. 
Imagine that, based on information such as a database of recently released movies 
and/or expert judgment, there is a test to determine whether a torrent is a fake or 
not by analysing its name. Suppose the test is accurate enough to conclude an item 
to be a fake in 99% of cases when it is an actual fake, and in 5% of cases when it is 
not a fake. So the true positive rate for the test is 99% and the false positive rate is 
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5%. Suppose, we can estimate that for the torrents posted more than 2 months ago, 
around 5 in 1000 are fakes. Then for this class of torrents we have: 
𝑃(𝐹𝑎𝑘𝑒) = 0.005
𝑃(𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑|𝐹𝑎𝑘𝑒) = 0.99   
𝑃(𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑|¬𝐹𝑎𝑘𝑒) = 0.05   
 (33) 
According to the rule of total probability (Zwillinger & Kokoska 2000): 
𝑃(𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) = 
𝑃(𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑|𝐹𝑎𝑘𝑒)𝑃(𝐹𝑎𝑘𝑒) + 𝑃(𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑|¬𝐹𝑎𝑘𝑒)𝑃(¬𝐹𝑎𝑘𝑒) = 
0.99 × 0.005 + 0.05 × 0.995 = 0.0547 
(34) 
We are interested in the chance that the item really is a fake given that the match 
was positive: 
𝑃(𝐹𝑎𝑘𝑒|𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑) =
𝑃(𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑|𝐹𝑎𝑘𝑒) 𝑃(𝐹𝑎𝑘𝑒)
𝑃(𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)
= 
0.99 × 0.005
0.0547
≈ 0.091 
(35) 
This means that even if our test determines the torrent to be a fake, the chances are 
that it is a false positive, because the initial probability of finding such an item is 
very low. This means that the test for fake items must be made more accurate, or 
accompanied by another test. 
 Not Fake Fake 
Not Detected 94525 5 
Detected 4975 495 
Total 99500 500 
Table 17: Illustration of Fakes Detection Test 
Table 17 illustrates this example applied to a random selection of 100,000 items. In 
the rest of this chapter we demonstrate how we apply Bayes’ theorem in building 
a probabilistic model to address the problem of item classification in the problem 
domain context. 
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3.2. Bayesian Networks Overview and Key Concepts 
This section provides an overview of Bayesian networks (BNs) covering those 
aspects necessary for the thesis and is structured as follows: Sub-section 3.2.1 
provides an essential definition of BNs. Sub-section 3.2.2 gives relevant BN 
examples. Sub-section 3.2.3 outlines the key properties of BNs, relevant tools, 
applications and briefly covers the Bayesian inference methods. Sub-section 3.2.4 
explains the difference between hard, soft and virtual evidence. Sub-section 3.2.5 
outlines how continuous nodes are modelled in AgenaRisk. 
 Bayesian Network Definition 
A Bayesian Network (BN) is a graphical probabilistic model  (Pearl 1988; Edwards 
2000; Nielsen & Jensen 2009; Koski & Noble 2009), consisting of variables or events, 
formally called nodes, connected with arrows, formally called edges and 
representing causal or influential relationships between the nodes. The collection 
of nodes and edges is called a graph or topology. For a pair of events 𝐴 and 𝐵 in a 
relationship 𝐴 → 𝐵, 𝐴 is called parent and 𝐵 is called child. Nodes that do not have 
a parent are called root nodes. A BN is a type of directed acyclic graph (DAG), which 
implies that no node can be an ancestor to itself, and that all edges are directed 
(Christofides 1975; Thulasiraman & Swamy 1992). 
There are many possible types of nodes such as Boolean, labelled, ranked, and 
continuous or integer intervals. Depending on the node type, random variables 
represented by the nodes, are either discrete or continuous. In the former case the 
range of values must be an exhaustive collection of mutually exclusive states (e.g. 
“True” and “False”; or “Low”, “Medium” and “High”). In the latter case we can 
define ranges, but the actual variable can take any value allowed by the node type. 
For example, for a continuous integer type node, we may define ranges (-∞, -11], 
[-10, 10], [11, +∞), allowing the variable to take any integer value. However, the 
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number of states of the variable is then 3, which makes it possible to process 
continuous nodes in the same manner as discrete nodes.  
Each node has an underlying node probability table (NPT), also called conditional 
probability table for child nodes. For a node A without parents the NPT is simply 
the prior probability of each state of A. For a node 𝐵 with parents the NPT specifies 
for each state of B, the probability of that state given all combinations of the states 
of the parents of B. 
 Simple BN Examples 
Consider the example of fakes detection illustrated in Table 17 and a very simple 
corresponding BN in Figure 11. It is very important to note that the causation is 
expressed in this case by the arrow going from Torrent is Fake to Evidence of Fake 
Detected, because the result depends on the input, and not the other way around. 
However, correct inference in BNs is also possible when edges do not follow 
causation direction. 
   
Figure 11: Basic BN for Fakes Detection 
Considering the set of newly added records, the prior for a file name to contain a 
risky title was set at 30 in 100, which has to be first normalised so that it adds up 
to 1. Leaf nodes like Torrent is Fake have a very simple NPT such as in Table 18. 
Torrent is Fake 
False 0.7 
True 0.3 
Table 18: NPT for Torrent is Fake in the Basic Model 
Evidence of Fake Detected is a child node, so we have to specify probability values 
based on detection accuracy, which is assumed to be 99% for cases where there 
really is a risky title and 95% otherwise, as shown in Table 19. 
Torrent
is Fake
Evidence of 
Fake Detected
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 Torrent is Fake False True 
Evidence of Fake Detected 
False 0.95 0.01 
True 0.05 0.99 
Table 19: NPT for Evidence of Fake Detected in the Basic Model 
Once an observation is entered into the Evidence of Fake Detected, it back-propagates 
to Torrent is Fake as in Equation 35 as the model calculates the posterior probability 
of Torrent is Fake (see Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12: Basic BN for Fakes Detection Example after Evidence Propagation 
Now, in practice, the test to determine whether a torrent is fake based on its name 
will depend on a number of factors. One such factor is the Database Coverage (where 
we assume the test involves looking up a database of ‘risky titles’). In this case we 
revise the BN model shown in Figure 11 by adding an extra parent to Evidence of 
Fake Detected as shown in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: Revised Example Model for Fakes Detection 
If a node has multiple parents its NPT table becomes increasingly complex because 
the number of cells in the table is equal to the product of the number of options 
each parent variable can take. Suppose the variable Database Coverage has just two 
states “high” and “low”, which may correspond to the proportion of movie titles 
in the database out of all titles filmed. Clearly the accuracy of our test is going to 
be influenced by whether or not we have a sufficient number of titles in our 
database. 
Torrent
is Fake
Evidence of 
Fake Detected
Database
Coverage
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 DB Coverage Low High 
Torrent is Fake False True False True 
Evidence for Fake Detected 
False 0.99 0.7 0.95 0.01 
True 0.01 0.3 0.05 0.99 
Table 20: NPT for Evidence for Fake Detected Example with 2 Parents 
Table 20 illustrates a possible revised NPT for Evidence of Fake Detected in the more 
complex version of the model. If the database coverage is “Low”, evidence can 
only be correctly detected in 30% of cases when it actually is in the name string, as 
opposed to 99% detection rate with a “High” coverage database. We also assume 
a “Low” database coverage may rarely lead to false positives while a “High” 
coverage may cause a higher number of false positives due to file names matching 
something in the database. 
Figure 14a shows the model in its prior marginal state before any observations are 
entered. Note that observing the evidence for a fake yields a high confidence in the 
prediction that the item is fake (Figure 14b, c), regardless of the database state. 
However, when we do not observe any evidence of a fake, there is an important 
difference. In Figure 14d our prior belief in 30% chance of a fake is only weakly 
affected, because database coverage is low. In this scenario failing to observe any 
evidence of fakes is likely due to having insufficient data rather than because the 
item was not a fake. 
On the other hand, when database coverage is high as in Figure 14e an item that is 
a fake is very strongly expected to be properly detected, hence failing to observe 
evidence for a fake leads us to believe that the item is not one. 
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Figure 14: Possible Outcomes of the Fakes Detection Model: a) Show the marginal values before 
propagation, b-e) Show the values after propagation with the given observations 
From consulting with domain experts and studying the problem domain, we 
determined a possible improvement to the model in Figure 13. This extension may 
be motivated by inclusion of a relation between the type of an item and its 
prevalence to be a fake. For example, we know that most fakes are disguised as 
movies, and we can express this by adding two new nodes Item is Movie and Item 
Looks Like Movie, as in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15: Extended Example Model for Fakes Detection  
Torrent
is Fake
Evidence of 
Fake Detected
Database
Coverage
Item is Movie
Item Looks
Like Movie
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This extension allows us to specify that an actual movie is very unlikely to be a 
fake, while items that are fakes or movies are very likely to appear as movies too. 
Items that appear as movies and are fakes at the same time, are likely to contain 
evidence for fakes, such as a title of a highly anticipated movie. 
 Bayesian Network Inference Algorithms, Tools and Applications 
While the Bayesian inference calculations in the above 3-node model for fakes 
detection example can be computed manually, the necessary calculations quickly 
become intractable as more nodes and edges are added. For example, inference in 
the extended model in Figure 15 is already extremely complex to undertake 
manually. Indeed, the general problem of exact inference for an arbitrary BN is 
known to be NP-hard (Cooper 1990). However, in the late 1980s efficient 
propagation algorithms were developed for a broad variety of BNs (Pearl 1988; 
Henrion 1988; Lauritzen & Spiegelhalter 1988). These algorithms have 
subsequently been implemented in widely available software tools. To run the 
necessary computations for the BN model and associated classification and 
identification method developed in this thesis, we use the application program 
interface (API) of one such tool AgenaRisk (Agena 2016c). AgenaRisk employs the 
junction tree propagation algorithm (Jensen & Nielsen 2007), which we describe in 
Appendix E. 
With the advent of widely available BN tools, there has been an explosion of 
interest in BNs since the mid-1990s with BN-based decision support applications 
developed in a wide range of fields (Fenton & Neil 2012b; Pourret et al. 2008). 
These include: making high-stakes critical real-time decisions at the NASA Mission 
Control Center (Horvitz & Barry 1995); device fault diagnostic and troubleshooting 
(Breese & Heckerman 1996; Skaaning et al. 2003); pharmacokinetic analysis 
(Gelman et al. 1996); medicine (Díez et al. 1997) (Burnside et al. 2006; Fenton & Neil 
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2010); analysis in genetics (Friedman et al. 2000; Jansen et al. 2003; Jiang et al. 2011); 
vehicle reliability for the military (Neil et al. 2001); terrorist attack detection 
(Laskey & Levitt 2002); Air Traffic Control environment (Neil et al. 2003); railway 
accident causation (Marsh & Bearfield 2004); football predictions (Constantinou et 
al. 2012); software reliability (Fenton & Bieman 2014);  reliability of complex 
systems (Marquez et al. 2010), law (Fenton 2011; Keppens 2011; Fenton et al. 2013). 
Compared to classical statistics, BNs provide the following benefits (also note that 
c and e cannot be achieved with rule-based decision support systems): 
a) Modelling causality allows a BN to be explained to a domain expert who is 
not necessarily a statistician. When data is not available, it is still possible to 
model causal relations between significant variables by eliciting 
probabilities and likelihoods from the domain experts. This is crucial 
because in many classical statistical methods such as regression analysis 
(Seber & Lee 2003), observational data is analysed for direct correlation 
clues, and may lead to wrong assumptions about causation (Armstrong 
2012; Cook & Weisberg 1982; Freedman 1991). Moreover, such methods do 
not allow inclusion of any kind of logical reasoning that must apply 
regardless of data, e.g. an argument that while predicting software defects, 
performing no testing would yield no defects (Fenton et al. 2007). Likewise, 
regression models are incapable of adequately incorporating very rare 
events that a domain expert may consider possible in future. 
b) Combining different types of evidence makes it possible to encode objective 
data and subjective beliefs into the model (Heckerman 2008) and allows 
setting the type of data and NPT individually for each variable. 
c) What-if analysis is possible because causal BNs allow differentiation between 
observations and interventions. As defined in (Pearl 2009), an intervention 
on a variable A simply sets the variable to a desired state and cuts off edges 
leading from its parents to disable back-propagation, which enables us to 
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avoid a correlation due to unmeasured common causes and highlights 
direction of causality. 
d) Back-propagation of evidence from effect to cause provides crucial backward 
reasoning that enables powerful predictions. Once an observation is entered 
in an effect node, it updates probability distribution of its cause, as per 
Figure 12. 
e) Explaining away, as in the fakes detection example in Figure 14 above, where 
the probability of the torrent being a fake is discounted when other reasons 
for detecting evidence of fake are observed. For example, when some 
evidence is found and the database coverage is low, the final confidence is 
higher that the item is a fake. However, if the database coverage was high, 
it is considered to be the more likely reason for detecting the evidence (i.e. 
false positive) and the posterior probability of fake is reduced. 
f) Visible auditable reasoning means that it is possible to work out why exactly 
the model arrived at a particular prediction, which may be a great 
debugging opportunity. 
g) Computing predictions despite missing evidence is crucial for many real world 
applications, because we cannot rely on always having sufficient data, nor 
do we actually have that much data in reality. With no observations entered, 
a BN would return predictions that represent our prior belief, and with 
more evidence added, the more accurate the final predictions will become. 
While Bayes’ theorem provides a rational and correct way to characterise 
uncertainty of an unknown hypothesis as new evidence is observed, there is no 
universal acceptance of the need for Bayes or even the need to capture uncertainty 
at all. There are also two common specific objections to using Bayes: 
1. Need to specify prior probabilities: There is a special concern when this 
requires subjective judgment. This arises from a philosophical debate going 
on in the field of probability analysis (Kendall 1949; Casella & Berger 1987; 
92 
 
Gelman 2008; Senn 2011) for decades, concerning the definition of 
probability itself and involving the comparison of frequentist and Bayesian 
schools of thought. The frequentist approach considers drawing 
probabilities from directly observing data, while the Bayesian considers 
probability to be a function of logic and revolves around updating initial 
subjective prior with subsequent objective evidence. It can be argued that 
with sufficient data one can arrive at an objective probability of a variable 
by simply observing the frequency of that variable in a big enough sample. 
However, this fails to address cases where little or no historical data is 
available while expert judgment may be in abundance. The Bayesian 
approach joins data and knowledge allowing better decision-making when 
data is scarce (McGrayne 2012). 
2. Complexity of the Bayesian calculations: This is, of course, especially 
relevant when there are multiple dependent variables. Fortunately it is 
alleviated by using Bayesian networks and automated tools that implement 
the necessary inference algorithms. 
 Hard, Soft and Virtual Evidence 
Whenever evidence is entered into a node, it is usually ‘hard evidence’ that is 
considered, which means that one node state is assigned a probability of 1 and the 
other states of 0. However, in real world applications we sometimes can only 
obtain uncertain evidence in cases when we are not entirely sure about the 
observation. For example, we could be 90% certain that a Boolean node is true, but 
this means that we cannot use hard evidence to express this. In fact, the model 
should propagate and return marginal values for the states of “true” and “false” 
as 0.9 and 0.1 respectively. Such implementation is called soft evidence. However 
this is technically difficult to implement (Fenton et al. 2012), so commercial tools 
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normally implement virtual evidence (Pearl 1988) which uses a likelihood ratio 
defined as: 
𝑃(𝑂𝑏(𝑎1)|𝑎1) ∶ … ∶ 𝑃(𝑂𝑏(𝑎𝑛)|𝑎𝑛) (36) 
where 𝑛 is the number of states of the variable 𝐴, 𝑃(𝑂𝑏(𝑎𝑖)|𝑎𝑖) is interpreted as the 
probability of observing state 𝑎𝑖 when 𝐴 is indeed in this state. Then the posterior 
probability 𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑎𝑚|𝑉𝑒) is defined as: 
𝑃(𝐴 = 𝑎𝑚|𝑉𝑒) =
𝑃(𝑎𝑚) × 𝑃(𝑂𝑏(𝑎𝑚)|𝑎𝑚)
∑ 𝑃(𝑎𝑖) × 𝑃(𝑂𝑏(𝑎𝑖)|𝑎𝑖)𝑖
 (37) 
where 𝑉𝑒 denotes ‘virtual evidence’. To illustrate, a Boolean variable with prior 
probability for true being 0.2 and virtual probability for true being 0.9 would result 
in a posterior probability: 
0.9 × 0.2
0.9 × 0.2 + 0.1 × 0.8
≈ 0.69 (38) 
We use virtual evidence in the model for title identification in cases of multiple 
title category matches per torrent name, as explained further in Section 3.11. 
 Modelling Continuous Variables 
Unlike other propagation algorithms which assume that numerical variables have 
a fixed set of pre-defined discrete states, the AgenaRisk inference algorithm 
implements dynamic discretisation as described in (Neil et al. 2007). The 
implementation is based on the ideas originally proposed in (Kozlov & Koller 
1997) and is a more flexible alternative to approaches involving conditional 
Gaussian (Lauritzen & Jensen 2001; Lauritzen 1992), or mixtures of truncated 
exponentials (Cobb & Shenoy 2006; Rumí et al. 2006). 
Specifically, in AgenaRisk it is possible to use all of the following distributions: 
Beta, Chi Squared, Exponential, Extreme Value, Gamma, Gaussian, Logistic, Log 
Normal, Student, Triangle, Truncated Normal, Uniform or Weibull. The dynamic 
discretization algorithm approximates the probability density function (PDF) 𝑓𝑥 of 
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any of these distributions. It finds an optimal discretization set and optimal values 
for the discretised PDF 𝑓𝑥
′ via a series of iterations within an acceptable degree of 
precision. Unlike other Bayesian modelling software (Lunn et al. 2000; Stan 
Development Team 2014; Murphy 2014; Bayes Server 2015; Hugin 2015), 
AgenaRisk therefore provides an efficient and flexible way of modelling 
continuous nodes without having to manually specify discrete intervals or limit 
oneself to Gaussian distributions only. 
We used continuous nodes in a supplementary BN to learn parameters of the size 
distributions for the main BN. Moreover, in revisions of the model following the 
original submission of this thesis, we use continuous nodes both for the size node 
and for the nodes that measure the level of evidence detected for each item 
category (e.g. category keywords and patterns, or file size). 
3.3. Building Bayesian Networks 
While Section 3.2 makes clear the benefits of a well-crafted BN once it is built, there 
are great challenges in actually building a sensible and useful BN for a given 
problem domain.  This section describes the various methods used in this thesis to 
develop the BN model for file identification and classification and is structured as 
follows: Sub-section 3.3.1 compares two distinct approaches – knowledge 
engineering and machine learning – to building BNs. Sub-section 3.3.2 covers the 
topic of conditional dependency of variables. Sub-section 3.3.3 outlines some 
approaches to creating BN structure and lists the major steps in this process. Sub-
section 3.3.4 provides an overview of popular approaches to learning prior 
probabilities for the model, including elicitation from domain experts. Sub-section 
3.3.5 explains in detail theory behind reusable patterns called idioms, introduced 
first in Section 3.3.3 and how they are relevant to this project. 
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 Knowledge Engineering versus Machine Learning 
A good model lies at the heart of proper probability analysis, and it is important 
to capture the structure of the model and define prior and conditional 
probabilities. A natural approach is knowledge engineering (KE), which aims to 
exploit the experience, judgement and knowledge of the domain experts and elicit 
from them the BN structure, any possible causal relationships between variables, 
and probabilities.  
Although BNs are originally motivated by the knowledge and insight of domain 
experts, there is a separate branch of Bayesian modelling, which employs machine 
learning (ML) methods (Neapolitan 2003; Murphy 2012; Barber 2012) and is 
concerned with both model structure and the prior and conditional probabilities 
being learned from the data itself, such that the resulting model describes the data 
sample. Because ML implementations naturally recover a model that best 
describes the data, it is important to consider the possibility of the analysed sample 
being insufficiently large. 
In practice, however, it is often sensible to integrate knowledge-based and data-
driven approaches. A number of theory refinement methods are discussed in 
(Buntine 1991), some of which revolve around the idea of starting with a network 
structure elicited from an expert and refining it with subsequent automated 
learning. Belief and causal networks are contrasted in (Heckerman et al. 1994) by 
enforcing different requirements on automated learning methods, which shows 
how domain knowledge impacts the learning process even in the early stages of 
model type definition. A method for specifying constraints into a model learning 
process is proposed in (Altendorf et al. 2005; Zhou et al. 2014; Zhou et al. 2015). 
Such constraints represent the proportional relation between variables. A 
framework allowing an expert to define hard constraints on the structure and soft 
constraints on the priors is proposed in (de Campos & Qiang 2008). A method 
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based on dependency analysis aimed at learning structure from incomplete data-
sets by making assumptions about missing data to fill the gaps, is proposed in (Fiot 
et al. 2008). It is suggested in (Cano et al. 2011) to learn the structure of the BN 
automatically, but confirm certain low-confidence parts of the structure with an 
expert. Work in (Flores et al. 2011) presents an overview of several methods 
allowing an expert to specify the full structure; identify causal direct links; causal 
dependency; relation (i.e. edge) directions; identify related variables with 
unknown relation direction; temporal tiers, where variables are grouped within 
timeline; or correlations. The method proposed in (Khan et al. 2011) is based on an 
expert executing an evidence gathering test at each step of the learning procedure. 
The example provided in (Fenton 2012) illustrates a common situation whereby it 
is impossible, even when there is an extremely large data sample for a small 
number of variables, to use a machine learning or frequentist approach to learn a 
simple relationship easily known to an expert. An example in (Fenton 2014) 
illustrates how a model refined by expert judgement can provide more semantic 
insight and lead to better decision making.  Another example in (Fenton 2015a) 
illustrates how a data-based approach may have to arrive at a wrong model, due 
to a critical semantic meaning not explicitly present in the data set. Yet an expert 
can identify semantics missing from the data and help create a correct model. An 
illustration of how data-driven approaches may fail to identify crucial 
interventions that may impact the data critically, is presented in (Fenton 2015b). It 
is clear that employing, at least to some degree, expert judgement is preferable to 
a pure machine learning approach, to be able to cope with inadequacies of data. 
This thesis is concerned with analysing data where a sufficiently large validated 
sample with known actual item categories may not be available for implementing 
ML approaches appropriately; hence the rest of this section refers to KE methods. 
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 Conditional Dependency 
When linking nodes together, it is important to consider that from the 
mathematical standpoint 𝐴 → 𝐵 structure is just as valid as 𝐵 → 𝐴. However, from 
the practical perspective it may be better to select the parent based on whether it 
is easier to define the unconditional rather than conditional prior probability for it, 
or if maintaining the causal relation allows for a more transparent model. For 
example, consider a variable Collection 𝐶  that represents the source, from which 
we process torrent files, with possible values ‘new’ and ‘old’, and a variable Fake 
𝐹. As noted in Sections 2.2 and 3.1, newly posted torrents are much more likely to 
be fakes and this increases the risk of malware. 
Depending on the structure of the model, there can be two sets of priors to define: 
1. For 𝐶 → 𝐹: 𝑃(𝐶), 𝑃(𝐹|𝐶) 
2. For 𝐹 → 𝐶: 𝑃(𝐹), 𝑃(𝐶|𝐹) 
It is simple to define the model in terms of known parameter Collection influencing 
the unknown parameter Fake because we can define the former based on the data 
being analysed. For example, we may know in advance which torrent collection 
the experiment will be running on, and whether the item in consideration is ‘new’ 
or ‘old’. In such a case the prior probability of 𝐶 does not matter because the 
variable is always observed, and can be set with an ignorant prior of 0.5 for each 
option. We can then use our expectation of a larger proportion of fakes among the 
‘new’ items to define conditional priors of 𝐹 given 𝐶. On the other hand, defining 
the prior unconditional probability of item being a fake is much more difficult than 
working out expected proportions based on other factors such as the recency of an 
item, or its medium which allows defining what kinds of media are more likely to 
be faked. 
We can extend this model by including the real medium of the item. This allows 
specifying that fake downloads are mostly videos (e.g. broken videos) or software 
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(e.g. malware). Finally, to give a prediction of the risk of malware, the model is 
extended with another node that specifies that malware is mostly found in fakes 
that are in reality software. We end up with the model in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16: Basic BN for Input, Real Medium, Fake and Malware 
In BNs there are 3 types of dependency connections (d-connections) identified in 
(Fenton & Neil 2012c), which are all found in Figure 16: converging, diverging and 
serial. Evidence flow between nodes depends on hard evidence being entered at 
the nodes between them as illustrated by Figures 17, 18 and 19. 
a) Converging (Figure 17) 
Node 𝐹 has multiple parents 𝐶 and 𝑀. If there is hard evidence entered at 𝐹 
or any its children, then 𝐶 and 𝑀 are dependency-connected (d-connected), 
meaning that any evidence entered at 𝐶 will update posterior of 𝑀 and vice 
versa. Otherwise they are dependency-separated (d-separated), meaning that 
there is no evidence flow between them. 
 
Figure 17: Converging Connection 
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b) Diverging (Figure 18) 
Node 𝑀 is a parent of multiple nodes 𝐹 and 𝑊. If there is hard evidence 
entered at 𝑀, then 𝐹 and 𝑉 are d-separated. Otherwise they are d-connected. 
 
Figure 18: Diverging Connection 
c) Serial (Figure 19) 
Nodes 𝐶, 𝐹 and 𝑊 are connected in a sequence such that 𝐹 is conditionally 
dependent on 𝐶, and 𝑊 is conditionally dependent on 𝐹. 
If hard evidence is entered at 𝐹, then 𝐶 and 𝑊 are d-separated, and d-
connected otherwise. 
 
Figure 19: Serial Connection 
The solid arrows on Figures 17, 18 and 19 represent the actual edges, while the 
dashed arrows illustrate information flow from instantiated nodes. Instantiation of 
a node refers to a hard observation being entered into that node. Note how 
information can flow in the direction opposite to the direction of the edge. Middle 
nodes with a pink background block evidence propagation between side nodes 
and make them d-separated. Middle nodes with green background allow d-
connection and evidence flow. 
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 Defining BN Structure 
According to standard software engineering practices, a system should be built 
from modules or components, usually employing object-oriented (OO) methods 
(Goldberg & Robson 1983; Rumbaugh et al. 1991; Meyer 1998). A number of 
repeated concepts is identified, which are implemented and reused on a regular 
basis, and are called design patterns (Gamma et al. 1995; Jackson 1995). These 
patterns represent templates of recognised solutions to common problems. For 
example, most software systems have at least one object that is unique in its type, 
and accessed by many other components of the system. The Singleton design 
pattern structurally describes how this case may be implemented in a coherent 
way. 
Extending this idea to BN construction, Laskey and Mahoney defined a method of 
organising parts of BNs into semantically meaningful units, which they called 
fragments (Laskey & Mahoney 1997). In this definition, all fragments can be 
constructed separately from each other, and each is a set of nodes related by edges 
and makes logical sense on its own. They build on this in (Laskey & Mahoney 2000) 
by proposing a system engineering approach where simple prototypes are created 
in iterations following a spiral lifecycle model, which are evaluated and amended. 
Following this approach allows the knowledge engineer to better understand the 
domain and the expert to acquire understanding of principles of Bayesian 
modelling. 
Koller and Pfeffer argued that just like programming languages and databases 
benefit from an object-oriented approach, the BN building process could be 
improved greatly in the same fashion (Koller & Pfeffer 1997). They conceptualised 
object-oriented Bayesian Networks (OOBNs) where an object is a BN fragment 
which is viewed as a stochastic function with attributes that can be observed as 
inputs and predicted attributes as outputs, with some of the attributes being 
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private and not visible or accessible from outside of the object. Furthermore, an 
output node of one object can be an input node for another, which enables multiple 
levels of abstraction. The objects are encapsulated in a sense that only internal 
evidence can influence their outputs. 
Building on the OOBN work, Neil et al. define a number of idioms (Neil et al. 2000), 
which are refined in (Fenton & Neil 2012d), and are analogous to design patterns 
in OO programming and generalise a set of very particular types of BN structure 
fragments which are viewed as building blocks for a BN. They also formalise the 
process of mapping a subset of nodes and edges to a particular idiom, allowing an 
engineer who is building the model to refer to this simple idiom selection rule 
when translating structure elicited from a domain expert to a BN. We use this 
approach extensively and a detailed explanation of both the idioms and how these 
idioms were used to develop the BN in the thesis is provided in Section 3.3.5. 
Other related approaches to building BNs are: 
 Similarity networks proposed by Heckerman (Heckerman 1990) which he 
used for disease diagnostic, but is not restricted to this domain. This method 
identifies the single hypothesis node called distinguished node (e.g. the 
disease) and produces a series of small disjoint knowledge maps of various 
variables related to the distinguished node. These are then merged into a 
large knowledge map. This method assumes that the smaller knowledge 
maps cover instances of the distinguished node that are exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive; that the distinguished node is not a child; and that the 
domain has only non-zero probabilities. 
 Causal maps are defined in (Eden et al. 1992) as a directed graph which 
expresses judgement that certain actions or events will cause specific 
outcomes. Nadkarni and Shenoy propose an approach that elicits a Bayesian 
causal map (Nadkarni & Shenoy 2001) from experts via an interview and 
transforming it into a Bayesian Network (Nadkarni & Shenoy 2004).  
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In essence, building a BN can be summarised into the following steps: 
1) Identify significant variables relevant to the problem, preferably using pre-
defined relevant idioms, which also capture the node dependencies (i.e. 
edges). 
2) For those variables that are not part of a pre-defined idiom construct, 
connect the variables with edges, preferably directed along causal links. 
3) Identify correct type of all variables and what their values could be, and 
whether they are continuous or not. 
4) Define prior probabilities for non-children nodes. 
5) Define conditional probabilities for children nodes. 
The steps 1 and 2 were covered above, and the next sub-section covers the steps 3 
to 5. 
 Prior and Likelihood Definition 
It is a common argument that humans work best with qualitative rather than 
quantitative assessment (Pearl 1988; Spiegelhalter et al. 1993) and that domain 
experts and humans in general are prone to have difficulties or express biases 
when dealing with probabilities (Tversky & Kahneman 1974; Gigerenzer et al. 
1998; Donnelly 2005; O’Hagan et al. 2006), and that addressing these issues is 
increasingly expensive and is generally infeasible (Renooij 2001). Because of such 
prevailing views, eliciting parameters from experts (Savage 1971) is focused on 
acquiring general notion of variables, relations between the variables, and degree 
and direction of impact. 
Parameter elicitation is often done via interviews with experts (Nadkarni & 
Shenoy 2004) or questionnaires. Experts are normally asked to rate prior 
probabilities on a scale e.g. from 1 to 10, “very low” to “very high”, a combination 
of numeric scale and text labels (van der Gaag et al. 2002), or using probability 
lotteries (Harrison et al. 2014). 
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While it is possible to perform sensitivity analysis to refine the elicited parameters 
by exploring sensitivity to edge removal (Renooij 2010), or more traditionally by 
inspecting how a target variable reflects changes to other parameters in its 
posterior probability, it is computationally expensive, especially when multiple 
parameters are adjusted simultaneously (Laskey 1995; Coupé et al. 2000). 
With increasing complexity of models, the task of probability elicitation becomes 
more daunting. One technique called divorcing (Neil et al. 2000; Nielsen & Jensen 
2009) is to reduce the number of parents a node has by introducing synthetic 
intermediate nodes, which in turn significantly reduces the size of the node’s NPT 
and hence requires fewer probabilities to be entered. It is increasingly more 
common to apply approaches that allow us to avoid specifying probability values 
directly. Conditional probabilities can often be defined with a Noisy-OR model if 
an expert indicates that any cause can independently lead to a particular effect. A 
Noisy-AND model can be used if a combination of causes is required to achieve 
the effect (Henrion 1989; Pradhan et al. 1994; Zagorecki & Druzdzel 2004). 
Another option is to consider using qualitative probabilistic networks (Wellman 1990) 
which are an abstraction of quantitative BNs, and use qualitative instead of 
numeric relationships with emphasis on synergy and degree of impact. When 
coupled with sensitivity analysis this method is claimed to be successful in arriving 
at meaningful likelihood values (Biedermann & Taroni 2006). 
A special type of variable called ranked node was introduced in (Fenton & Neil 2007) 
that largely solves the problem of defining probability distributions for many 
commonly occurring nodes that have a scale-type list of ordered states e.g. “Very 
Low”, “Low”, “Medium”, “High”, “Very High”. Such ranked nodes are modelled 
by a doubly truncated normal distribution (i.e. TNormal). Typically the ordinal 
scale has 3, 5 or 7 states, but the method described in (Fenton & Neil 2007), which 
is implemented in AgenaRisk, allows for any number of  states since a ranked node 
has an underlying numerical range of 0-1; the 𝑛 states are mapped to 𝑛 equal 
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intervals within this range. Instead of manually defining all entries of the 
underlying probability table of the ranked node, it is possible to capture most 
common parent child relationships by a TNormal distribution whose mean is some 
kind of weighted type function of the parents. (Fenton & Neil 2007) demonstrated 
that four such weighted functions covered most common relationships (namely: 
weighted mean, weighted max, weighted min and a weighted min-max that 
combines min and max). Each of these is implemented in AgenaRisk.  
In essence, only the relevant weighted function, together with the parent 
weights,needs to be elicited from the expert. The variance of the TNormal acts as 
a ‘credibility’ index and is directly proportional to the magnitude of the correlation 
between variables. Tests performed by Fenton & Neil and by Laitila & Virtanen 
(Laitila & Virtanen 2016) indicate that using this approach is much more reliable 
than eliciting every probability value for the NPTs manually and provides 
enormous effort savings. 
 
Figure 20: Example of using Ranked Nodes to Assess Classifier Accuracy 
Figure 20 provides an illustration of a typical application of ranked nodes. In this 
case the child node “Classifier Accuracy” refers to the accuracy of a human 
classifier, which is impacted by their experience, training and the effort they put 
into the classification task. We may define all nodes as ranked, with 3 states each 
“Low”, “Medium” and “High”. We note that effort is an especially important 
factor, because no matter how good the expert is, a lack of effort will result in a job 
done poorly. Therefore we may define the weights for experience, training and 
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effort as 3, 3 and 10 respectively, and define accuracy as a weighted minimum of 
these parameters. In the figure we consider two polar scenarios. The first (blue) 
observes low experience and training, but high effort, which results in likely low 
accuracy of the expert. In the second scenario (green) the expert has high 
experience and training, but puts in a low effort, which also results in a low overall 
accuracy, which is in line with our assumptions. We could use any other weighted 
function, such as a weighted mean, but this particular option would not be suitable 
for this illustration, as it would allow high effort to overpower low experience and 
training and cause the model to incorrectly predict high accuracy. 
 Applying Idioms in the Project 
Each idiom (as specified in Section 3.3.3) has its own semantic meaning, and 
dictates the edge directions. It needs to be noted that, although it is recommended 
that edges maintain causal directions (Koller & Friedman 2009; Fenton & Neil 
2012a), it is not a hard requirement, as explained in Section 3.3.2. The following 
idioms were identified: 
1) Cause-consequence idiom (Fenton & Neil 2012d) models a causal process in 
terms of the relationship between its cause (i.e. process input) and its consequence 
(i.e. process output). 
 
Figure 21: Cause-Consequence Idiom  
Figure 21 shows the generic example in a), its basic instantiation in b) and an 
extended generic example with controls and mitigants in c), which is instantiated 
in Figure 22. The direction of the arrows in a) and b) indicates the causality 
Cause
Consequence
Virus in System
Failure during 
Operation
a) Basic Format b) Simple Instance
Cause Event Consequence
Control Mitigant
c) Extension: Risk Cause-Consequence Idiom
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direction. The model describes the basic relation where one variable is a direct 
cause for another and models uncertainty about the cause when the consequence 
is observable. 
 
Figure 22: Cause-Consequence Idiom Example 
Figure 22 gives an example instantiation of a risk cause-consequence idiom, 
showing how consequences can be influenced by controls, which are not direct 
causes but rather work in combination with them; and mitigants, which are 
combined with consequences to impact severity of the outcome. 
2) Definitional / synthesis idiom allows for combination of information from 
multiple nodes into a single node via a non-causal relationship as seen in Figure 
23. The synthetic node is determined by the values of its parent nodes according 
to a particular combination rule. 
 
Figure 23: Definitional-Synthesis Idiom (Fenton & Neil 2012d) 
We give two examples to illustrate this concept. 
a) Definitional Relationship 
Consider the task of identifying a torrent as a particular movie title. To do this, 
we need to compare the torrent’s name to a candidate movie title. One of the ways 
would be to break up both strings of characters into a number of pieces of the 
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same length (e.g. sub-sequences 3 characters long) and count the total number of 
matching sub-sequences, to establish a very rough estimate of similarity between 
the torrent’s name and the title. The maximum number of such overlaps can be 
calculated if we simply know lengths of the two compared strings. 
 
Figure 24: Definitional Idiom Example of a Deterministic Formula 
Figure 24 illustrates how we can encode the Maximum Overlap node to serve as a 
function that takes as parameters Title Length and Torrent Name Length and 
calculates the result deterministically. Section 2.6 provides relevant background 
into string comparison for title identification. 
b) Synthesis to Reduce Combinatorial Explosion (‘Divorcing’) 
Within the context of risky title detection, we may design a basic model which 
takes account of not only database coverage but also quality of the torrent name 
string. The factors that we might be willing to consider are file name length, 
whether there is a mix of characters from different languages, and the chance that 
there was an intentional obfuscation of the name or unintentional misprints. 
 
Figure 25: Synthesis Example for String Properties before Divorcing 
Figure 25 demonstrates a model that combines multiple factors into a single node, 
resulting in a very big NPT. Separately defining each probability value in this 
NPT is impractical or extremely difficult. Table 20 demonstrated how NPTs 
increase in complexity with every new added parent, therefore it is important to 
keep the number of parents to a minimum if the NPT is to be constructed 
Maximum 
Overlap
Title Length
Torrent Name 
Length
Multiple 
Languages in 
Torrent Name
Title Detected
Title in File 
Name
Database 
Coverage
Torrent Name 
Length
Obfuscation or 
Misprints
108 
 
manually. Suppose Torrent Name Length has 3 states (e.g. “Short”, “Medium” and 
“Long”) and the other nodes are binary. In this case the total number of cells in 
Title Detected NPT is 96. 
 
Figure 26: Synthesis Example for String Properties after Divorcing 
Figure 26 demonstrates that by creating a synthetic node Torrent Name String 
Clarity which combines relevant nodes and has 3 states, we can reduce the 
number of cells from 96 to 24. 
3) Measurement idiom captures uncertainty arising from the way in which a 
variable is measured. It relies on 3 components: the actual value or attribute, the 
assessed value or attribute and the assessment method’s accuracy, as shown in 
Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27: Measurement Idiom (Fenton & Neil 2012d) 
In fact, a simple instance of the measurement idiom was already presented in 
Figure 13, where the attribute we are seeking to ‘measure’ is whether or not an 
item is a fake. As is common in all instances of the measurement idiom, the ‘actual 
value’ is normally not directly observable; instead the ‘assessed value’ (which is 
the test result in the example) is the approximation of it. The higher the assessment 
accuracy (i.e. the higher the database coverage is in the example) the more closely 
we expect the assessed value to reflect the actual value. If the assessment accuracy 
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is known to be low then generally the assessed value of the attribute tells us little 
about the actual value. 
We may further improve the example model by including another important factor 
– Torrent Name String Clarity – such that the revised model is as in Figure 28. 
  
Figure 28: Fakes Detection as Example of Accuracy Measurement Idiom Instantiation 
Note that dotted arrows represent the synthesis idiom instance, as multiple nodes 
are combined into a single synthetic accuracy node. Solid arrows are the ones 
making up the measurement idiom instantiation. 
 Torrent is Fake False True 
Detection Accuracy Low High Low High 
Evidence of Fake Detected 
False 0.7 0.95 0.6 0.01 
True 0.3 0.05 0.4 0.99 
Table 21: NPT for Evidence of Fake Detected in Accuracy Idiom Example 
Let the NPT for Torrent is Fake be defined as in Table 18, and the NPTs for Evidence 
of Fake Detected and Detection Accuracy be defined according to Tables 21 and 22 
respectively. Torrent String Clarity and Database Coverage are defined to be uniform. 
 Database Coverage Low High 
Torrent String Clarity Bad Good Bad Good 
Detection Accuracy 
Low 0.99 0.4 0.6 0.01 
High 0.01 0.6 0.4 0.99 
Table 22: NPT for Detection Accuracy in Accuracy Idiom Example 
The general motivation behind these example NPTs is that either bad name string 
clarity or low database coverage may cause low accuracy, but string clarity has a 
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higher impact. When accuracy is low, we effectively have low confidence in the 
results of the detection test, either positive or negative. 
 
Figure 29: Extended Fakes Detection Model Demo 
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This is illustrated by scenarios b and c in Figure 29, where our prior belief about 
the item being a fake was almost unaffected by detected evidence due to low 
accuracy. 
On the other hand, increasing the system’s accuracy makes for a dramatic impact 
of detecting evidence on our posterior belief, as demonstrated by Figure 29d and 
to a larger extent by Figure 29e. 
4) Induction idiom is used when a number of observations of the same event 
type are available, to make a prediction about an unknown event of this type, given 
contextual differences. A very simplistic example is parameter learning such as 
trying to learn movie length distribution based on a number of observed movie 
lengths in a user’s collection. 
 
Figure 30: Induction Idiom Example 
In the BN illustrated by Figure 30, we model movie length as a Normal distribution 
with unknown parameters Mean and Variance. The priors for both Mean and 
Variance are defined as uniform continuous distributions expressing our initial 
ignorance of movie length. By creating a node for each observed movie with NPT 
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defined as Normal(mean, variance), we learn the mean and variance parameters and 
hence the movie length distribution. 
The ‘contextual differences’ in this case (illustrated by Figure 31) would be whether 
we were trying to predict the length of an unobserved movie in a different user’s 
collection, knowing that the different user tends to be less patient, and therefore 
likely to watch movies of shorter length. We may add a contextual parent to the 
predicted node, and define the latter to consist of two partitions. One would apply 
if user is not impatient (the original prediction as in Figure 30), and the other would 
use a weight of e.g. 0.8 for the learnt mean to calculate the predicted movie length, 
as seen in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31: Effects of Contextual Differences on Learnt Distribution 
Defining the idioms is an important step towards formalising the process of 
building BNs, and closing the gap between well-established software engineering 
procedures and BN-building practices. 
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3.4. Model Overview 
 
Figure 32: Basic Overview of the Current Model 
Over multiple iterations of the model throughout the lifespan of the project we 
arrived at the general structure shown in Figure 32. Note that multiple nodes are 
combined behind nodes with rectangular dashed border for diagram simplicity 
(the rectangular nodes can be thought of as BN objects). The core concept is that 
the torrent type, also called ‘medium’, dictates other properties of the file. 
However, as we may not directly observe the actual medium or other properties; 
we have to predict them based on the declared file size and evidence encoded in 
the torrent name string by its poster. It is important to distinguish actual and 
advertised properties because some torrents have a description that is deceptive 
and does not correspond to their actual contents. 
One of the primary objectives of this thesis was to develop a coherent framework 
to produce reliable predictions about the content of torrent downloads. We 
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identified the following attributes that are normally not directly observable and 
that we therefore seek to predict (coloured green in Figure 32): 
 Primary medium of the download e.g. music, movie, game etc. 
 Whether the item is porn 
 Whether the item is a fake 
 Whether the item contains malware 
These predictions are based on evidence, entered as observations, for nodes that 
are directly observable (coloured pink in Figure 32). These include: 
 File size 
 Medium signatures 
 Porn signatures 
 Porn actor and studio names 
 Movie, TV series and game titles 
 ‘Risk group’ titles 
Each of the above is explained in their own sections in this chapter. 
3.5. Real Medium 
In the early conceptualisation stage MovieLabs supplied us with their estimation 
of possible medium distribution of super categories, as shown in Table 23. 
Medium 
Category 
Proportion 
Audio 16 
Image 6 
Software 8 
Text 10 
Video 60 
Table 23: Original Medium Category Proportions Estimated by MovieLabs 
We adopted our two-level taxonomy at a later stage and then needed to extend 
MovieLabs priors to the relevant subcategories. 
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We used human classifiers’ votes on DS2500 to get rough proportions of sub-
categories within their super categories (𝐻 column in Table 24). In some cases the 
human classifiers were not always sure or disagreed about an item’s classification. 
Although they were instructed to select the category they felt was most probable, 
in some cases they chose only a super category or the “unknown” option. 
According to feedback from MovieLabs on these proportion figures, we adjusted 
some of them (𝐻𝐴 column in Table 24). For example, we redistributed weight from 
movies and music towards other video and audio sub-categories, accordingly. 
Books, on the other hand, gained weight. 
Super Category Sub-Category 𝑯 𝑯𝑨 
Audio 
Audio: Music 0.92 0.83 
Audio: OST 0.03 0.05 
Audio: Other 0.06 0.12 
Image Image 1.00 1.00 
Software 
Software: Game 0.30 0.30 
Software: Other 0.70 0.70 
Text 
Text: Book 0.75 0.90 
Text: Magazine 0.20 0.08 
Text: Other 0.05 0.02 
Video 
Video: Movie 0.45 0.34 
Video: Other 0.25 0.30 
Video: TV 0.30 0.36 
Table 24: Proportions of Sub-Categories Provided by Humans and Amended by MovieLabs 
At a much later point we inserted the “Mixed” category into the taxonomy. The 
resulting figures were rounded to 3 significant figures to accommodate 
probabilities as low as 0.001 for “Mixed”. The resulting distribution can be found 
in Table 25. 
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Real 
Medium 
Audio: Music 0.132 
Audio: OST 0.008 
Audio: Other 0.016 
Image 0.058 
Mixed 0.001 
Software: Game 0.025 
Software: Other 0.058 
Text: Book 0.090 
Text: Magazine 0.008 
Text: Other 0.001 
Video: Movie 0.206 
Video: Other 0.182 
Video: TV 0.215 
Table 25: NPT for Real Medium in Current Model 
The NPT table for Real Medium is very simple because it is a root node. Ultimately, 
it expresses our prior belief in the distribution of various categories of medium 
among the downloadable torrent files. 
3.6. Fakes and Malware 
A study in (Cuevas et al. 2010) reveals that 30% of supplied and 25% of 
downloaded content could be classified as fake items in 2010. Note that we focus 
primarily on fakes mimicking movies that are either anticipated or running in 
movie theatres. The actual content of the fakes may be either broken videos or 
malware. These observations are in line with information provided to us by 
MovieLabs and with our own analysis of the DSFM and DS120 samples. We also, 
however, consider the possibility for games, software and TVs to be faked. We can 
draw a chain of relations between the events ‘movie title match in file name’, ‘title 
of interest’, ‘fake’ and ‘malware’ where various risks must be assessed. It can also 
happen that a file name contains a movie title, but ends with an executable 
software extension such as ‘exe’, which also highlights a high risk of malware. 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, we define a fake as a torrent that is created not for the 
purpose of sharing the desired original content, but to mislead the public. For 
example, it could be named as an upcoming movie and contain a broken video, or 
a bait video with instructions to download a ‘codec’ from a suspicious web 
address, which actually turns out to be malware. 
3_Idiots__Full_Movie__DVDRiPHQ__Hindi_Torrent_____Download_.exe 
Figure 33: Example of a Fake Torrent 
The item in Figure 33 illustrates a simple fake torrent, which has a movie title 
(‘3 Idiots’) in the name string and claims to contain a movie ripped from a DVD. 
However, it also has some evidence in the name string that indicates that it actually 
might contain an executable rather than a video file. In theory, it could be software 
that would download the actual movie, but most likely it is malware, trying to fool 
an unwary user into launching this potentially malicious runnable file. In our 
study of newly posted torrent files we observed multiple items similar to this 
example, and all of them were malware. 
In addition to the research in (Cuevas et al. 2010), which attempts to study the 
intentions of those who post torrent content online, we conducted a small study of 
our own. It was supposed to confirm or refine the prior expectation of fakes and 
malware among downloadable torrent files, and confirm or disprove the original 
statement that MovieLabs shared with us that a third of items that look like porn 
are, in fact, malware. In this experiment we downloaded 211 items from a single 
stream of newly posted torrents that looked like they contain porn, or upcoming 
or recently released movies. We then verified the contents of the items, which are 
summarised in Table 26, where 𝑈 denotes upcoming titles, 𝑇 refers to movies 
running in theatres, and 𝑅 refers to movies that were released within 3 months 
from the date of the study, and not running in theatres any more. 
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Looks Like 
Porn 𝑼 𝑻 𝑹 
Total 106 4 63 38 
Fake 3 4 33 2 
Malware 1 2 20 2 
Advertisement 11 1 15 1 
None of the above 92 0 24 22 
Table 26: Fakes & Malware Preliminary Study Summary 
The groups ‘Fake’, ‘Malware’ and ‘Advertisement’ are not mutually exclusive in 
this table. We noticed that many torrents contained text files and web links that 
promoted torrent tracker websites or contained other advertising. Note that 
upcoming titles and those currently running in theatres are the most at risk of 
being fake. Additionally, out of all 42 fake items, 25 were malware, and the rest 
were broken or irrelevant videos. This small study provides us with a basis for 
drawing general relationships between porn, fakes, malware and titles that are 
most at risk. 
The BN fragment of the current model illustrated by Figure 34 demonstrates the 
core mechanism for detecting fakes and malware. Input is a simple switch node 
that allows to choose a different prior for fakes depending on the collection of items 
being analysed. In our case two modes were relevant – ‘newly posted files’ and 
‘old files’ – with the relevant observation set automatically depending on the mode 
selected by a human operator prior to running a classification task on a batch of 
items. This BN fragment presents a simple instantiation of the cause-consequence 
idiom from Section 3.3.5. 
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Figure 34: Model Fragment – Real Medium, Input, Fake, Malware 
We define the NPT for Fake in Table 27, based on expert feedback from MovieLabs 
and our own study summarised in Table 26. Note that by default we use a very 
small number for True e.g. 0.0001, and only columns with non-default values are 
shown. 
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Fake 
False 0.9 0.4 0.999 0.7 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.99 0.999 0.99 0.999 
True 0.1 0.6 0.001 0.3 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.01 0.001 0.01 0.001 
Table 27: NPT Fragment for Fake in Current Model 
Table 27 captures the knowledge that old files generally pose a much lower risk of 
fakes, yet we still identify that it is mostly items in “Software: Other” and “Video: 
Other” categories that may be deceiving. Other categories such as “Software: 
Game”, “Video: Movie”, “Video: TV” and “Mixed” are assumed to also have a 
small chance of being a fake. On the other hand, for new files there is a much higher 
chance of fakes originating in “Software: Other” and “Video: Other” categories, 
e.g. because a torrent bearing a name of a relevant popular movie actually contains 
a broken video or malware. 
Many users are very likely to remove an item they discover to be fake from their 
machine, which makes most fake items rather short-lived and means that there 
Fake
Input Malware
Real
Medium
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may be torrents containing fakes that did not circulate in the network long enough 
to be even picked up by the MovieLabs system. 
 Fake False True 
Real 
Medium 
Mixed Software: 
Game 
Software: 
Other Mixed 
Software: 
Game 
Software: 
Other 
Malware 
False 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999 0.4 0.1 0.05 
True 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.6 0.9 0.95 
Table 28: NPT Fragment for Malware in Current Model 
The NPT for Malware is defined as in Table 28 and is based on expert feedback 
from MovieLabs and our own study summarised in Table 26. Note that by default 
we use a zero probability for True, and only columns with non-default values are 
shown. This effectively means that we assume that malware can only be software, 
and those torrents that contain other types of files mixed with software. We 
decided to use this assumption to avoid unnecessary complexity of the model, 
even though there is technically a non-zero (but very low) probability that other 
types of media may be infected. Normally we assume that software, when it is not 
a fake, still has a very low probability of containing malware, for example due to 
sharing infected software that is otherwise legitimate. However, if the software is 
a fake, then chances of malware become very high, but not a complete certainty, 
because sometimes it may just be a faulty or harmless computer program. 
3.7. Advertised Medium 
Advertised Medium is the key to interpretation of the evidence we can gather. The 
essence of this concept is that declared file size and the posted name may not 
describe the actual content of the torrent. Normally, we assume that a non-fake 
item is most likely to be described in a meaningful way that reflects its actual 
contents (i.e. advertised medium is the same as real medium), while a fake will 
attempt to look like something else (i.e. advertised medium is different from real 
medium). 
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Figure 35: Current Model Fragment – Real Medium, Fake, Advertised Medium 
Figure 35 demonstrates the relevant fragment from the model. The relationship 
between Real Medium and Fake defines which categories can or are expected to be 
fakes, and the node Advertised Medium specifies how the appearance of items can 
be affected if they were fakes according to the NPT fragment in Table 30. An item 
that is not fake has its medium simply translated from ‘real’ to ‘advertised’ as 
illustrated by the NPT fragment in Table 29. Note that only a subset of the 
categories are displayed. 
 Fake False 
Real Medium 
Audio: 
Music 
Software: 
Other 
Text: 
Magazine 
Video: 
Movie 
Advertised 
Medium 
Audio: Music 1 0 0 0 
Software: Other 0 1 0 0 
Text: Magazine 0 0 1 0 
Video: Movie 0 0 0 1 
Table 29: NPT Fragment for Advertised Medium in Current Model (Not Fake) 
The purpose of the NPT fragment in Table 30 is to map the real medium of a fake 
to its advertised medium, allowing us to express the relationship between each 
pair of real and advertised categories. Note that the values shown are prior to 
normalisation and each value in every column is then proportionally scaled, such 
that all values in a column add up to 1 (this is done automatically in AgenaRisk). 
Assume that omitted cells contain a value of 1. The numbers in this table are based 
on consultations with MovieLabs experts. 
Real
Medium
Fake
Advertised 
Medium
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 Fake True 
Real Medium 
Audio: 
Music 
Mixed 
Software: 
Other 
Video: 
Movie 
Video: 
Other 
Advertised 
Medium 
Audio: Music 1000 1 1 1 1 
Mixed 1 700 1 1 1 
Software: Game 1 50 350 1 1 
Software: Other 1 50 450 1 1 
Video: Movie 1 100 400 1000 600 
Video: Other 1 1 50 10 100 
Video: TV 1 1 50 1 50 
Table 30: NPT Fragment for Advertised Medium in Current Model when Fake is True (non-normalised probabilities) 
The motivation behind the figures in Table 30 is that “Mixed” category items, when 
being fake, might be advertised as software, or they can be a real movie file 
accompanied with an executable malware file. The column for “Software: Other” 
suggests that fakes coming from this category will mostly be presented as 
applications, games or movies. It is a rare case that movies themselves may be 
fakes, but sometimes users post a porn movie and name it as a recent blockbuster. 
We also observe cases where a movie would be posted with a cryptic name, 
suggesting that there is a private catalogue that maps these cryptic names to the 
actual movie titles, available to users of a particular sharing service. A possible 
reason for this is to avoid detection by anti-piracy agents. 
From Figure 36a we note that there are very few fake items compared to the total 
population size. When an item is not fake, the posterior medium distribution is 
maintained across all categories except for a small fluctuation in “Video: Movie” 
and “Software: Other”, because these two categories are most affected by fakes. 
123 
 
 
Figure 36: Relationship between Fake, Real Medium and Advertised Medium 
When Fake is set to “True”, Advertised Medium shows categories that the fakes 
mimic, while Real Medium shows real categories of the fakes. Note that a small 
proportion of fakes may still originate from “Video: Movie” and “Video: TV” 
probably due to mistakes or intentional obfuscation in the name. 
The most significant and practical implication of this section for the current model 
is the ability to handle cases when an item looks like a “Video: Movie”, but we find 
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some evidence that it may be a fake, and therefore change our posterior belief 
about real medium to be “Video: Other” or “Software: Other” instead. 
3.8. File Size 
File size is a very significant piece of evidence, since it is indicative of the torrent’s 
content even without much meaningful evidence in the name string. However, a 
deep analysis of the relationship between file size and medium categories was 
required before we could use this data. The NPT for File Size is ultimately based 
on DS2500. See Figure F.1 and Table F.1 for the original data supplied by experts. 
We define 33 discrete ranges that increase in interval size according to their order 
of magnitude as shown in Table 31. For example, a file of size 907MB will fall into 
the range “900 to 1,000” while a file of size 4,500MB will fall into the range “4,000 
to 5,000”. 
File 
Size (MB) 
Range 
Size (MB) 
0 to 100 10 
100 to 1,000 100 
1,000 to 10,000 1,000 
10,000 to 50,000 10,000 
Over 50,000 ∞ 
Table 31: File Size Ranges 
The primary reasoning for such a discretisation of ranges is that there is more 
diversity in the lower end of the spectrum – more than 50% of files in the sample 
fall below 500MB and more than 70% of files fall below 1,000MB. 
Ideally File Size should be defined as a continuous-type node within the modelling 
software with a multi-modal distribution for each parent’s state. However, due to 
difficulties in learning the necessary distributions and their parameters we decided 
to discretise this node and plot smoothened distributions manually. The multi-
modal nature of file size distributions lies with potential granularity of some 
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categories according to their orthogonal properties. For example, we observe that 
movies cluster around 2GB for regular movies and 8GB for high definition movies. 
We constructed the NPT for the File Size node, motivated by the original data (see 
Figure 37; frequency per range is y-axis, ranges are x-axis), avoiding data artefacts 
like zeros and sudden spikes. In some cases our derived distributions do not follow 
the data completely due to not having observed sufficient numbers of items of 
every category. For 5 of 13 categories with total count less than 1% of all items in 
DS2500, we manually defined distributions based on expert-confirmed 
assumptions. 
For example, “Audio: OST” (original soundtrack) comprised less than 0.5% of the 
studied sample, which significantly lowers the reliability of such data. In case of 
“Audio: OST”, we made an assumption that it is more likely for somebody to share 
a complete soundtrack for an item such as a movie, for which a reasonable size 
may be under 200MB. As indicated in the Future Work Section 7.3, a separate study 
of the file size alone would benefit the overall model. 
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Figure 37: Example of File Size Distributions 
0
20
40
60
80
100
10 60 200 700 3000 8000
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
10 60 200 700 3000 8000
0
1
2
3
4
10 30 50 70 90 200 400
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
10 50 90 400 800
126 
 
Essentially, evidence connected to Real Medium would have a higher impact on the 
final predictions than the evidence connected to Advertised Medium due to relation 
to Fake, which was explained in Section 3.6. Therefore we decided to connect the 
File Size node to Advertised Medium in the absence of a complete expert 
understanding of how file size was related to different types of media at all size 
ranges. It is important to note that many fakes also mimic file size. For example, a 
broken video bearing a name of a popular movie could play for only several 
seconds, but still have the size that a decent movie video file is expected to have, 
which indicates that file size is yet another attribute of the torrent appearance and 
should not be directly connected to Real Medium. The final NPT and accompanying 
graphs for each medium category are available in Appendix Table F.2 and 
Appendix Figure F.2 respectively. 
3.9. Signatures 
The original expertise provided to us by MovieLabs revolved around the idea of 
keywords, which could be detected as substrings in a file name and subsequently 
associated with a medium category. We re-defined this approach in terms of 
signatures, which are the primary piece of evidence found in the torrent name 
strings, and consider whether the name string contains: 
 Specific medium category evidence 
 Mention of a language 
 Subtitles info 
 Date 
 Year 
For the purpose of the BN model in the project, a signature is evidence found in 
the torrent name that is associated with a particular medium category and has a 
strength value for this association. Section 4.1 explains the process of extracting 
evidence to be used for the BN model as observations, and how signatures are 
127 
 
defined in terms of text strings, patterns and strength of category associations. 
There are several special types of evidence such as date, subtitles, year and 
language that are similar to the regular category signatures. Each medium sub-
category has its own node, e.g. as illustrated by the BN fragment in Figure 38. This 
allows us to specify that there is a chance to detect a signature for a particular 
advertised medium category when the item actually belongs some real medium 
category. 
 
Figure 38: Current Model Fragment – Advertised Medium and Several Signature Nodes 
Consider, for example, the torrent name from Table 32. While it has a number of 
general video and movie-specific attributes, it also contains information about the 
audio channel. This means that we can expect to observe some audio signatures in 
a file name that ultimately describes a video file (see Appendix Figure G.1 for a BN 
illustration). 
Before.Sunset.2004.DVDRip.x264.aac.mkv 
Before Sunset Movie title 
2004 Movie release year 
DVDRip Video source 
x264 Video encoding 
mkv File extension 
aac Audio compression 
Table 32: Movie Torrent Example with Audio Signature 
Another type of behaviour modelled is that the same bit of information may refer 
to files of different type. For example, a date in a file name may indicate that it is 
either a radio recording (i.e. “audio”), or a record of a TV programme (i.e. “video”) 
as demonstrated by Appendix Figure G.2. 
Advertised 
Medium
Date
Signature
Found
Audio:
Music Signature
Found
Video:
Movie Signature
Found
Software:
Game Signature
Found
Subtitles 
Signature
Found
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Some signatures may have to be able to overpower other evidence. For example, a 
file name may have a number of strong clues that the item is a movie (e.g. as in 
Appendix Figure G.3), but a simple inclusion of ‘OST’ in the name may almost 
definitively indicate that it is, in fact, only soundtrack (e.g. as in Appendix Figure 
G.4) and not the actual movie. Of course, file size would also be different for both 
these examples and has to be taken into account. However, even without file size 
evidence, the posterior belief will shift towards soundtrack after observing 
relevant evidence as shown in Appendix Figure G.5. Note that detecting both 
soundtrack and movie signatures may also refer to a mixed torrent that contains 
both the movie and the soundtrack, so a decision rule approach here is not a 
completely suitable option. 
 Regular Signature Node NPTs 
In the early iterations of the model we used Boolean nodes to model evidence for 
a particular category. However, the necessity to specify the amount (or strength) 
of evidence for a particular category soon became apparent. The current model 
uses a positive numeric value for the strength of detected signatures. Apart from 
state 0 which simply means that nothing was found, there are 19 more states up to 
2 in increments of 0.1, and the last state is from 2 to infinity. Effectively, the value 
of 2 is a cap we placed to make the NPTs for signature nodes more practical. In 
reality very few items will reach the cap for more multiple categories at once. For 
example, an item with over 2 signature strength for “Video: Movie” is very 
unlikely to also reach over 2 for another category. 
The underlying probability distribution for every signature node must be 
inherently bimodal because the normal expectation should be ultimately high to 
find no evidence, e.g. prior probability for the 0 state is close to 1. However, the 
discovery of evidence should follow a logical progression. For example, the more 
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accurate the description of a movie torrent, the higher the signature score for 
“Video: Movie”. 
The manner of discretisation of the regular signature nodes means that they each 
have a 21 by 13 NPT. Our approach for defining conditional probabilities for 
signature nodes is based on the notion of related medium categories. For example, 
“Video: TV” category is related to “Video: Movie” closer, as opposed to “Text: 
Book”, because there are some signatures shared between movie and TV torrents, 
such as HDTVRIP, which refers to the video being ripped from HDTV source. It is 
also of interest that the same signature may not be relevant for all sub-categories 
within one category, e.g. x264 is not used for “Video: Other” but possible for 
“Video: Movie” or “Video: TV”. 
Sony.Vegas.Movie.Studio.Platinum.Edition.v.8.0d.build.139.2008.PC 
Figure 39: Video Editing Software Torrent with Weak Movie Signature 
Note that evidence associations between categories are not necessarily reversible, 
for example, weak movie evidence may contribute toward “Software: Other”, but 
not the other way around. This case may be illustrated by a torrent containing 
video processing software such as the example in Figure 39. 
The crucial point about associations between categories lies in the ability to capture 
the following behaviour: 
 An item that belongs to a category 𝐴 is expected to have strong evidence 
associated with 𝐴 in the name string. 
 Presence of weak evidence associated with category 𝐴 may contribute to our 
belief that the item actually belongs to a different category 𝐵. 
A simple example to illustrate this was presented in Table 32. Such a torrent 
contains strong cumulative evidence for “Video: Movie” and weak evidence for 
“Audio”, which in this case must contribute to our belief that the actual sub-
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category is “Video: Movie”. In essence, a movie torrent is more likely to have very 
strong movie evidence and may have some weak audio evidence. 
 
Figure 40: Video: TV Signature Detected NPT Graphs (Driven by Original Data and Generated) 
Figure 40 demonstrates the original data motivating the NPT for Video: TV 
Signature Detected node as well as our projected interpretation of this data. The 
x-axis is the signature strength of advertised medium categories found in a torrent 
of a particular real medium category (e.g. “Video: TV” in this graph). The y-axis of 
the leftmost graph is the frequencies with which each signature strength value was 
observed in the data for “Video: TV”, while y-axis in the rightmost graph is the 
expected probability of observing signature strengths. The actual numbers on the 
y-axis are not important as we are mostly concerned with trends and proportions 
here. 
Note that we deliberately reduce sensitivity to finding no evidence by setting the 
first row in each NPT column to a very large number, which enforces little 
posterior effect when the node is instantiated to 0 evidence. Therefore, the first 
data point in the graph on the right is omitted. Parameters for the distributions 
were informed in part by expert knowledge provided by MovieLabs, and 
supplemented by analysis of the DS2500 data sample.  
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Every medium category corresponds to a column in the NPT and, except for the 
first row, features a distribution with a geometric progression based on parameters 
𝑇 (i.e. starting point) and 𝑀 (i.e. multiplier), which are determined according to 
Tables 33 and 34. We identified several levels of category relationships as seen in 
Table 33. Refer to the short sub-category names in Table 4. 
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Audio: Music 1         W       S   W 
Audio: OST S 1                     
Audio: Other S   1                   
Image       1               S 
Software: Game         1         S   S 
Software: Other W     W   1           S 
Text: Book       W   S 1 W         
Text: Magazine           S   1         
Text: Other             S   1       
Video: Movie W         W       1 S S 
Video: Other                   S 1 W 
Video: TV W                 S   1 
Table 33: Associations between Medium Categories 
Table 33 outlines how much evidence associated with a category 𝐶𝐸 will contribute 
to believing that the item actually belongs to a category 𝑐, and assumes the 
following legend: 
 1: category 𝑐 is the same as 𝐶𝐸 
 S: weak evidence associated with 𝐶𝐸 strongly contributes to 𝑐 
 W: weak evidence associated with 𝐶𝐸 weakly contributes to 𝑐 
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Table 34 provides definitions of 𝑇 and 𝑀 which are passed as parameters to 
Algorithm 1 below. 
Association 𝑻 𝑴 
1 1.0 1.10  
S 6.0 0.65 
W 3.0 0.65 
(default) 2.0 0.65 
Table 34: Mapping for 𝑇 and 𝑀 from Table 33 
Each column of a signature node NPT is defined according to the Algorithm 1, 
which takes parameters 𝑇 and 𝑀, the list of column rows 𝑅 and uses an arbitrarily 
large constant e.g. 3,000 as the value for the first row before normalisation. 
// Parameters: starting value 𝑇, multiplier 𝑀, rows 𝑅 
// Initialise cell value 𝐸 
𝐸 =  𝑇 
for each 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 do { 
 // Set the row cell Er 
 𝐸𝑟 = 𝐸 
 𝐸 = 𝐸 ×𝑀 
} 
// Set the zero row cell to a sufficiently big number 
// to represent prior belief in zero evidence 
𝐸0 = 3000 
// Normalise column by invoking Algorithm 2 
NORMALISE(𝑅) 
Algorithm 1: Generate Column for Signature Found NPT 
The normalisation procedure simply weights all values in the column according to 
Algorithm 2, such that they add up to 1 and are effectively probabilities. Algorithm 
2 takes as a parameter the list of column rows 𝑅. We assume here that the sum of 
values in the whole column is not equal to 0. 
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// Parameters: rows 𝑅 
// Initialise column sum 𝑆 
𝑆 =  0 
for each 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 do { 
 // Row cell Er 
 𝑆 = 𝑆 + 𝐸𝑟 
} 
for each 𝑟 ∈ 𝑅 do { 
 // Row cell Er 
 𝐸𝑟 = 𝐸𝑟 𝑆⁄  
} 
Algorithm 2: NPT Normalisation 
The following example considers generating values for the NPT in Video: TV 
Signature Found node, column “Audio: Music”. According to Tables 33 and 34, 𝐶𝐸 
is “Video: TV”, 𝑐 is “Audio: Music”, parameters 𝑇 and 𝑀 are 3.0 and 0.65 
respectively. A relevant scenario is when we find weak TV evidence e.g. ‘Part 1’, 
and the desired outcome here is for this evidence to contribute to the belief that the 
item actually is “Audio: Music” on the assumption that a real TV would have a 
much stronger TV evidence. 
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Column 
Generated by 
Algorithm 1 
Final Column 
Normalised with 
Algorithm 2  
3000 (initially 3.0) 0.998147 
1.95 0.000649 
1.2675 0.000422 
0.823875 0.000274 
0.535519 0.000178 
0.348087 0.000116 
0.226257 7.53E-05 
0.147067 4.89E-05 
0.095593 3.18E-05 
0.062136 2.07E-05 
0.040388 1.34E-05 
0.026252 8.73E-06 
0.017064 5.68E-06 
0.011092 3.69E-06 
0.00721 2.4E-06 
0.004686 1.56E-06 
0.003046 1.01E-06 
0.00198 6.59E-07 
0.001287 4.28E-07 
0.000837 2.78E-07 
Table 35: Generating Signature NPT Column Example 
Table 35 shows how Algorithm 1 starts with setting the zero row to 𝑇 then fills the 
column down multiplying the previous value by 𝑀, and then sets the zero row to 
an arbitrarily high number e.g. 3000. Then Algorithm 2 normalises the column 
such that all values become probabilities and add up to 1. The large number in zero 
row is used to make sure that not finding any evidence does not have a big impact 
on the posterior belief. We decided to use this approach in order to avoid situations 
where a signature, that Toran is not aware of, fails to be picked up and thus impacts 
the posterior belief in a wrong way. 
135 
 
 Special Signature Node NPTs 
While most signatures are based on generic patterns related to media types, 
extensions, commonly used keywords etc., there are particular signatures that 
could be combined into several groups: 
 Date 
 Year 
 Subtitles 
 Language 
When considering NPTs of these nodes below, note that only significant columns 
are displayed, and all others can be assumed to have 0.999 in “false” or “none” as 
applicable, which is also true for Tables 37 and 38. 
Date Detected is a very basic node and it captures whether a numeric date is 
contained in the torrent name. Its NPT is defined in Table 36. Most commonly we 
find dates to be used for videos in general and short videos in particular, as well 
as for music, images and software. 
 Advertised 
Medium 
Audio: 
Music 
Image 
Software: 
Other 
Video: 
Movie 
Video: 
Other 
Video: 
TV 
Date 
False 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.99 0.995 
True 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.01 0.005 
Table 36: NPT Fragment for Date Detected 
Year Detected is also a basic node and captures whether the torrent name contains 
a year starting with 19 or 20, and its NPT is defined in Table 37. We can often find 
a mention of year in names of music and movie files, and less frequently in other 
videos, software and books. 
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 Advertised 
Medium 
Audio: 
Music 
Software: 
Other 
Text: 
Book 
Video: 
Movie 
Video: 
Other 
Video: 
TV 
Year 
False 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 
True 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Table 37: NPT Fragment for Year Detected 
Subtitles Detected is another binary evidence node and refers to whether the torrent 
name contains subtitles information. We find that the absolute majority of such 
items are movies or TV series, as illustrated by Table 38. 
 Advertised 
Medium 
Video: 
Movie 
Video: 
TV 
Subtitles 
False 0.993 0.994 
True 0.007 0.006 
Table 38: NPT Fragment for Subtitles Detected 
Language is very often present in the names of video torrents, and to a lesser extent 
in software. The NPT for Language Detected was generated according to the 
procedure in Algorithm 1 with “Video: Movie”, “Video: TV” and “Video: Other” 
as increasing columns with 𝑇 = 1.0 and 𝑀 = 1.1, “Software: Other” decreasing 
with 𝑇 = 6.0 and 𝑀 = 0.65 and all other categories decreasing with 𝑇 = 2.0 and 
𝑀 = 0.65, as is demonstrated by Figure 41. 
 
Figure 41: Language Detected NPT Graph 
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Note that the zero row is omitted and contains numbers close to 1 to express our 
prior belief of not detecting language in any torrents. 
3.10. Porn Detection 
A large number of torrents contain porn content (around 16% according to DS2500) 
and this can be captured with signatures that are specifically related to porn, and 
by checking whether the file name string contains some of the names of porn actors 
or studios. MovieLabs initially informed us that around a third of content that 
claimed to be porn, turned out to be malware. This assertion suggested that a BN 
to model this behaviour should look like that shown in Figure 42. 
 
Figure 42: BN Fragment – Option for Modelling Porn and Malware 
However, our own study of the data could not confirm this claim. Out of over a 
hundred items that looked like porn only one turned out to be malware (see Table 
26), so we concluded that there was not a special relationship between porn and 
malware and that a possibility for malware could be modelled via fakes. We 
concentrated on trying to more accurately detect porn content by modelling it 
according to the BN fragment in Figure 43. 
 
Figure 43: Current Model Fragment – Porn Detection 
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It is important that we can specify which types of media can actually contain porn 
and this is accommodated by the Porn node being a child of Real Medium, and the 
NPT is defined as in Table 39. 
 Real 
Medium 
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Porn 
False 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.9 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.99 
True 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.01 
Table 39: NPT for Porn 
The logic behind Porn NPT is that some media formats simply should not be 
considered porn, such as audio, while others have varying probability of 
containing adult material. Most porn is observed in a form of short videos and, to 
a lesser extent, full length movies that are often simply compilations of short 
unrelated videos. 
The current model draws evidence from the following clues found in the torrent 
name, as illustrated by Figure 43: 
 Porn signatures 
 Names of porn actors 
 Porn studios 
 Titles for movies that are listed as adult 
Actual Category Torrent Name 
Audio: Music 200069 - Sexy Trance – 07 
Audio: Music VA-Sex4yourears.Com_Presents-the_Ultimate_Sextape-2010-DjLeak 
Video: Movie Sex.Tape.[1080p].2014 
Video: Other Sexy Striptease (Vocal Trance).mp4 
Video: Movie The Girl Next Door.mkv 
Table 40: Example – Torrents with Porn Signatures but Actually Not Porn 
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The node Porn Signature Found works similarly to other signature nodes covered 
in Section 3.9. However, one important difference is that we specify explicitly that 
porn keywords can be found for items that are not porn. See a number of examples 
in Table 40. Note that “Audio: Music” is not even a visual type of medium, yet it 
may be accompanied by porn keywords. 
 
Figure 44: Porn Signature Found NPT Graphs 
The NPT columns for Porn Signature Found are generated by the procedure 
explained in Algorithm 1, with the configuration in Table 41. When porn is false, 
“Audio: Music” is the increasing column and when porn is true, “Video: Other” 
and “Image” are the increasing columns. The resulting NPT (except the zero row) 
is illustrated by Figure 44. The x-axis is the porn signature strength of advertised 
medium categories found in a torrent of a particular real medium category when 
the torrent is actually porn or not. The y-axis is the expected probability of 
observing signature strengths. The actual numbers on the y-axis are not important 
as we are mostly concerned with trends and proportions here. 
We assume that images generally do not get such an abundance of porn keywords 
as do videos, but images are the second most common source of porn. Note that 
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the graph on the right omits “Audio: Music” as it is now included in “Other 
Categories”. 
 Category 𝑻 𝑴 
N
o
t 
P
o
rn
 
Audio: Music 0.8 1.10 
Video: Movie 3.0 0.65 
Other Categories 2.0 0.65 
P
o
rn
 
Video: Other 1.0 1.10 
Image 1.0 1.05 
Video: Movie 3.0 0.65 
Other Categories 2.0 0.65 
Table 41: 𝑇 and 𝑀 Parameters for Porn Signature Found NPT 
The BN also supports the notion that in some cases items that may look like porn 
actually are not porn. For example, titles such as ‘Sexy Vol Trance’ may often be 
found in names of torrents that contain music. Note how “Audio: Music” is 
defined in Table 41 in such a way that it allows for strong porn evidence. This 
means that when only porn-related words are detected, the model still needs to 
take other factors like video or image evidence and file size into account. 
In order to improve porn detection we expanded a short list of porn studios 
provided by MovieLabs and gathered more than 3,500 porn actors’ names. The 
detection mechanism here is binary and therefore the NPTs are rather simple, as 
illustrated by Tables 42 and 43. 
 Porn False True 
Porn Studio 
Found 
False 0.9999 0.99 
True 0.0001 0.01 
Table 42: NPT for Porn Studio Found in Current Model 
The list of studios in our database is composed of rare combinations of words and 
characters, and was collected specifically to minimise false positives. However, it 
is a small list and we do not expect to often detect an entry from it. 
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 Porn False True 
Porn Actor 
Found 
False 0.999 0.88 
True 0.001 0.12 
Table 43: NPT for Porn Actor Found in Current Model 
Similarly, we only picked actors’ names for which we were confident false 
positives could be avoided, at the cost of the list being not nearly exhaustive. 
However, when there is a match, it should act as strong evidence in favour of porn. 
More details about detecting names and studios can be found in Section 4.3. 
The final piece of evidence relevant for porn detection is being able to match the 
torrent name to a title of a known adult movie. Title detection is more generally 
covered in Section 3.11. 
3.11. Title Detection 
Based on manually processing 2500 items, we estimate that 99% of movies, games 
and TV series torrents contain the item’s title in the torrent name. However, out of 
these 99% items only 22% contain a title in its original release form while others 
contain an official alternative (e.g. translated), obfuscated or unofficial title or 
shorthand. We collected a number of official titles from IMDb as we explain in 
Section 2.4. Some items are pre-classified by IMDb as adult content. We use this 
distinction to improve porn detection by separating movies into two types of titles: 
’movie not porn‘ and ’movie porn’. 
An identification system can only get as good as its knowledge of the titles that it 
needs to identify, therefore database coverage is a very important factor in our 
estimation of identification expectations. It is important to note that a lot of content 
on the Internet is inherently something that would not appear on a formal database 
of titles. For example, somebody may film their cat performing a trick, and the 
video may become very popular; then someone would make a compilation of 
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similar videos and post them as a torrent. Such a torrent would not appear as a 
title in a database. 
There is an additional difficulty in maintaining any kind of relevant database. For 
example, we could not use IMDb’s data directly because a very large proportion 
of it was irrelevant and made title matching significantly longer and less accurate. 
New items must also be regularly added to the database, which means even higher 
maintenance costs. This is one of the reasons we decided to use title matching as a 
secondary source of evidence. 
Please refer to the model overview BN in Figure 32 for the structure relevant to 
title identification. The node Found in DB specifies that it is very unlikely for an 
item to be a fake and porn at the same time, however, real fakes are likely to mimic 
movies specifically. When an item is not a fake, we expect to capture few titles by 
putting a strong prior for “None”. 
When an item is not fake or porn, we expect to detect some titles in their relevant 
categories. The porn category is expected to come mainly as movies with fewer 
TVs and even fewer games. We also expect that some of the porn torrents may be 
identified as non-porn movies, and vice-versa. Primarily this is due to porn and 
non-porn movies being sometimes named the same way. For example, there are 
several thriller, drama and even horror movies named ‘The Girl Next Door’, as 
well as dozens of porn movies and shorts. 
The NPT for Found in DB is defined as in Table 44. Note that the values shown are 
prior to normalisation and each value in every column is then proportionally 
scaled, such that all values in a column add up to 1. Assume that omitted columns 
contain a value of 1 in all rows except the top row, which contains an arbitrarily 
large number e.g. 3000. 
143 
 
 Fake False True 
Porn False True False True 
Advertised 
Medium 
Software: 
Game 
Video: 
Movie 
Video: 
TV 
Software: 
Game 
Video: 
Movie 
Video: 
TV 
Software: 
Other 
Video: 
Other 
… 
F
o
u
n
d
 i
n
 D
B
 
None 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 3000 
Game 500 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Movie Not 
Porn 
1 500 1 1 50 1 2000 2000 1 
Movie Porn 1 50 1 1 500 1 1 1 1 
TV 1 1 500 1 1 50 1 1 1 
Table 44: NPT for Found in DB in Current Model (non-normalised probabilities) 
The probability values of this NPT were primarily informed by the performance 
of Toran on the DS2500 sample. Note that we may also sometimes erroneously 
detect a title (e.g. a movie title found for an item that is a game). We also expect to 
often get a positive match to a correct title when the item is a TV or a movie. 
However, our database of game titles is underpopulated, so only around a third of 
game items may return a positive game title match. 
[SKIDROW]Battleship.2012.HQ.REPACK 
Figure 45: Example of a Torrent Name with Multi-Category Title Match 
The evidence for this node may be uncertain in cases where the detection 
mechanism returns multiple title matches of the same score in different categories. 
In these cases the observation is entered as virtual evidence as defined in Section 
3.2.4. For example, the torrent name in Figure 45 would positively match to a 
movie ‘Battleship’ released in 2012, and its accompanying video game that has the 
same title and release year. In this case the evidence is entered as 0.5 for both 
“Movie Not Porn” and “Game” states (see Figure 46c, note that it is actually virtual 
evidence rather than soft). In contrast, should we only detect a match in a single 
category, we would enter hard evidence on one of those states (Figure 46b). 
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a) Prior marginal values 
before propagation 
b) Revised probabilities when 
found game title 
c) Revised probabilities when 
found both game and a movie title 
 
  
Figure 46: Title Detection Example – Current Model Fragment 
For further details on the procedure for filtering the name string and capturing a 
title see Sections 4.3 and 4.4. 
3.12. Risky Titles 
As indicated in Section 1.1, upcoming, recently released or otherwise relevant 
movie titles are often aggressively protected by their owners, especially when they 
are Hollywood studios. Such movies are also often a target for hackers who post 
disguised malware. Before a movie is leaked or digitally released to the public in 
any other way (e.g. on DVD, Blu-ray, official web download etc.), its title should 
be listed in the ‘risk group’. While we observe very few cases of downloads with 
illegal recordings made inside a cinema theatre, we do notice that after a movie is 
digitally released, it is always guaranteed to be available on the Internet, and may 
soon be moved from the ‘risk group’ to the general title database. 
The node Risky Title Found describes the chances of an item being successfully 
matched to one of such titles depending on whether it is a fake, and on how it looks 
like. 
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 Fake False True 
Advertised 
Medium 
Mixed 
Software: 
Game 
Video: 
Movie 
Mixed 
Software: 
Game 
Video: 
Movie 
Video: 
TV 
Risky Title Found 
False 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.7 0.99 0.01 0.99 
True 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.3 0.01 0.99 0.01 
Table 45: NPT for Found Risky Title in Current Model 
The NPT for Found in DB is defined as in Table 45. Note that only significant 
columns of the NPT are shown, and for all other columns assume 0.9999 for the 
“False” row. This NPT is based on the expert knowledge supplied to us by the 
MovieLabs, our own study of newly posted torrents (see Table 26) and 
performance of our title matching mechanism. We suggest from the records we 
processed manually that among items that look like movies that currently are or 
recently were running in theatres, around 45% and 25% were fakes and malware, 
respectively. 
It is important that even when an item is not a fake and is a movie or, to a lesser 
extent, game or mixed collection, it can match a title in the risk group (i.e. produce 
a false positive), because items may have different content based on the same title. 
For example, it is quite common for popular movies to be followed up by a video 
game based on the movie and sharing the same title. For example, at the time of its 
release in 2012 the movie ‘Battleship’ (2012) would have been considered a risky 
title, and it would very likely be detected in a torrent with the game ‘Battleship’ 
(2012), hence resulting in a false positive. Alternatively, there could be an old 
movie that has the same title as a more recent remake. A mixed collection could 
claim to include both. 
Figure 47 shows two scenarios applicable to risky title detection. Note that for this 
figure there is strong evidence for the item to look like a movie, but this is omitted 
from the figure. 
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a) Item looks like a movie but does not 
contain a risky title 
b) Item looks like a movie and contains a 
risky title 
  
Figure 47: Normal Use of the Risky Title Detection Mechanism for New Torrent Items 
Once a ‘risky’ title is detected in a file name (see Figure 47a), this should lead us to 
believe that the file is a fake with a high degree of confidence. In this case, it most 
likely is either a trailer, a short snapshot of the movie running repetitively or 
featuring the production studio’s logo, or simply a broken video. There is also a 
reasonable probability that the video file would request the viewer to download a 
‘codec’ by following a link to a web page planted with malware. Most items, 
however, will not be positively matched to the ‘risk group’, and our belief would 
be that they are likely to be what they look like, such as in Figure 47b. 
Figure 48 shows that the model is able to correctly classify an item when it is not a 
fake even when there is evidence that it is. In this example the risky title is detected, 
but other evidence suggests that the item is music, so the posterior probability of 
a fake is driven down. 
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Figure 48: Non-Fake Can Match as Risky Title 
When the item is fake, however, the belief is that it most likely will target a movie 
for reasons explained above. 
One of the drawbacks of this approach is that it is heavily dependent on the list of 
‘risky’ titles being up to date, which implies high maintenance costs. 
Unfortunately, it may be otherwise impossible to establish whether an item is a 
fake in many cases, relying only on the torrent’s name and size. 
3.13. Extensibility 
A model is not set in stone and must be able to adapt to changes in the environment 
it reflects. While it may be difficult to prepare the model for all kinds of future 
challenges and types of evidence yet to be observed, there are two most probable 
scenarios of our model being extended: 
1. Changing Medium Signature Associations 
A rather simple case is when new data is discovered about relationships between 
evidence of a particular medium and other medium categories. For example, if a 
strong link between “Text: Magazine” and “Video: TV” is established, then we re-
generate the column for “Video: TV” in the Text: Magazine Signature Found 
according to the strength of the relationship and the procedure outlined in 
148 
 
Algorithm 1. In any other case the solution is ultimately the same and simply 
requires the distribution in the relevant column to be re-generated with the right 
parameters. 
2. Revising Taxonomy 
Most of the nodes in the BN are child nodes of Real Medium or Advertised Medium 
which means that a change to taxonomy will require most NPTs in the model to 
be updated. While the existing hierarchy allows all possible items to be classified, 
alternative variations or granularity levels are possible. New NPTs will have to be 
derived from the relationship between the old and new hierarchies. Here are a few 
examples: 
a) Change “Audio: Soundtrack” to “Audio: Music: Soundtrack” 
In this case we only need to amend “Audio: Music” to “Audio: Music: Other” to 
specify that it does not include soundtrack, and no other changes are required. 
b) Add a category “Video: Other: Trailer” 
This change requires “Video: Other” to be updated to “Video: Other except 
Trailers” and to have its probability reduced to accommodate a new probability 
appearing for the trailers in Real Medium. Similarly, conditional probabilities for 
“Video: Other: Trailer” in the nodes Fake, Advertised Medium, Found Date, Found 
in Database, Found in Risk Group take some value from “Video: Other except 
Trailers” depending on the relation to medium being specifically a trailer. For 
example, it is relevant for the node Fake, because trailers are one of the mediums 
of fakes together with “Video: Other except Trailers” and “Software: Other”. The 
node Porn is largely unaffected and trailers must be given very low probability. 
In Malware a zero probability can be assumed for trailers. For medium signature 
nodes the column is defined depending on the expected relationship to the 
category. For example, it is reasonable to expect a stronger relationship in “Video: 
Movie” Signature Found and a weaker relationship in other video evidence nodes. 
For other signature nodes the same column is used as for the “Video: Other except 
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Trailers”. A new signature node is required to model trailer-specific evidence like 
a keyword ‘trailer’, for which movies should get a stronger relationship and other 
video categories a weaker one. 
3.14. Summary 
The primary background highlighted by this chapter comes from Bayesian 
Network modelling for the purpose of classification, and string alignment to aid 
title identification. This chapter covered in detail the topics of Bayesian calculus 
and discussion about modelling and interpreting uncertainty which is inherent to 
our everyday lives; and approaches to constructing BNs and parameter elicitation. 
In this chapter we also covered in detail the structure and logic of our classification 
model. The primary attributes of a downloadable item the model predicts are: real 
medium, porn content, risk of fakes and malware. One of the key concepts of the 
model is the distinction between what an item looks like and what it really is. Most 
of the evidence we may gather is directly related to the appearance of the item and 
not necessarily its true nature, hence most of the observation nodes are linked to 
Real Medium via Advertised Medium. We capture evidence by looking for media 
type signatures, title matches, porn keywords, studios and actors. 
This chapter also provides reasoning behind conditional prior probabilities in the 
BN’s NPTs and provides insight into how the model evolved over the course of 
the project. It explains the concept of signature nodes which are able to indicate 
the medium category most likely to contain the detected evidence. We recognise 
that some medium categories are more closely related than the others and use these 
relationships to build the conditional probability distributions for the signature 
found nodes’ NPTs. 
Lastly, we cover possible ways of extending the model by providing a number of 
scenarios for future work and improvement. 
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Chapter 4  
Capturing Evidence 
In this chapter we address Research objective 1 (from Section 1.2) by providing the 
means to automatically gather evidence to be used as inputs for the BN model 
described in Chapter 3. This chapter describes the processing of strings (e.g. file 
names) in order to extract observations for the Bayesian network model. The 
chapter defines relevant rules and explains how an expert system was built 
encoding the original MovieLabs expertise combined with our study of DS2500 
and newly posted torrent items. 
Separating the configuration of evidence signatures and their category association 
strengths provides an extension to the model that is flexible and can be updated 
easier without having to change BN structure or priors. 
 
Figure 49: Evidence Entering into the Classifier BN Model 
The chapter is therefore primarily concerned with collecting evidence for the BN 
model from torrent names. Figure 49 describes Toran extracting evidence (solid 
ended arrows) and entering it into the model (empty ended arrows). Given a 
torrent name, we first run it through our database of signatures.  
Most signatures are associated with a node in the BN and observations are entered 
into the model based on the evidence extracted from the name string. We also 
apply a number of regular expressions to the name string in order to clear as much 
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noise (such as brackets, extra spaces, other separator characters etc.) as possible. 
The remainder of the name string is considered a candidate title and is then 
matched to our database of titles. The result of this procedure is used as an 
observation for the model. Finally, we check whether the name string contains a 
‘risky’ title, which is a process similar to the regular title matching, but is only 
concerned with a small list of titles, which has to be regularly updated. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.1 covers in detail 
how we define links between evidence and medium categories or other nodes in 
the network. Section 4.2 explains how we use the names of porn studios and actors 
and how these records are matched against a file name. Section 4.3 details the 
procedure and the algorithm of extracting observations and filtering the file 
names. Section 4.4 is concerned with the title matching procedure, and explains 
the challenges and practical issues we faced. Section 4.5 outlines the possibility for 
expanding the list of discoverable signatures or incorporating new data. 
4.1. Signature Definition 
MovieLabs use a set of over 600 items (see Appendix Section H.1) as keywords to 
match against names. However, these are not exactly keywords as they also 
include names of porn actresses, popular software packages, movie studios and 
some other titles. We studied the DS2500 sample in order to expand and refine this 
set of keywords, and then ultimately decided to transform the concept of keywords 
into the concept of regular expressions, which we now refer to as signatures. Full 
configuration of signatures is available in Appendix Section H.2. Using regular 
expressions rather than exact keywords allows adopting a form of stemming (as 
specified in Section 2.6.1) and make each signature apply to a number of possible 
forms within the file name string. 
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Each signature record has the following attributes: 
 Order of application 
 Type 
 Regular expression 
 Associated categories with strength of each such association 
A simple example is presented in Table 46. The meaning of this signature is that it 
either suggests that the file is a movie or TV series or episode with dubbing, or it 
refers to a genre of electronic music. Category weights suggest that this signature 
is more relevant to videos rather than music, and are informed by expert 
judgement and our own study of the DS2500 sample. Type 501 means that this 
signature must be removed from the file name string if it is surrounded by 
separators, which is covered in more detail in Section 4.1.1. 
Attribute Value 
Order 11 
Type 501 
Regular Expression dub(bed)? 
Associations 
Video: TV (0.25) 
Video: Movie (0.25) 
Audio: Music (0.10) 
Table 46: Basic Signature Example 
Detection of signatures is paired with filtering the torrent name string, which 
makes the order of application of regular expressions important. For example, 
considering items such as in Table 47, we want to match and remove HDTVRip 
before HDTV, because the former is a larger keyword and removing the latter first 
could result in a residual Rip which could then lead to a wrong interpretation of 
the evidence. These two keywords have different semantic meanings – the former 
generally refers to videos ripped from an HD stream and is not limited to TV 
episodes, while the latter refers to TV episodes much more often than to other 
types of video. 
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Category Torrent Name 
Video: TV House.S07E17.PROPER.HDTV.XviD.2HD 
Video: Other One_Rat_Short (2006).HDTVRip.720p.mp4 
Table 47: Example – Torrent Names with HDTV and HDTVRip Signatures 
Another example is DVD which more commonly appears in plain form for video 
processing software packages than for video files themselves. However, there are 
a number of signatures based on this keyword that strongly relate to various 
videos, such as HDDVDRip, DVDPAL, DVDScreener, DVD5 etc. Note that these 
signatures have varying strength of relations to different video sub-categories. 
All signatures are loosely separated into 17 ordered groups and are matched case-
insensitively except for one special case, which is covered in Section 4.1.3. 
1) TV patterns to match a wide variety of ‘season X episode Y’ type 
combinations, including some combinations from other languages; see 
Section 4.1.3 for further details; 
2) Date and year; 
3) A number of porn-associated release groups and domains; 
4) File extensions; 
5) Release groups and domains not associated with porn; 
6) Other domains; 
7) A particular IP address pattern that is associated with porn (see Section 4.1.3 
for details); 
8) Strong language patterns; 
9) Weak language patterns and subtitles; 
10) Various signatures related to medium categories; 
11) Various signatures related to medium categories that must be applied 
after (10); 
12) Porn signatures; 
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13) A special porn signature referring to a popular way of encoding porn movie 
names (e.g. KTDS-529, see Section 4.1.3 for details); 
14) Various signatures and release groups related to medium categories that 
must be applied after (13); 
15) Numeric sequences that are not dates or years; 
16) Countries, which appear mostly in names of video files; 
17) Several patterns to clear up filtering leftovers, primarily non-alphanumeric 
characters, but also patterns to remove substrings that were not associated 
with any model observations and are unlikely to be a part of a title (e.g. the 
highlighted content in Figure 50) and most commonly referred to torrent 
releasers. 
[LE-Production]_Sanzoku_no_Musume_Ronja_[1280x720_x264]_[oster1&Meri] 
Figure 50: Torrent Name Example with Disposable Data 
The remainder of this section is structured as follows: Sub-section 4.1.1 covers in 
more detail the different signature types. Sub-section 4.1.2 explains how we define 
associations between medium categories and signatures and their strength. Sub-
section 4.3 provides an overview and explanation of the procedure of detecting 
signatures in a torrent name. Sub-section 4.1.3 covers in more detail several non-
trivial signatures. 
 Pattern Types 
It was indicated earlier that signatures not only capture observations for the BN, 
but also clear up the torrent name string such that, ideally, only an item’s title and 
release year are left. Hence all signatures refer to either removable or non-
removable content. The general idea is to remove all signatures that reasonably 
should not be a part of a title. Of course, there is always a possibility that somebody 
makes a movie called e.g. ‘Best of torrent mp3s’, but we believe it is a reasonable 
compromise to model more common items instead. 
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Apart from removability, signature types refer to common conditions on the 
signature surroundings within the torrent string. For example, signature type 701 
adds optional domain prefix (e.g. www) and suffix (e.g. org, net, com etc.) and then 
removes any part of the name string which matches the resulting regular 
expression. For instance, using torrents as such a signature will match the gold-
highlighted substring in all torrents in Table 48. An obvious improvement is to 
allow the expression to absorb neighbouring sequences of alphanumeric 
characters (e.g. by adding [\p{N}\p{L}]* on both sides of the string ‘torrents’), 
which expands the matches to blue-highlighted substrings. 
Torrent Name Example 
talking.slovoed.deluxe.7.1_[torrents.ru] 
Pyar Ka Punchnama (2011) 1CD DVDRip Xvid MSubs(www.mastitorrents.com) 
[DVD-9-AYN]POONGATRILEUNSWASATHAI-www.tamiltorrents.net-arun14184 
Windows Loader v1.9.7 [h33t] [rahultorrents] 
DelDengi042010 [Bigtorrents.org].pdf 
Table 48: A Few Examples Torrent Names Matching the torrents Signature 
A separator is a sequence of non-alphanumeric characters, except $ and @ that 
matches the pattern [^\p{L}\p{N}\$@]. We decided to use this definition 
because of the high degree of variability in punctuation used by torrent posters to 
separate words in the name string. 
We group patterns together in order to improve the effect of filtering and reduce 
processing time. The following properties are taken into consideration when 
grouping: 
 Whether a pattern can be safely removed from the string, or it can be a part 
of another pattern or used as a word in a title (e.g. ‘movie’ is often used in 
titles so should not be removed). Such removable pattern can be used as 
evidence or simply match noise. 
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 Whether there are any conditions on the context (e.g. surrounding 
characters) to match a pattern. 
 If a pattern is removable, whether any surrounding characters could also be 
removed. This property simplifies configuration and maintenance of 
signatures since it is effectively factorisation of common removable context. 
We arrived at this configuration after a lot of experimenting with DS2500. The 
signatures are grouped into following types: 
a) Matches if surrounded by non-alphanumeric characters, and removed. This 
type is mostly reserved to file extensions such as audio extension mp3. 
b) Matches if found as a substring, and removed.  It is suitable for patterns 
which are not expected to be a part of something else or deemed safe to be 
simply cut out e.g. image or video dimensions 1920[хx×]1080p?. 
c) Like b) but not removed and is useful for patterns that have a meaning and 
can also appear as parts of a title, and is mostly used with porn keywords. 
d) Matches if surrounded by separators, and removed. It is suitable for 
patterns that are complete exact words e.g. full.?movie. 
e) Like d) but not removable and is appropriate for separate words that have 
category associations but may also appear in a title, e.g. babysitters?. 
f) Matches if found between open and closed brackets, and removed. It is used 
for clean-up patterns to remove unnecessary punctuation remaining after 
filtering, and to remove a small number of specific releaser patterns that are 
related to common release groups, e.g. malestom. 
g) Matches if found between open and closed brackets, and removed together 
with all content up to the nearest open and closed bracket to the left and 
right respectively. It is suitable for removing releaser patterns e.g. 
mix(ed)?.by. 
h) Matches if found as a substring, and is removed together with an optional 
domain prefix (e.g. www) and suffix (e.g. org, net or com etc.). It is used to 
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match potential domain addresses of seeders and release groups, and also 
to remove all unknown domains from the name string. 
i) Matches if found as a substring, and is removed together with optional 
surrounding sequences of alpha-numeric characters. It is used to clean up 
parts of the name string that contain patterns that are unlikely to be a part 
of a title e.g. downloader. 
These signature types allow for a flexible configuration of signatures and 
simplification of the pattern definition within signatures as we can simply specify 
what prefix and suffix should be attached to a signature pattern. 
 Associations and Strength 
We analysed the DS2500 sample to make sure important relations between 
categories were not missed. We ran each item from the sample through the 
signature association and strength detection procedure explained in Algorithm 3 
to make our priors partially informed by data. 
 
Figure 51: Medium Category Associations of Signature live  
Figure 51 shows a frequency distribution of the live signature per medium 
category in DS2500, as well as prior manual definitions and the final combined 
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values. Note that the observations from data may help refine manually defined 
values and make the final associations more relevant. 
Algorithms 3, 4, 5 and 6 are motivated by theory from Section 2.6.1 and are 
collectively a procedure for analysing a data sample of pre-classified torrents and 
extracting signature to category associations and their strengths directly from data. 
Then a new configuration of signatures is suggested, based on a balanced fusion 
of existing set up and the attributes learnt from data. 
// Variables: torrent and signature databases 𝐷𝑇 and 𝐷𝑆, temporary signature 
map 𝐷?̂?, signature count map 𝐶𝑆, category count map 𝐶𝐶 
// Gather frequencies per signature per category 
for each 𝑡 ∈ 𝐷𝑇 do { 
 𝑡. 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 =  𝑡. 𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 
 for each 𝑠 ∈ 𝐷𝑆 do { 
  if 𝑡. 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 matches 𝑠. 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛 { 
   if 𝑠. 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 { 
    𝑡. 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 = 𝑡. 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑.remove(𝑠. 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛) 
   } 
   𝐶𝑆 [𝑠] += 1 
   𝐶𝐶  [𝑡. 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦] += 1 
   𝐷?̂? [𝑠, 𝑡. 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦] += 1 
  } 
 } 
} 
Algorithm 3: Gather Signature Frequencies 
Algorithm 3 assumes that all items in 𝐷𝑇 are properly labelled, and is mainly 
suitable for medium category associations and porn. However, it may also be 
adapted to provide more insight into associations for special signatures like date, 
subtitles, language and year.  
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// Variables: category average count 𝐴𝐶, temporary signature map 𝐷?̂? 
for each 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶𝐶 do { 
 𝐴𝐶  += 𝑐. 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 
} 
// Calculate average count per category 
𝐴𝐶 = 𝐴𝐶   𝐶𝐶 . 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒⁄  
// Weigh each temporary signature association by frequency of appearance 
for each (𝑠, 𝑐) ∈ 𝐷?̂? { 
 if 𝐷?̂? [𝑠, 𝑐] < 𝐴𝐶 { 
  // Signature was rarely seen for category 𝑐, weigh it by 𝐴𝐶  
  𝐷?̂? [𝑠, 𝑐] = 𝐷?̂? [𝑠, 𝑐]  𝐴𝐶⁄  
 } 
 else { 
  // Signature was seen for category 𝑐 more than average, 
  // weigh by category 𝑐 count 
  𝐷?̂? [𝑠, 𝑐] = 𝐷?̂? [𝑠, 𝑐]  𝐶𝐶 [𝑐]⁄  
 } 
} 
Algorithm 4: Weigh Category Counts (Continuation of Algorithm 3) 
Algorithm 4 is a procedure to weigh the significance of each association within a 
particular signature. If a category was generally rarely observed in the sample, it 
should not be taken as reliable. Instead, it is given a lesser weight by dividing it by 
general category average count. If, however, a category was seen relatively often, 
we may then conclude that association with a signature may be meaningful. 
Algorithm 5 is the next step and describes normalising association values within 
each signature to add up to the signature max weight 𝑊𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 3, which is a 
reasonable value for a very strong single association, and may be fairly distributed 
among several associations of a signature. Essentially normalisation is the same as 
in Algorithm 2, but the final values are multiplied by 𝑊𝑚𝑎𝑥. After normalisation 
weak results below threshold 𝜏𝑊 = 0.1 are filtered out. 
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// Variables: temporary signature map 𝐷?̂?, signature max weight 𝑊𝑚𝑎𝑥, 
// threshold 𝜏𝑊 
for each 𝑠 ∈ 𝐷?̂? { 
 // Invoke Algorithm 2 
 NORMALISE(𝑠. 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) 
 for /* association */ 𝑎 ∈ 𝑠 { 
  𝑎. 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ ∗=  𝑊𝑚𝑎𝑥 
  if 𝑎. 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ < 𝜏𝑊 { 
   𝑠.remove(𝑎) 
  } 
 } 
} 
Algorithm 5: Normalise and Filter Associations (Continuation of Algorithm 4) 
Finally, a new set of signature associations is suggested by combining 𝐷𝑆  and 𝐷?̂? 
by weighing them appropriately. Each signature is weighted separately by 
assessing how often the signature was detected in the sample. A rare occurrence 
in the sample is weighted heavily towards the old configuration while a frequent 
sighting of a signature in the sample gives it more credibility. However, we 
decided to limit the maximum weight, which can be applied to an update from the 
sample, to 0.3 on the basis that an existing set up should be gradually updated with 
new data rather than be significantly impacted straight away.  
As defined in Algorithm 6, the weight for an update is calculated based on 
individual signature appearance frequency in the sample compared to that of an 
average signature. Rare signatures are capped at 0.1 weight and more frequent 
signatures are assigned a weight between 0.1 and 0.3. This weighting policy 
expresses our belief in reliability or significance of the sample that is used for 
updating association strengths. If the confidence in the sample is higher than 0.3, 
it is possible to use the same sample multiple times to update associations, such 
that each subsequent application of the update procedure would make the final 
associations closer to those derived from the sample. Alternatively, a different 
weighting policy could be used. 
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Algorithm 6 assumes that the signatures that did not appear in the sample at all 
are not included in the calculation of the average signature appearance count 𝐴𝑆 
on the premise that such signatures should simply be unaffected by this 
configuration update. In fact, the sample may be specifically themed towards a 
particular set of signatures which would put other signatures at a disadvantage, 
which should not be allowed. 
Once the final strength value for an association was calculated, it is only kept if it 
is above threshold 𝜏𝐴 = 0.15, which is supposed to keep signatures specialised 
rather than provide a general blanket distribution for all categories. 
// Variables: signature database 𝐷𝑆, temporary signature map 𝐷?̂?, 
// signature count map 𝐶𝑆, average non-zero signature count 𝐴𝑆, 
// update weight 𝑊𝑈, original weight 𝑊𝑂, threshold for associations 𝜏𝐴, 
// total number of signature occurrences |𝐶𝑆|  
for each 𝑠 ∈ 𝐷?̂? { 
 if 𝐶𝑆 [𝑠] < 𝐴𝑆 { 
 // Rarely observed signature, weight up to 0.1 
  𝑊𝑈 = 0.1 ∗ 𝐶𝑆 [𝑠] / 𝐴𝑆 
 } 
 else { 
 // Frequently observed signature, weight between 0.1 and 0.3 
  𝑊𝑈 = 0.1 +  0.2 ∗ 𝐶𝑆 [𝑠] / |𝐶𝑆| 
 } 
 𝑊𝑂 = 1 −𝑊𝑈 
 for /* association */ 𝑎 ∈ 𝑠 { 
  𝑎. 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ =  𝑎. 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ ∗ 𝑊𝑈 + 𝐷𝑆 [𝑠, 𝑎. 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦]. 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ ∗𝑊𝑂 
  if 𝑎. 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ < 𝜏𝐴 { 
   𝑠.remove(𝑎) 
  } 
 } 
} 
return 𝐷?̂? 
Algorithm 6: Updating Signature Associations  (Continuation of Algorithm 5) 
Inspecting the data in this manner helped us define the final strength figures. 
However, we could not simply take associations and strengths from the data. To 
confidently use such an approach alone we would need a much larger sample, 
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with each medium sub-category appearing a sufficient number of times. Therefore, 
to a large extent, the strengths and associations of signatures rely on expert 
judgement, informed by data and general understanding of the field. 
We studied final classification results on the DS2500 set iteratively, sensibly 
tweaking effects of applicable signatures for items that were classified poorly until 
we were satisfied with the method’s performance. We used three separate sample 
sets as a safeguard from overfitting to original DS2500 data. 
 Special Signatures 
Some signatures are very large and elaborate. We do not necessarily aim to 
optimise the signature detection mechanism for performance, but we do have to 
keep the database of signatures easy to maintain while it is in development and 
hence some items may not appear properly structured. This section covers several 
important signatures which may not be included in the overall list in the 
appendices due to their size or composition and may be difficult to understand 
without an explanation unlike most of the signatures. 
a) Complex TV signature 
Most TV series or episodes torrent names’ try to identify a particular season or 
episode within the series, or even a more complex combination of them. Often 
these may be given in foreign languages or in certain format. Table 49 illustrates 
several such examples with the signature highlighted in gold. 
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Torrent Name Example 
Witchblade.season2.episode6.avi 
The_Infinite_Vacation_03_(of_05)_(2011).cbz 
[AniDub]_Ultimate_Girls_TV_[08_of_12]_[ru_jp]_[704x396_XviD_mp3].avi 
Zemlya.Lyubvi.(051-075.serii.iz.150).1999.XviD.TVRip 
Futurama.(6.sezon.01.serija.iz.26).2010.XviD.DVDRip.(HDRip).avi 
Versiya.(3.sezon.6.seriya.iz.8).2012.XviD.SATRip.avi 
[한글]스파르타쿠스 벤젠스 시즌2 7화 저용량 
Эпизод 9 - Рефлексы Часть I .mp4 
Table 49: A Few Examples Torrent Names Matching the Special TV Signature 
The signature is composed of several ‘scenarios’, each of which is in turn 
composed of a combination of common parts (see Appendix Table I.1). Each 
part is a simple set of possible options combined as a union. 
 Part 1 (P1) generally matches the state of a season such as ‘full’, ‘whole’, ‘all’ 
etc.; 
 Part 2 (P2) provides a mix of expressions for ‘season’ and ‘episode’ in a 
number of forms and languages; 
 Part 3 (P3) matches membership articles such as ‘of’, ‘from’ etc.; 
 Part 4 (P4) describes the episode’s number, e.g. numbers of words like ‘one’. 
There are several options for these parts to be combined together: 
 P4, P2, P4, P2, P3, P4, 
 P2, P4, P2, P4, 
 P4, P2, P3, P4, 
 P2, P4, P3, P4, 
 P1, P2, P4, 
 P4, P3, P4, 
 P1, P2, 
 P2, P4 
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The separator between a pair of parts is assumed to be a sequence of non-
alphanumeric characters of length 0 to 3. This helps us ensure that common 
separators do not get into the way of detection. An example interpretation of 
“P4, P2, P4, P2, P3, P4” could be ‘3 season 5 episode of 12’. 
b) IP address porn 
A rare but practically definitive porn signature follows the pattern of an IP 
address starting with either 3 or 6 and having only two digits in the first group, 
which can sometimes be followed by a number in brackets. It is defined in 
Figure 52 and is matched and removed directly from the name string without 
restrictions. 
[36]\d{1,2}(\p{Ps}[0-9]\p{Pe})?\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3} 
Figure 52: Porn IP Signature Pattern 
c) Special porn signature 
We noticed that a portion of porn videos contain a specific pattern of: 
 3 capital letters followed by a possible dash and then 2-4 numbers; 
 Or 2-4 capital letters followed by 3 numbers. 
However, it also often appears for non-porn items such as music, so we decided 
to define this signature as: weak porn, strong “Video: Other”, weak “Video: 
Movie” and medium “Audio: Music”. This is the only case where a match is 
forced to be case-sensitive. 
4.2. Porn Studios and Actors 
Porn studios and actors are stored as two separate lists (see Appendix C) in pre-
processed format as regular expressions. For porn studios spaces in the name are 
replaced with .? which allows them to be matched if separated by other characters 
or found in the name string without separators at all. For actor names a similar 
logic is applied, however we not only check for a Name.?Surname pattern, but 
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also Surname.?Name. While this provides us with a great opportunity to detect 
porn, this part of the detection mechanism clearly depends on the quality of 
studios and actors database and could be further expanded. If matched, both porn 
studios are removed from the torrent name string, though actors’ names are kept 
since there could be porn movies containing porn actor’s name in the title. 
4.3. Signature Detection and Filtering Algorithm 
The detection and filtering procedure closely follows the ordering groups given in 
Section 4.1 with a few additions, and is formally defined as Algorithm 7. The list 
below informally summarises the complete filtering procedure. Note that, as 
shown in Table 48, some signatures may be detected by patterns of other 
signatures. Therefore, matching order may be important for some patterns, which 
is especially relevant in case of bigger patterns associated with strong evidence. 
For example, the TV pattern is quite complex and involves words in multiple 
languages as well as digits. It is also a very strong piece of evidence and to 
guarantee its detection, it is matched first. Date and year patterns may easily be 
absorbed by some of the other signatures and are therefore matched early. Some 
groups have similar priority or are unlikely to overlap, but are grouped together 
to simplify configuration maintenance (e.g. groups 3-5, 6-7 and 9-14). The noise 
group is extremely aggressive in matching and has to be applied last, or it would 
remove a lot of potentially useful evidence. 
1) Match and remove TV patterns 
2) Numerical patterns 
a) Match  and remove full dates 
b) Match 4-digit 19xx and 20xx years 
3) Match and/or remove porn studio and actors’ names 
4) Match and remove porn release groups or domains 
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5) Match and remove all file extensions, surrounded by non-alphanumeric 
characters 
6) Match and remove known domains or release groups (for example, 
SKIDROW refers to a community of game crackers and any file containing 
this keyword is almost certainly a game) 
7) Remove other domains (e.g. www.byte.to is a reference to a torrent 
tracker which is used to share all kinds of files and is not associated with 
any particular category) 
8) Match and remove porn IP pattern 
9) Match full language keywords, and remove if surrounded by brackets e.g. 
[English], because otherwise may be a part of a title 
10) Match and remove short language patterns surrounded by separators 
11) Match and remove, depending on type, universal keywords or patterns 
12) Match and remove, depending on type, specialised keywords or patterns 
13) Match and remove, depending on type, porn keywords or patterns 
14) Match and remove the special porn pattern 
15) Match and remove, depending on type, brands or release groups 
16) Match and remove non-year numeric sequences surrounded by brackets 
17) Match countries 
18) Clean up noise 
a) Trim non alphanumeric characters from start and end until opening 
or closing bracket respectively 
b) Remove the single ending word, if preceded by a bracket 
c) Remove the ‘distributor’ pattern (e.g. by Group or [-EKZ] which 
are the nickname of the person or group who shared the file and are 
not yet associated with any particular category) 
d) Remove brackets that do not have alphanumeric values between 
them 
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e) Remove secondary ‘distributor’ pattern (i.e. contents of first and last 
brackets) 
f) Remove ending ‘distributor’ pattern (i.e. sequence starting with a 
dash followed by (a space and) numbers or letters, trailing with 
separators, until the end) 
g) Replace separator sequences by a space 
Algorithm 7 is the main procedure and relies on Algorithms 8 and 9. It takes torrent 
name 𝑁 and BN model 𝑀 as parameters, and returns filtered torrent name. 
// Parameters: torrent name 𝑁, BN model 𝑀 
// Variables: signature database 𝐷𝑆, observations map 𝑂 
for each 𝑠 ∈ 𝐷𝑆 do { 
 if 𝑁 matches 𝑠. 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛 { 
  if 𝑠. 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 { 
   𝑁 = 𝑁.remove(𝑠. 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛) 
  } 
  // Invoke Algorithm 8 
  RECORD_OBSERVATION(𝑠,𝑂) 
 } 
 if 𝑠. 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 == 3 { 
  // Invoke Algorithm 9 
  𝑁 = FILTER_PORN_STUDIO_ACTOR(𝑁,𝑂) 
 } 
} 
// Transfer gathered evidence to model 
for each 𝑜 ∈ 𝑂 do { 
 𝑀𝑜.𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 = 𝑜. 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 
} 
Return 𝑁 
Algorithm 7: Detect Signatures and Filter Torrent Name 
Algorithm 8 assumes that an association from a signature to a medium category 
corresponds uniquely to a node in the BN, and takes a signature 𝑠 and the map of 
observations 𝑂 as parameters. 
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// Parameters: signature 𝑠, map of observations 𝑂 
for each /* association */ 𝑎 ∈ 𝑠𝐴 do { 
 if 𝑎. 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒. 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 is Boolean { 
  // Boolean evidence found, set to true 
  𝑂𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒.𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 
 } 
 else { 
  // Node is numeric, accumulate evidence 
  𝑂𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒.𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 += 𝑎. 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ 
 } 
} 
Algorithm 8: Record Signature Observations 
Algorithm 9 takes the torrent name 𝑁, a signature 𝑠 and the map of observations 𝑂 
as parameters, and returns filtered torrent name. 
// Parameters: torrent name 𝑁, map of observations 𝑂 
// Variables: porn actor and studio databases 𝐷𝑃𝐴 and 𝐷𝑃𝑆, 
// observations map 𝑂 
for each /* studio record */ 𝑟 ∈ 𝐷𝑃𝑆 do { 
 if 𝑁 matches 𝑟. 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛 { 
  // Set observation and filter name 
  𝑂𝑟.𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒_𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 
  𝑁 = 𝑁.remove(𝑟. 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛) 
 } 
} 
for each /* actor record */ 𝑟 ∈ 𝐷𝑃𝐴 do { 
 if 𝑁 matches 𝑟. 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛1 or 𝑁 matches 𝑟. 𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛2 { 
  // Set observation 
  𝑂𝑟.𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒_𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒 = 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒 
 } 
} 
return 𝑁 
Algorithm 9: Detect and Filter Porn Studios and Actors 
To illustrate the procedure given above let us consider two torrent record names 
with signature matches highlighted in gold in Table 50. 
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# Original Torrent Name 
1 Ghost.Rider：Spirit.of.Vengeance.2012.2D.BluRay.1080p.AVC.DTS-HD.MA5.1-CHDBits 
2 Phineas.i.Ferb.(1.sezon.25-26.serii.iz.32).2008.XviD.SATRip.-Puzkarapuz 
Table 50: Example Torrents for Signature Detection and Filtering Illustration 
Table 51 provides an overview of all meaningful signatures detected in the torrent 
names from Table 50. Refer to the short sub-category names in Table 4. Note that 
clear-up patterns are omitted. 
Torrent #1 Torrent #2 
Signature 
Match 
Associated 
Node 
Strength Signature Match 
Associated 
Node 
Strength 
AVC 
Video: Movie 0.75 1.sezon.25-26.serii.iz.32 Video: TV 2.95 
Video: Other 0.3 2008 Year 1 
Video: TV 0.45 
XviD 
Video: Movie 0.8 
MA5.1 
Software: Other 0.2 Video: Other 0.45 
Video: Movie 0.45 Video: TV 0.55 
Software: Game 0.2 
SATRip 
Video: Movie 0.4 
Video: TV 0.4 Video: Other 0.4 
1080p 
Video: Movie 0.85 Video: TV 0.95 
Video: Other 0.6 
 
Video: TV 0.6 
2D 
Video: Movie 0.7 
Video: Other 0.7 
Video: TV 0.7 
BluRay 
Video: Movie 1 
Video: Other 0.3 
Video: TV 0.3 
DTS 
Audio: Other 0.2 
Video: Movie 0.5 
Audio: OST 0.2 
Audio: Music 0.4 
HD 
Image 0.15 
Video: Movie 0.45 
Video: Other 0.35 
Software: Game 0.15 
Video: TV 0.35 
2012 Year 1 
Table 51: Signatures Detected in Torrents from Table 50 
As per Algorithm 7 above, for each torrent record we calculate cumulative strength 
for each numeric evidence node, illustrated by Table 52. Note that the category 
with the highest cumulative strength actually matches the expected category of the 
torrent, i.e. movie for Torrent #1 and TV for Torrent #2. Entering such observations 
into the BN model naturally reinforces the correct prediction. 
170 
 
Torrent #1 Torrent #2 
Category 
Cumulative  
Strength 
Category 
Cumulative 
Strength 
Audio: Music 0.40 Video: Movie 1.20 
Audio: OST 0.20 Video: Other 0.85 
Audio: Other 0.20 Video: TV 4.45 
Image 0.15 
 
Software: Game 0.35 
Software: Other 0.20 
Video: Movie 4.70 
Video: Other 2.25 
Video: TV 2.80 
Table 52: Cumulative Signature Strength from Table 51 
Finally, after the filtering was performed, the resulting strings contain only the 
movie and TV series titles, including release years as illustrated by Table 53. More 
examples of original and filtered torrent names can be found in Appendix J. 
# Torrent Name After Filtering 
1 Ghost Rider：Spirit of Vengeance 2012 
2 Phineas i Ferb 2008 
Table 53: Torrent Names from Table 50 after Filtering 
The next step is to perform title matching, explained in the next section. 
4.4. Title Matching 
The central idea of title matching is the possibility to improve medium 
classification if the title of the downloadable file content was correctly identified, 
by making the assumption that file content is of the same type as the identified 
title. For example, when we detect a movie title in the torrent name, this increases 
our belief that the file is a “Video: Movie”, unless there is sufficient evidence to 
believe otherwise (e.g. signatures of audio, soundtrack and small file size). An 
additional benefit is the ability to sensibly predict the medium even if no traces of 
actual file type are found in the torrent name, and only the title is present, e.g. as 
in torrent from Figure 53. 
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The Hobbit: The Battle of the Five Armies (2014) 
Figure 53: Example of Torrent without File Type Evidence 
In the file names the most common titles to be found are movies, TV series, games 
and music. As explained in Section 2.4, we use a list of movie, TV series and game 
titles imported from IMDb. It is absolutely crucial that the database of titles used 
for identification is well built and maintained, because file names inherently 
contain text that can lead to false matches against a title, which is especially true 
for very long titles or file names. 
The rest of this section is structured as follows: Section 4.4.1 explains in detail how 
torrent names and titles are aligned. Section 4.4.2 covers the n-gram pre-filtering 
procedure that we use to greatly reduce processing time. Section 4.4.3 describes 
the complete process of matching a title and how all parts and procedures are 
linked together. 
 Title Alignment 
We use string alignment to match titles to torrent names because this provides us 
with a number of tweaks i.e. scoring rules, which we can use for optimisation. It 
also provides us with an opportunity to capture imperfectly matching pairs of file 
name and title strings as though they were identical. We base our algorithm on the 
SW algorithm and other theory described in Section 2.6. In essence, this algorithm 
puts two strings next to each other and tries to align them by inserting gaps such 
that the best alignment score is achieved. The primary differences that we 
introduce are: 
a) Matching is case insensitive, and implemented by turning both compared 
strings to upper case. 
b) Matched sub-sequences are scored proportionally to their length, such that 
the longer the unbroken matched sub-sequence, the higher the score; and 
that several matched sub-sequences will score lower than a single matched 
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sub-sequence of the same length. See example in Table 54 where the first 
title has only 1 matching sub-sequence of length 12 highlighted in yellow 
and the second title has two matching sub-sequences of 4 and 8 length 
highlighted yellow and green respectively.  
Filtered Torrent Name Bad Apple 2004 
Title 1 Bad Apple 2012 
Score 1 367 
Title 2 Bad Pineapple 2012 
Score 2 146 
Table 54: Matching Titles with a Gap and without 
c) Gapping policy specifies a more expensive gap opener, but allows up to 2 
gaps at a lower cost. A gap opener in this case is the beginning of a gap 
longer than 2 characters. Extending a gap further than that also has a cost. 
Essentially, this makes a number of smaller gaps more attractive than one 
single gap of the same total length, yet the intent is to account for possible 
variation in separators (which is partially addressed by prior pattern 
filtering). 
d) We build on the idea of a substitution matrix to allow numbers to be treated 
as letters, to handle cases of intentional obfuscation like in Figure 54, where 
numbers from a torrent are matched to letters in a title, and are indicated by 
a “+” underneath. 
50U7H P4RK B45S T0 M0U7H 
SOUTH PARK BASS TO MOUTH 
+  +   +    ++   +  + + 
Figure 54: Obfuscated Torrent Name Alignment 
Otherwise a very taxing score is given to matching differing characters to 
avoid this completely. Note that such substitutions are allowed one-way 
only. See Table 55 for complete substitution table. 
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Character in 
Torrent Name 
0 1 3 4 5 6 7 9 
Allowed 
Substitutions 
O 
L 
I 
E A S G 
H 
T 
G 
Table 55: Title Alignment Substitution Table 
According to Equation 30, for each possible character alignment, we calculate a 
score for a match which, in this case, means aligning two characters together, or 
for inserting a gap. Table 56 summarises the title alignment scoring policy. 
Adjusting these variables makes it possible to tune the alignment algorithm to 
other components of our method. For example, the current set up is very strict 
because we are aware of a rather poor state of the title database, and hence we limit 
the matches only to confident cases as much as possible. 
Variable Value 
Match score 6 
Substitution match score 5 
Mismatch score -30 
Gap score -3 
Gap expensive score -20 
Expensive gap 3 
Table 56: Title Alignment Configuration 
The motivation for a large negative mismatch score is to discourage the algorithm 
matching different digits or characters beyond those allowed in the substitution 
matrix. The gapping policy is configured in a way that it is more affordable to 
insert a gap than to mismatch symbols, yet a long gap is more expensive than a 
symbol mismatch. A low penalty for mismatching would cause the algorithm to 
align wrong words, while a low penalty for gaps could lead to a situation where 
the majority of file name or title would be matched to gaps instead of symbols. 
The essential idea is that we want to allow some noise in the matched string, but 
want to keep the algorithm strict enough and be able to see a significant difference 
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between a clean match and a noisy match. We experimented with the values in 
Table 56 by calibrating them on the validation set DS480. 
Algorithm 10 defines the procedure for calculating a score for matching a pair of 
characters and takes characters 𝐶1 and 𝐶2, and the number of consecutive matches  
𝑐 prior to this comparison, as parameters and returns a score. Note that a pattern 
of a single symbol match followed by a single gap repetitively, is discouraged by 
starting to award a positive score only from the second consecutively matched 
character. 
// Parameters: characters 𝐶1 and 𝐶2, 
// prior consecutive matches 𝑐 
if 𝐶1 == 𝐶2 { 
 return 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ ∙ 𝑐 
} 
 
if 𝐶1 substitutes 𝐶2 { 
 return 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ ∙ 𝑐 
} 
return 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ 
Algorithm 10: Score Match 
Likewise, Algorithm 11 defines the procedure for calculating a gap score by taking 
the prior number of consecutive gaps 𝑔. 
// Parameter: prior consecutive gaps 𝑔 
if 𝑔 == 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒_𝑔𝑎𝑝 { 
 return 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑔𝑎𝑝_𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 
} 
return 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑔𝑎𝑝 
Algorithm 11: Score Gap 
Actual alignment score 𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐴  is calculated according to SW algorithm and our 
scoring policy given above. We calculate the maximum alignment score 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐴 , 
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which would be achieved if the filtered torrent was the same as the title; and 
normalised alignment score 𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝐴  according to Equation 39. 
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐴 =∑(𝑙 × 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒_𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ)
𝐿−1
𝑙=0
 
𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝐴 =
𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐴
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐴
 
(39) 
Where 𝐿 is the length of the shortest string of the two aligned. Table 57 illustrates 
actual and normalised alignment scores for the example from Table 54 above. 
 Title 1 Title 2 
𝑺𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝑨  546 546 
𝑺𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝑨  367 146 
𝑺𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒎
𝑨  0.672 0.267 
Table 57: Actual and Normalised Alignment Scores for Table 54 
For each torrent we find the best match in each of the categories contained in the 
title database, namely movies, TV series and games. Section 4.4.3 provides further 
details for title match selection. 
 n-gram Pre-filtering 
String alignment is often a computationally expensive process (Li & Homer 2010), 
and it does not really need to be performed for each of the 3.2 million titles we hold 
on record. Doing so takes 66 seconds on average to filter and identify a torrent 
record. We draw on the idea of improving retrieval performance (for example, 
similar to the BLAST algorithm from Section 2.6) by using n-grams to first establish 
the titles that are even worth attempting to align to. 
Before any title alignment is performed, we first determine suitable titles for the 
filtered torrent name by calculating the proportion of matching 3-grams between 
the filtered name and the title. For this operation both strings are stripped of any 
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non-alphanumeric characters. Consider an example in Table 58 which illustrates 
n-gram generation. 
Filtered Name THE MISFITS 
Name 3-grams THE HEM EMI MIS ISF SFI FIT ITS 
Title 1 String THE MISFIT 
Title 1 3-grams THE HEM EMI MIS ISF SFI FIT 
Title 2 String THE FLUXUS MISFITS 
Title 2 3-grams THE HEF EFL FLU LUX UXU XUS USM SMI MIS ISF SFI FIT ITS 
Table 58: Generating 3-grams 
We calculate the maximum n-gram score 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐺  according to Equation 40. 
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐺 = 𝐿 + 1 − 𝑁 (40) 
Where 𝐿 is the length of the shortest compared string, and 𝑁 is the length of 
n-grams, which we set to 3. We then calculate the total number of overlapping 
3-grams 𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐺  according to Algorithm 12, which takes as parameters: the shorter 
string (i.e. needle) 𝐸, list of 3-grams of the needle 𝐺𝐸 and the longer string (i.e. 
haystack) 𝐻. The normalised n-gram score 𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝐺  is calculated according to 
Equation 41. 
𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝐺 = min (1,
𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐺
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐺 ) (41) 
Table 59 illustrates n-gram scores for the example in Table 58. 
 Title 1 Title 2 
𝑺𝒎𝒂𝒙
𝑮  7 8 
𝑺𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒖𝒂𝒍
𝑮  7 6 
𝑺𝒏𝒐𝒓𝒎
𝑮  1 0.75 
Table 59: n-gram Scores for the Example in Table 58 
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Because the maximum score is based on the shortest of the two strings, the second 
title will be considered similar enough for further analysis on the premise that 
extra content from the title could have been omitted in the torrent name. 
// Parameters: needle 𝐸, 3-grams 𝐺𝐸, haystak 𝐻 
// Variables: n-gram score 𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐺
, max n-gram score 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐺
, 
// n-gram length 𝑁 
if 𝐸. 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ <  𝑁 and 𝐻 contains 𝐸 { 
 return 1 
} 
if 𝐸 == 𝑁 { 
 return 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐺
 
} 
𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐺 = 0  
for 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺𝐸 do { 
 if H contains g { 
  𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐺 = 𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐺 + 1 
 } 
} 
return 𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐺
 
Algorithm 12: Calculate Overlapping 3-grams 
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The normalised n-gram score 𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝐺  is calculated according to Algorithm 13. It 
takes torrent 𝑡 and title 𝑖 as parameters and returns a score 𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝐺 . 
// Parameters: torrent 𝑡, title 𝑖 
// Variables: n-gram length 𝑁, needle 𝐸, set of n-grams 𝐺𝐸, haystack 𝐻 
𝐿 = shortest(𝑡. 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑, 𝑖. 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑑) 
𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐺 = 𝐿 + 1 − 𝑁 
if 𝑡. 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑. 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ <  𝑖. 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑑. 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ { 
 𝐸 =  𝑡. 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 
 // Generate ngrams like in Table 58 
 𝐺𝐸 = ngrams(𝑡. 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑, 3) 
 𝐻 =  𝑖. 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑑 
} 
else { 
 𝐸 =  𝑖. 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑑 
 // Generate ngrams like in Table 58 
 𝐺𝐸 = ngrams(𝑖. 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑑, 3) 
 𝐻 =  𝑡. 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 
} 
// Invoke Algorithm 12 
𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐺
 = OVERLAPS(𝐸, 𝐺𝐸, 𝐻) 
𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝐺 = 𝑆𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙
𝐺 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐺⁄  
return 𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝐺
 
Algorithm 13: Calculate 𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝐺  
Note that for Algorithm 13 we strip both strings of any spaces to discount for cases 
where a torrent name has deliberately no separators between words. Title 
alignment procedure handles the same cases with scoring rules. 
We use a threshold 𝜏𝐺 = 0.5 to filter out an absolute majority of titles before any 
alignment is attempted. For the torrent with filtered file name ‘The Misfits’ this 
procedure quickly eliminates 99.95% titles from the database. This allows us to 
bring the average processing time to 4 seconds per torrent, down from 66 seconds, 
which is more than 16 times faster and makes running experiments much easier. 
These algorithms are essentially of polynomial time complexity (Pocklington 1911; 
Cobham 1964). 
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 Procedure 
This section provides further insight into the combined procedure of performing 
title identification. Algorithm 14 defines a high level procedure of matching an 
item 𝑡 to a database and assumes that all items and database records are 
represented by strings (e.g. torrent name and a title from database) and may share 
a secondary property, which follows a particular pattern and positively affects the 
final match score if shared. Records in the database are assumed to be grouped by 
category. A record may also be marked as ‘alternative’, which would reduce any 
score that it can produce. A ‘match’ here is an object created for particular item-
record pair and describes their matching score; and whether they share the 
secondary property, referred to as ‘shared property’. If two matches have the same 
score, the one with the shared property is prioritised. Maximum of 1 record can be 
returned per category (e.g. movie, TV or game). For a match to be considered, it 
must also have a score above threshold 𝜏𝐼. We tested 𝜏𝐼 in the range from 0.75 to 1 
and the best results were attained with 𝜏𝐼 = 0.95. 
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// Parameter: item 𝑡 
// Variables: database 𝐷𝐼, set of previously approved matches 𝑀, score threshold 𝜏𝐼 
// First filter out known patterns according to Algorithm 7 
𝑡. 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 = FILTER(𝑡. 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔) 
for each 𝑖 in 𝐷𝐼 { 
 // Match object 𝑚 created for item 𝑡 and record 𝑖 according to Algorithm 16 
 𝑚 = MATCH(𝑡,𝑖) 
 if 𝑀 is empty { 
  𝑀.add(𝑚) 
  continue 
 } 
 if 𝑚. 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 < 𝜏𝐼 or 𝑚. 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 < 𝑀[0]. 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒{ 
  // Discard new match if below threshold or worse than previous results 
  continue 
 } 
 if 𝑚. 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 > 𝑀[0].score { 
  // If new match has better score, overwrite previous results 
  clear 𝑀 
  𝑀.add(𝑚) 
  continue 
 } 
 // New match is same-score as previous results 
 for each ?̂? in 𝑀 { 
  if 𝑚. 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 == ?̂?. 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 { 
   // Replace old match of same score and same category, 
   // if new match has a shared property 
   if 𝑚. 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 and not ?̂?. 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 { 
    𝑀.remove(?̂?) 
    𝑀.add(𝑚)    
    // Continute to next item 
    continue 2 
   } 
  } 
 } 
 // 𝑀 does not contain a match object in the same category as new match, add it 
 𝑀.add(𝑚) 
} 
Algorithm 14: Find Best Record Matches for an Item (Part 1) 
Algorithm 15 is the part 2 of Algorithm 14 and performs the final round of filtering 
of the results. At this point set 𝑀 may contain either no matches at all, or up to 3 
matches of different categories. If any of these matches have a shared property (i.e. 
year match), then other matches must be removed. 
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// Variable: set of approved matches 𝑀, temporary set 𝑀𝑌 
for each ?̂? in 𝑀 { 
 // Copy matches with a shared property to 𝑀𝑌 
 if ?̂?. 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 { 
  𝑀𝑌.add(?̂?) 
 } 
} 
if 𝑀𝑌 not empty { 
 return 𝑀𝑌 
} 
return 𝑀 
Algorithm 15: Find Best Record Matches for an Item (Part 2) 
The procedure for actually matching an item to a database record may be separated 
into 3 major parts: 
1) Set up and handling trivial cases (see Algorithm 16) 
2) Choosing n-gram score or alignment score 
3) Application of penalties and bonuses 
// Parameter: item 𝑡, record 𝑖 
// Variables: this match 𝑚 
𝑚. 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 = ( 𝑡. 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 contains 𝑖. 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 ) 
// Account for short records by concatenating the secondary property 
if 𝑖. 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑑. 𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑡ℎ <  3 { 
 𝑖. 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑑.append(𝑖. 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦) 
} 
else if 𝑚. 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 { 
 𝑡. 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑.remove(𝑖. 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦) 
} 
if 𝑡. 𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 ==  𝑖. 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑑 { 
 𝑚. 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 1 
 return 𝑚 
} 
Algorithm 16: Match Item and Record (Part 1) 
In application to torrent names and a title database, 𝑖. 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑦_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 refers 
to title’s release year. 
182 
 
The procedure in Algorithm 17 is aimed at establishing the raw match score either 
via n-gram assessment only, or via string alignment. 
// Parameter: item 𝑡, record 𝑖 
// Variables: this match 𝑚, score threshold 𝐻𝑖, score 𝑆, maximum score 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 
// Invoke Algorithm 13 
𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝐺
 = NGRAM_SCORE(𝑡, 𝑖) 
if 𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝐺 < 𝐻𝑖 { 
 // 𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝐺
 below threshold, no need to do string alignment 
 𝑆 = 𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝐺
 
 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐺
 
} 
else { 
 // Calculate according to Equation 39  
 𝑆 = 𝑆𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚
𝐴
 
 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐴
 
} 
if 𝑆 == 0 { 
 𝑚. 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑆 
 return 𝑚 
} 
Algorithm 17: Match Item and Record (Part 2) 
Note that before string alignment is performed, we replace Roman numbers in 
both strings with Arabic numbers to tackle cases when e.g. ‘Part III’ has to be 
aligned to ‘Part 3’ with exactly the same score. 
Algorithm 18 applies relevant bonuses and penalties to the score. For example, 
movies and games have a particular release year which normally accompanies the 
title. This is not the case for TV series because they may span years and initial 
release year is rarely mentioned. Therefore, in case the matched title is a game or a 
movie there is a bonus for a year match, or a penalty for a year missing from the 
torrent name, or a penalty for a mismatch between a year in the title and a year in 
the torrent name. Another interesting case is when the torrent is matched to a title 
which is an alternative (i.e. ‘aka’) title. In this case a slight penalty is applied to 
differentiate such a match from a match to a full independent form of a title. These 
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bonuses and penalties are applied as multipliers to the match score, which is then 
divided by the previously calculated maximum score and is capped at 1. 
// Parameter: item 𝑡, record 𝑖 
// Variables: this match 𝑚, shared property bonus 𝐵𝑌, 
// array of record categories 𝐶𝐵 eligible for receiveing 𝐵𝑌, 
// penalties for missing secondary property 𝑃𝑀 and secondary property mismatch 𝑃𝑋, 
// penalty for alternative records 𝑃𝐾, 
// regular expression for detecting secondary properties 𝑅𝑌 
if 𝑖. 𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 { 
 𝑆 ∗= 𝑃𝐾 
} 
if 𝑖. 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑦 in 𝐶𝐵 { 
 if 𝑚. 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 { 
  𝑆 ∗= 𝐵𝑌 
 } 
 else if 𝑡. 𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙_𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 matches 𝑅𝑌 { 
  // Secondary property mismatch 
  𝑆 ∗=  𝑃𝑋 
 } 
 else { 
  // Secondary property missing 
  𝑆 ∗=  𝑃𝑀 
 } 
} 
𝑚. 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = min(𝑆,1) 
return 𝑚 
Algorithm 18: Match Item and Record (Part 3) 
Current bonus and penalty multipliers can be found in Table 60. 
Variable Value 
𝐵𝑌 1.15 
𝑃𝑀 0.95 
𝑃𝑋 0.9 
𝑃𝐾  0.95 
Table 60: Bonuses and Penalties for Title Matching 
As explained in Section 3.11, title identification is used as evidence for the BN node 
Found in DB. In case only a single match is remaining at the end of identification 
process, the observation is set as hard evidence for the appropriate category. If 
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multiple matches were returned, then each category of returned matches will 
receive soft evidence according to the value of their relevant score. So, for example, 
if a single match was returned for a movie title with score 0.99, the node Found in 
DB is set to “Movie” = true; and if on the other hand there was also a match for a 
game with score 0.99 then virtual evidence entered into the Found in DB node 
resembles a vector as in Table 61. 
 
Virtual 
State 
Evidence 
Found 
in DB 
None 0.0 
Game 0.5 
Movie Not Porn 0.5 
Movie Porn 0.0 
TV 0.0 
Table 61: Virtual Evidence for Found in DB Example (normalised) 
The implication of using soft evidence here is that it will bear less weight when the 
model calculates than hard evidence. 
The same procedure applies to detecting ‘risky’ titles, albeit simpler because only 
non-porn movies are included on that list.  
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4.5. Extensibility 
There are three areas where there is potential for extending and improving the 
evidence capturing procedure:  
1. Updating Signature Category Association Strengths 
One of the crucial aspects of any working system is the ability to adapt to new 
conditions. A basic way of improving our approach is by having a few experts 
classify more downloads to reinforce signature associations to categories, and the 
strength of these associations. 
If the new sample adheres to a different class hierarchy and the sample's 
significance justifies adopting that taxonomy, then the process described in Section 
3.13 2) could be followed. In case the taxonomy is compatible with the one in Table 
4, we can use the procedure in Algorithms 3, 4, 5 and 6 to fuse the weights and 
associations from a data sample with the existing signature configuration. 
2. Adding New Signatures 
New signatures can be added to our configuration to incorporate new knowledge. 
Once a signature is defined together with all its associations, we can use the same 
procedure as in Section 4.5 1) to see if there is any useful information in the data to 
support this signature set up. 
3. Amending the Database of Titles 
The database of titles is likely to be the first part of the method configuration to be 
updated. The current title database set up has several problems explained in the 
Future Work Section 7.3. It is, however, a straightforward process to update or 
completely replace the title database as long as items conform to the general 
format. Adding, removing or amending a title requires no additional changes and 
any new items classified after the update will take this new information into 
account. 
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4.6. Summary  
This chapter covers in detail all automatic processes involved in assessing items 
and in performing actual classification and identification. The process may be 
summarised as initial detection of medium signatures and file name filtering, then 
a set of roughly similar titles is quickly identified using n-gram comparison, 
followed by a much more thorough process of title alignment to get a precise match 
score. 
Lastly, we cover possible ways of extending Toran or updating its configuration 
by providing a number of scenarios for future work and improvement. 
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Chapter 5  
Formal Framework for System Evaluation 
This chapter addresses Research objective 3 (from Section 1.2) by introducing a 
novel and robust framework to reconcile varying class taxonomies employed by 
different systems, and probabilistic predictions and non-probabilistic hard 
verdicts generated by automatic systems and human experts. We propose an 
extension to well-established error metrics that makes them compatible with a 
multi-label hierarchical class taxonomy. We show how the framework is used to 
pre-format and then compare the results achieved by our prototype Toran to the 
results of the benchmark MovieLabs system (MVL) and human expert panel (HP). 
It is crucial to be able to estimate accuracy and effectiveness of an approach once 
it is formalised and tested. Evaluation of classification algorithms is an area of 
research of its own (see Section 2.6 for more background), but most accuracy 
metrics revolve around the concept of real state (i.e. classification) of an item 
compared to its estimated state (i.e. the outcome of the classifier). We believe that 
in the absence of a sufficiently large sample of verified items, an assessment of the 
real item state can be drawn from a human expert, or a majority vote of multiple 
human experts, which is more desirable. This approximation of the true state can 
then be compared to the results of the algorithm that is being evaluated. 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.1 describes a framework 
consolidating different class taxonomies and output of various classifying agents. 
Section 5.2 is concerned with mapping non-probabilistic verdicts of experts and 
MVL to a probabilistic vector and translations between super-category and sub-
category prediction vectors. Section 5.3 defines several examples of human panel 
classifying an item and resulting probability vectors. Section 5.4 identifies 
requirements that a scoring metric must satisfy in order to be suitable for 
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comparing results of probabilistic and non-probabilistic agents. Section 5.5 defines 
the tiered scoring rule which we use for evaluation. Section 5.6 highlights the 
importance of a random prediction definition. 
5.1. Compatibility of Agent Output 
In this thesis we are concerned with validating the results of our classification 
method. We gathered several samples of data and built several sets of predictions 
made by different agents – human experts, MVL and Toran. Output provided by 
these agents is very different in format. While humans and MVL select a single 
sub-category or super-category and may return an ‘Unknown’ result, Toran 
always returns a probabilistic distribution across all sub-categories. Yet we need 
to compare results provided by these agents in order to evaluate the quality of our 
predictions. 
Using an appropriate evaluation metric or a scoring rule is absolutely crucial, 
because ultimately, it is this metric that defines whether a classification approach 
is valid and accurate. An unsuitable metric can lead to completely wrong 
conclusions. In essence, the work presented in this thesis would be incomplete 
without proper means of assessing quality of predictions made by Toran by 
comparing them to predictions made by other agents. 
In this section we list a number of challenges arising from classification results 
comparison and evaluation in similar settings involving agents that provide 
output in different formats, and present a framework for tackling these challenges. 
We can summarise the issues in the following list: 
1) Mapping 
Human agents as well as MVL can return a classification which is a sub-
category (i.e. full classification), a super-category (i.e. partial classification) or 
“Unknown” while the true state of an item from a set of verified items DS120 
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is the item’s full classification. Toran always returns a vector of probabilities for 
each sub-category, with all values adding up to 1. This brings forward the 
problem of mapping full, partial and “Unknown” predictions to a probabilistic 
vector of either super-categories or sub-categories. 
2) Related states 
Our classification categories are grouped into a multi-level hierarchy, which 
makes most classical accuracy metrics not fully appropriate to evaluate 
classification performance, as explained in Section 2.6.5. For example, an item 
that belongs to “Video: Movie” must score better being classified as “Video: 
TV” than being classified as “Audio: Music”, because sub-categories of a single 
super-category are obviously closer to each other than to members of other 
super-categories. We may address this problem by developing an appropriate 
scoring rule that extends the well-established metrics and allows handling the 
issue of multi-level classification hierarchy. 
3) Estimated or unknown true state 
The true state of an item is only known for a very limited subset of records 
where the real classification and identity are verified (i.e. DS120 sample). We 
developed knowledge and validation sets DS2500 and DS480 respectively by 
having human experts suggest an estimate of the true state. Three experts may 
provide varying estimates, which are sometimes completely different. We must 
be cautious when comparing prediction results between verified data and 
unverified non-unanimous expert estimates. While the former allows 
application of a range of existing accuracy metrics, the latter requires us to 
define the exact procedure to be followed, before any metric can be applied. 
An additional issue is that humans themselves may incorrectly classify a 
proportion of records, which means a truly correct prediction will score badly 
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against a wrong expert estimate, and this has to be taken into account when 
interpreting results. 
5.2. Verdict Mapping and Probability Vector Translation 
The most important part of the evaluation process is to compare how different 
agents classify items with known actual state. We decided to format hard human 
panel votes and MovieLabs decisions as probability distributions, which would be 
compatible with results returned by Toran or any other probabilistic system. In our 
taxonomy there are 6 super-categories and 13 total sub-categories (see Section 2.3). 
It is important to be able to convert a vector of full category predictions to a vector 
of partial category predictions and vice versa. This section explains the relevant 
processes. 
a) Mapping a single category verdict to a probability vector 
Essentially, every hard verdict given by a human expert or MVL can be 
represented as a vector of probabilities 𝑆𝑃 with the single selected label having a 
probability of 1 and all other labels having a probability of 0. 
b) Human and MVL prior distributions 
In DS2500 MVL classified 1033 items with only a super-category and 244 as 
“Unknown”. Between the three human classifiers these figures were 563 and 572 
respectively. In order to translate such votes into a sub-category distribution we 
use a concept of prior distribution. We produced the distributions in Table 62 
based on the number of full category votes given by MVL or humans in DS2500. 
The same logic was applied to prior distributions for porn in Table 63. 
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 DS2500 Counts Derived Prior Distributions 
Category Humans MVL 
“Unknown” Partial 
Human MVL Human MVL 
Audio: Music 971 35 0.15 0.03 0.94 1.00 
Audio: OST 29 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Audio: Other 59 0 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 
Image 187 55 0.03 0.04 1.00 1.00 
Mixed 0 0 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Software: Game 271 51 0.04 0.04 0.31 0.57 
Software: Other 604 42 0.09 0.03 0.69 0.43 
Text: Book 279 17 0.04 0.01 0.80 1.00 
Text: Magazine 69 0 0.01 0.00 0.20 0.00 
Text: Other 24 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Video: Movie 1,732 564 0.27 0.46 0.45 0.55 
Video: Other 966 129 0.15 0.11 0.25 0.13 
Video: TV 1,174 330 0.18 0.27 0.30 0.32 
Partial 563 1,033     
Unknown 572 244     
Table 62: Medium Prior Distributions for Humans and MVL 
During the accuracy evaluation process, when we consider an ‘unknown’ or 
partial verdict given by humans or MVL, we use these distributions. In the former 
case the distribution can be used as a prediction directly, while in the latter the 
distribution is restricted to the single selected super-category and individual sub-
category weights are scaled to sum up to 1. 
 Agent Counts Derived Priors 
Porn Humans MVL Humans MVL 
False 5,548 1,944 0.86 0.94 
True 874 126 0.14 0.06 
Unknown 1,078 430   
Table 63: Porn Prior Distributions for Humans and MVL 
For example, if MVL classifies an item as “Video”, the relevant prediction 
probability vector has all sub-categories set to 0, except for video sub-categories, 
which are set according to Table 62 partial distribution for video. 
In case we need to calculate prediction accuracy for humans against an actual 
item’s classification, we convert individual human votes using the same logic, then 
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sum up their relevant distributions into one and normalise it such that all values 
add up to 1. 
c) Translating a full category to partial category distribution 
We can translate a sub-category distribution into a super-category distribution by 
setting the weight of each super-category to the sum of the weights of its sub-
categories, which is formally defined by Equation 42. 
𝑆𝐶𝑗 = ∑ 𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐶𝑘)
𝐶𝑘∈𝐶𝑗
 (42) 
Table 64 illustrates how we map a full category prediction vector into a super-
category prediction vector. 
Full 
Distribution 
Partial 
Distribution 
Audio: Music  0.1 
Audio: OST  0.2 
Audio: Other  0.3 
Image   0.0 
Mixed   0.1 
Software: Game  0.0 
Software: Other 0.1 
Text: Book  0.0 
Text: Magazine  0.0 
Text: Other  0.0 
Video: Movie  0.0 
Video: Other  0.2 
Video: TV  0.0 
Audio  0.6 
Image  0.0 
Mixed  0.1 
Software 0.1 
Text  0.0 
Video  0.2 
Table 64: Example of Translating Full to Partial Category Distributions 
This procedure could be used to compare classifier agents in terms of super-
category prediction should there be a need to. 
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5.3. Comparing MVL and Toran on DS2500 and DS480 
Our approach absorbs the knowledge from DS2500 and is validated on DS480. 
However, these data sets contain items only classified by human experts while the 
actual categories of the items are unverified. Humans sometimes make mistakes 
or disagree with each other, which makes the ‘true’ state of these items itself 
uncertain.  
We considered evaluating accuracy for every separate human verdict per torrent 
item and then taking an average error score. So, for an item with 3 votes we could 
calculate a score 3 times. This poses a problem for cases where 2 experts classify 
an item correctly and 1 expert makes a mistake. Effectively, when Toran predicts 
correctly it is penalised by the wrong human vote. This is illustrated by Table 65, 
where a single human made a mistake, Toran made a correct prediction and MVL 
only named the correct super-category. An item like the ones in this table would 
increase Toran’s total error on the data set by around 0.67. 
 Torrent Name 
Human Verdict Toran Verdict Toran Error MVL Verdict MVL Error 
Example 1 
(2010) Кислород [320kbps] 
Video: Movie Audio: Music 1.99 Audio 1.49 
Example 2 
Dum Maaro Dum - 2011 - Mp3-320-Kbps - Yoge786[www.ahashare.com] 
Video: Movie Audio: Music 1.99 Audio 1.49 
Example 3 
[ohys] FateKaleid Liner Prisma Illya - 01 (NICO 720x400 x264 AAC).mp4 
Video: Other Video: TV 1.99 Video 1.49 
Table 65: Examples when an Expert is Wrong, MVL Partially is Right and Toran is Correct 
We ultimately decided to compare Toran and MVL results to the voice of the 
majority in the human panel. We pick the estimate of the ‘true’ state of an item 
according to a classification shared by at least 2 experts. This can either be a full or 
partial classification. Table 66 illustrates a few examples of working out the 
category of the item against which MVL and Toran will be evaluated. In DS2500 
194 
 
277 items have a majority super-category only and 194 items are undecided, while 
for DS480 these figures are 28 and 45 respectively. 
 Verdict  
Ex. 1 2 3 Derived ‘True’ State 
1 Video Video Unknown Video 
2 Video: TV Unknown Unknown N/A 
3 Video: Other Video Video: Other Video: Other 
4 Software: Game Unknown Video: TV N/A 
5 Video: Other Video: Movie Video: TV Video 
6 Audio: Music Unknown Audio Audio 
Table 66: Deriving a Single Estimate of the ‘True’ State from Expert Verdicts 
Once the single category is determined, we are free to apply any scoring metric in 
the same way it can be applied for DS120 where the actual item state is verified. 
5.4. Scoring Metric Requirements 
The classification task is essentially two-tiered with first super-category and then 
its particular sub-category being identified. We need to make sure that the metric 
we use for evaluation takes account of a correct classification in the super-category 
even when the sub-category is wrongly identified, e.g. for an item which is a 
“Video: Movie”, the best score should be when it is classified as such. However, 
being classified as “Video: Other” should be scored better than “Software: Other”, 
or any other equally irrelevant sub-category. 
It is also crucial that the metric does not discriminate by super-category size when 
calculating score for a correct sub-category match. For example, super-categories 
“Image”, “Software” and “Video” contain 1, 2 and 3 sub-categories respectively. 
Items correctly classified while belonging to any of these categories must be scored 
exactly the same. In other words, classifying an image correctly should not score 
better or worse than classifying a movie correctly. 
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A metric 𝑀 must: 
a) be defined to return a non-infinite score for average performance 
calculation; 
b) be able to handle partial classifications; 
c) behave equally for correct classifications for items in categories of different 
size; 
d) return best score for an exact match of predicted state and the real state; and 
the worst score when the prediction matches neither the item’s super-
category nor the item’s sub-category. 
5.5. Tiered Scoring Rule 
In Equation 43 we propose a tiered metric 𝑀𝑇 which can extend different classical 
scoring rules. For this metric we need a probability vector for each of super-
category and sub-category predictions. Once one of these is provided by an agent, 
the second can be derived according to procedures described in Section 5.2. An 
‘Unknown’ verdict can also be used to generate both vectors. 
𝑀𝑇 =
𝑀1 × |𝐶1| + 𝑀2 × 𝑐
|𝐶1| + 𝑐
 (43) 
Where 𝑀1 is the score calculated for a prediction vector of super-categories, |𝐶1| is 
the count of all sub-categories within the real super category of the item, 𝑀2 is the 
score calculated for the prediction vector of sub-categories. Variable 𝑐 is the 
coefficient of sensitivity to a full-category score. It allows specifying the 
significance of the super-category match. In other words, it provides an ability to 
specify how strongly sub-categories within the same super-category are related. 
Consider an implementation of this tiered metric 𝐵𝑆𝑇 based on the Brier score: 
𝐵𝑆𝑇 =
𝐵𝑆1 × |𝐶1| + 𝐵𝑆2 × 𝑐
|𝐶1| + 𝑐
 (44) 
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Where 𝐵𝑆1 and 𝐵𝑆2 are the super-category and sub-category Brier scores 
respectively. 
To illustrate, consider example 2 from Figure 9 and Table 11. The human votes 
were “Video: Movie” 2 times and “Video: Other” 1 time for an item which really 
is “Video: Movie”. We use sensitivity coefficient of 10 for reasons explained later 
in this section. Table 67 defines each of the components of the 𝐵𝑆𝑇 equation and 
other parameters for this instance. 
Component Component Description Instantiation 
𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟
𝑅  Real super-category of the item 𝑉𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜 
𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟
𝑃  Predicted super-category 
vector 
{
 
 
 
 
 
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑜) = 0.0
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒) = 0.0
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑) = 0.0
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒) = 0.0
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡) = 0.0
𝑷(𝑺 = 𝑽𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒐) = 𝟏. 𝟎
 
𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑏
𝑅  Real sub-category of the item 𝑉𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜: 𝑀𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑒 
𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑏
𝑃  Predicted sub-category vector 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑜:𝑀𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑐) = 0.00
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑜:𝑂𝑆𝑇) = 0.00
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑜:𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) = 0.00
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒) = 0.00
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑀𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑) = 0.00
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒: 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒) = 0.00
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑆𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒: 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) = 0.00
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡: 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘) = 0.00
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡:𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑧𝑖𝑛𝑒) = 0.00
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑇𝑒𝑥𝑡: 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟) = 0.00
𝑷(𝑺 = 𝑽𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒐:𝑴𝒐𝒗𝒊𝒆) = 𝟎. 𝟔𝟕
𝑷(𝑺 = 𝑽𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒐:𝑶𝒕𝒉𝒆𝒓) = 𝟎. 𝟑𝟑
𝑃(𝑆 = 𝑉𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜: 𝑇𝑉) = 0.00
 
|𝐶1| 
Number of sub-categories in 
the real super-category 
3 
𝑐 Sensitivity coefficient 10 
𝐵𝑆1 Brier score for 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑃  5 × (0 − 0)2 + (1 − 1)2 = 0 
𝐵𝑆2 Brier score for 𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑃  (1 − 0.67)2 + (0 − 0.33)2 = 0.22(2) 
𝐵𝑆𝑇 Final tiered Brier score 
0 × 3 + 0.22(2) × 10
3 + 10
≈ 0.17 
Table 67: Equation Components and Other Parameters for BST Example, 𝑐 = 10 
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This approach works with other metrics such as 𝐴𝐸, so we extend it as 𝐴𝐸. Table 
68 provides a summary of resulting 𝐵𝑆𝑇 and 𝐴𝐸𝑇 for each of the examples from 
Figure 9 and Table 11. We also show the relevant score for super and sub-
categories for reference. Examples #6 and #8 are treated quite differently by these 
rules, which is due to the Brier Score penalising a confident wrong prediction while 
favouring a spread of multiple wrong predictions. Note that the forms 𝐵𝑆1 and 
𝐵𝑆2 refer to the score for super-category and sub-category matches respectively. 
Ex. 𝑨𝑬𝟏 𝑨𝑬𝟐 𝑨𝑬𝑻 𝑩𝑺𝟏 𝑩𝑺𝟐 𝑩𝑺𝑻 
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 0.00 0.33 0.30 0.00 0.22 0.14 
3 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.22 0.22 0.22 
4 0.26 0.64 0.61 0.08 0.55 0.37 
5 0.51 0.62 0.61 0.33 0.41 0.38 
6 0.00 0.67 0.61 0.00 0.67 0.42 
7 0.77 0.92 0.91 0.73 0.92 0.85 
8 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.33 1.33 1.33 
9 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Table 68: Calculating BST (𝑐 = 5) and AE (𝑐 = 30) for Examples in Figure 9 and Table 11 
We demonstrate in Table 69 the tiered scoring rule return the same score for a 
correct classification regardless of the actual super-category size. 
Actual State ACS Prediction 𝑨𝑬𝑻 𝑩𝑺𝑻 
Image 1 Image 0.00 0.00 
Software: Game 2 Software: Game 0.00 0.00 
Video: Movie 3 Video: Movie 0.00 0.00 
Table 69: Illustration of Tiered Score Metric Being Non-Discriminative of Super-Category Size  
We believe that the tiered metric allows to better approach accuracy estimation in 
situations items are classified into a hierarchy of multiple labels. The tiered metric 
satisfies the criteria listed above: 
a) it can extend a metric that is defined within an acceptable range such as 
Brier score or mean absolute error; 
b) it respects related classes and correctly improves the score by a portion of a 
match attributed to a related category (as seen in Table 68); 
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c) it does not discriminate correct classifications by super-category size (as 
shown in Table 69); 
d) exact match returns the best score possible while a complete mismatch 
returns the worst score. 
The metric is compatible with the classical scoring rules by decomposing a score 
produced by such a metric into multiple levels and applying a weight, so the final 
output is in the same range as output of the classical metric used on the same 
instance of item classification. 
In addition to the characteristics above, this approach is also flexible in allowing 
us to specify how strongly members of the same super-category are related. The 
coefficient 𝑐 is defined in the range from 0 to positive infinity. Applied to 𝐵𝑆𝑇, a 
higher value of 𝑐 results in a score which is closer to 𝐵𝑆2 while a lower value makes 
the score closer to 𝐵𝑆1 with the value of 0 making the score equal to 𝐵𝑆1. 
 
Figure 55: Impact of Coefficient c on the BST for Examples #2 and #4 from Figure 9 and Table 11 
It needs to be noted that 𝑐 loses effectiveness quite sharply around the value of 60. 
Figure 55 illustrates two arbitrary examples 𝐵𝑆𝑇1 (𝐵𝑆1 = 0 and 𝐵𝑆2 = 0.22), and 
𝐵𝑆𝑇2 (𝐵𝑆1 ≈  0.09 and 𝐵𝑆2 ≈ 0.55). Lower values of 𝑐 make the score tend to 𝐵𝑆1 
while higher values of 𝑐 make the score tend to 𝐵𝑆2. 
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Formally, 
{ 
𝑐 ≥ 0
𝑐 = 0, 𝐵𝑆𝑇 = 𝐵𝑆1
𝑐 → 0, 𝐵𝑆𝑇 → 𝐵𝑆1
𝑐 → ∞,𝐵𝑆𝑇 → 𝐵𝑆2
 (45) 
For results evaluation we calibrated the value of 𝑐 for 𝐵𝑆𝑇 and 𝐴𝐸𝑇 based on the 
example predictions from Figure 9 and Table 11, such that they follow associated 
requirements. For 𝐵𝑆𝑇 we decided to use 𝑐 = 5, because a suitable value of c ranges 
from 3.9 to 5.3, and we believe that a considerably bigger weight must be given to 
a full category match over a partial match. For 𝐴𝐸𝑇 only 𝑐 = 30 falls within the 
constraints associated with Figure 9 and Table 11. 
5.6. Random Predictions 
When evaluating predictions, it is important to consider the score the metric gives 
to a ‘random’ guess. If a system does not perform better than selecting classes at 
random then it is inadequate. Considering the Brier score, we may calculate the 
‘random’ score when all categories are equally distanced from each other (e.g. a 
basic ‘Unknown’ distribution), according to Equation 46. 
𝐵𝑆𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑 = 1 −
1
|𝐶|
 (46) 
Where |𝐶| is the number of categories. For example, for an item with 13 possible 
categories and a random prediction of 1/13 per category, 𝐵𝑆𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≈ 0.92. However, 
when we consider an ‘Unknown’, the estimation of an average ‘random’ score 
becomes more complex.  
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Category 
Predicted 
Probability 
Item 1 
Actual 
State 
Item 2 
Actual 
State 
Item 3 
Actual 
State 
 
Audio: Music 0.06 1   
Audio: OST 0.06    
Audio: Other 0.06    
Image 0.17  1  
Mixed 0.17    
Software: Game 0.08    
Software: Other 0.08   1 
Text: Book 0.06    
Text: Magazine 0.06    
Text: Other 0.06    
Video: Movie 0.06    
Video: Other 0.06    
Video: TV 0.06    
 0.99 0.76 0.93 Brier Score 
Table 70: Possible Brier Score for ‘Unknown’ Predictions Depending on the True Item State 
Table 70 demonstrates that Brier Score for a prediction with a priored ‘Unknown’ 
distribution results in very different scores depending on the real state of the item, 
which should not be the case. 
A further complication is using a tiered Brier score as defined in Equation 44, 
which aims to reward predictions within the same super-category even if the sub-
category does not match. We empirically define a random 𝐵𝑆𝑇 by scoring a large 
number of randomly generated combinations of prediction vectors and true item 
states. To be exact, the following steps are repeated 10,000,000 times and an 
average is calculated: 
1) Pick random super-category 𝐶 
2) Pick random sub-category 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶 
3) Fill a prediction vector 𝑆 with random numbers and normalise 
4) Calculate 𝐵𝑆𝑇(𝑐, 𝑆) 
The resulting average 𝐵𝑆𝑇 for random predictions is 0.923, which is the same as 
for a random prediction according to a regular Brier score. We can use this number 
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as a very basic benchmark for a method viability. If the final score of a classifying 
agent is close to this figure, then the predictions are little better than random. 
5.7. Summary 
In this chapter we introduced a coherent framework for comparing results of 
different types provided by different classifying agents and systems. We identified 
a set of requirements that a metric should sensibly satisfy to work in a multi-class 
hierarchical setting and suggested an extension to classical metrics that addresses 
this issue and explained in detail justification for this extension and its parameters. 
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Chapter 6  
Empirical Evaluation and Analysis 
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis and comparison of results achieved by 
our system Toran, the MovieLabs benchmark system MVL and the human panel 
(HP). It addresses Research objective 2 in Section 6.1 by showing that title 
matching improves classification results and estimation of probability of fakes and 
malware. It addresses Research objective 4 by providing assessment of the results 
in comparison between classifying agents on multiple data sets. DS2500 and DS480 
provide the basis for preliminary testing on non-verified data, pre-classified only 
by humans. DS120 is the general-purpose testing set, while DSFM is specifically 
concerned with the ability to capture fakes and malware. DSBS is a sequential set 
of newly posted torrent records from BitSnoop online feed – to test our 
methodology in vivo. These data sets including results of all agents are available 
in Appendix D. 
This chapter considers performance of the four agents:  
 the human panel HP; 
 the MovieLabs benchmark system MVL; 
 our system Toran (with title matching turned off); 
 our system Toran T (with title matching turned on). 
Throughout the chapter we accept a confidence interval of 95% and margin of error 
is identified following classification error figures in the form 𝑒 ± 𝑚, where 𝑒 is the 
value of a classification error metric and 𝑚 is the statistical margin of error, which 
is calculated according to: 
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𝑚 =  𝑧 ∙ 𝑆𝐸 
𝑆𝐸 =
𝑠
√𝑛
 
𝑠 = √
∑ (𝑒 − 𝑒𝑖)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛 − 1
 
(47) 
where 𝑧 is the critical value associated with the chosen confidence interval (1.96 for 
95%), 𝑆𝐸 is the standard error of the mean, 𝑛 is the number of items averaged, 𝑠 is 
the sample standard deviation, 𝑒 is the mean classification error and 𝑒𝑖 is an 
individual item’s classification error. 
We use a combination of Brier score and absolute error as defined in Section 2.6.4, 
to evaluate the quality of our probabilistic predictions in Section 6.1. These metrics 
were selected because they address different aspects of classification analysis: the 
Brier score puts a higher emphasis on the spread of the wrong portion of a 
prediction, while absolute error is more concerned with the confidence of correct 
portion of the prediction. We complement evaluation by extending these metrics 
to their tiered versions as defined in Section 5.5, which addresses the issue of 
related classes in the taxonomy, and produce improved scores when a prediction 
is only partially correct, compared to a completely wrong prediction. 
We then consider how agents misclassify items and show how categories are 
mistaken for other categories in Section 6.2. 
We also consider an interpretation of the results where the top predicted category 
is selected as a hard verdict. In Section 6.3 we compare these hard choices directly 
to expert and MVL verdicts in terms of accuracy as defined in Section 2.6.3. 
We then compare Toran and MVL performance in Section 6.3.2 on an independent 
sample collected from a popular torrent tracker (BitSnoop 2015) by combining all 
scoring techniques used in previous sections. 
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While most of this chapter is concerned with medium classification, Sections 6.5 
and 6.6 evaluate the ability of Toran, MVL and humans to detect porn, fakes and 
malware. 
6.1. Assessment of Probabilistic Predictions 
This section is focused on evaluating performance in terms of the error metrics 
Brier score and mean absolute error, and their extended tiered versions. 
Parameters used for calculating predictions and evaluation scores are defined in 
Table 71. 
Parameter Value 
BST coefficient 𝑐 5 
MAET coefficient 𝑐 30 
n-gram pre-filtering 
score threshold 𝜏𝐺 
0.5 
Title match threshold 𝜏𝐼 0.95 
Table 71: Prediction and Evaluation Parameters 
This section first provides an overview of Toran’s performance during preliminary 
testing on DS2500 and DS480 in comparison to MVL in Sub-section 6.1.1, while the 
actual testing on DS120 is covered in Sub-section 6.1.2. 
 Knowledge and Validation Sets 
Our methodology is informed to a great degree by the data we studied in DS2500. 
However, it is important to note that humans sometimes make mistakes and 
therefore a classifier ideally trained to mimic human experts will be prone to the 
same type of errors, so we did not specifically aim to achieve zero error for these 
sets. 
As these data sets contain items that are not verified, we perform evaluation on the 
assumption that categories decided by the human majority are the actual 
classifications of items. This assumption is a compromise to allow us to obtain a 
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general idea of Toran and MVL performance before testing them on other data 
sets. Items, for which this human approximation of the actual state is undefined, 
are skipped from error calculation. 
  Error 
Set Agent BS BST MAE MAET 
DS2500 
MVL 0.56 ±0.03 0.45 ±0.03 0.37 ±0.02 0.35 ±0.02 
Toran T 0.44 ±0.03 0.36 ±0.02 0.34 ±0.02 0.33 ±0.02 
DS480 
MVL 0.63 ±0.07 0.49 ±0.06 0.43 ±0.04 0.40 ±0.04 
Toran T 0.51 ±0.06 0.40 ±0.05 0.40 ±0.04 0.38 ±0.04 
Table 72: Average Error of MVL and Toran T on DS2500 and DS480 with 95% Confidence Interval 
Table 72 considers average medium classification error, so the lower number 
indicates the better prediction. Note that over a set of items 𝐴𝐸 and 𝐴𝐸𝑇 become 
𝑀𝐴𝐸 and 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑇. DS2500 provides more reliable results due to increased sample 
size compared to DS480. One of the key observations here is that MVL benefits 
more from using a tiered metric (for example, the error drops from 0.56 to 0.45 𝐵𝑆 
in DS2500 while for Toran it only drops from 0.44 to 0.36). This is because MVL 
often (over 35% of times) returns only a partial classification or an “Unknown”, 
which spreads the weight of the prediction over multiple categories. The tiered 
metric rewards predictions that fall into the same super-category as the actual 
class, therefore a partial prediction, given that it picks the correct super-category, 
naturally benefits from this way of scoring. Effectively, the difference between 
regular and tiered metrics demonstrates how likely an agent is to pick a wrong 
sub-category within the correct super-category. 
Another observation from Table 72 is that Toran seems to score better with 𝑩𝑺 
rather than 𝑴𝑨𝑬 (e.g. 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑇 for DS480 is much more similar between Toran and 
MVL than 𝐵𝑆𝑇). A possible reason for this is that, even when classifying correctly, 
Toran will often not assign a whole 100% chance to the correct category. For 
example, a probability of 0.9 towards “Video: Movie” is a very strong probability 
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and we may interpret it as Toran classifying an item as a movie, however 𝑀𝐴𝐸 will 
consider this as 0.1 error.  
  Error 
Set Agent BST MAET 
DS2500 
Toran 0.26 ±0.03 0.28 ±0.02 
Toran T 0.23 ±0.03 0.23 ±0.02 
DS480 
Toran 0.30 ±0.06 0.32 ±0.05 
Toran T 0.25 ±0.06 0.27 ±0.05 
Table 73: Title Matching Improves Results for Movies, TVs and Games in DS2500 and DS480 
Table 73 shows the effect of enabling title matching in DS2500 and DS480 with 95% 
confidence level. This table uses the same item sets as Table 72, but restricted only 
to items identified by humans as games, movies and TVs, which are the categories 
where title data is available. We note that there is a small improvement in 
classifying items when an external title database is used, which demonstrates the 
potential of title matching. We believe that a better quality database of titles may 
yield a further improvement, which is noted in the Future Work Section 7.3. 
 DS120: Test Set 
Classification of items in DS120 is the test which allows us to compare automated 
systems against human experts and establish the general accuracy of human 
experts themselves. Comparing results to the actual state of the items instead of 
expert impression of it is the most conclusive way of calculating accuracy of a 
classification agent. 
  Error 
  BS BST MAE MAET 
Agent 
HP 0.30 ±0.08 0.24 ±0.06 0.38 ±0.05 0.37 ±0.05 
MVL 0.64 ±0.13 0.49 ±0.11 0.43 ±0.08 0.41 ±0.07 
Toran T 0.46 ±0.10 0.38 ±0.08 0.40 ±0.06 0.38 ±0.06 
Table 74: Average Error of HP, MVL and Toran T on DS120 
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One of the drawbacks of DS120 is the small sample size, which drastically hampers 
confidence in attained accuracy figures. The results shown in Table 74 indicate 
that Toran is a viable classification engine and performs only slightly worse than 
humans according to 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑇 (e.g. humans and Toran show 0.37 ±0.05 and 0.38 ±0.06 
error respectively). Interestingly, the Brier score indicates that Toran and 
especially MVL sometimes strongly misclassify items within the correct super-
category on a few occasions (e.g. 𝐵𝑆 0.64 for MVL dropping to 0.49 𝐵𝑆𝑇 and 0.46 
to 0.38 for Toran). This may happen, for example, when the item name contains 
sufficient super-category but little sub-category specific evidence. 
One of the surprising findings revealed by this experiment was an unexpectedly 
large error of the collective human classifiers (e.g. 0.37 ±0.05 according to 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑇). 
This is crucial as it shows that it is infeasible to train a classifier solely on human-
processed data, as it would inherit the non-ideal performance of humans. 
  Error 
  BST MAET 
Agent 
Toran 0.32 ±0.11 0.34 ±0.09 
Toran T 0.28 ±0.10 0.32 ±0.08 
Table 75: Title Matching Improves Results for Movies, TVs and Games in DS120 
Table 75 shows that there is potential for improving classification results by title 
matching, but error difference is very small and sample size does not allow us to 
make strong conclusions. 
6.2. Confusing Predictions 
A confusion matrix (Congalton & Mead 1983) visualises classification results and 
makes it easy to identify categories that attract false positives. Note that we only 
include items for which a full category is known in DS120 or assumed by human 
expert majority in DS480 and DS2500. Therefore, 73 and 471 items are not included 
in the confusion matrices from DS480 and DS2500 respectively. Each row 
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represents an average prediction that is assigned to an item that actually belongs 
to the row’s category, therefore values in each row add up to 1. An ideal classifier 
would have no false positives, and therefore its confusion matrix would show a 
simple filled diagonal. 
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Figure 56: Medium Confusion Matrices for DS2500 and DS480 
Figure 56 compares category confusion of Toran and MVL on DS2500 and DS480 
sets.  Both systems have a few things in common. Notably, many non-video items 
are predicted to be videos, as well as many text items in DS2500 are misclassified 
(i.e. wrongly predicted) to be specifically books, just like many audios are 
misclassified as specifically music. This is likely to happen due to prior 
expectations of both systems. For example, most items are videos, so when there 
is a lack of evidence found in the name string, both Toran and MVL might consider 
209 
 
it to be a video. When there is evidence of a text item but not any specific text 
category, both systems are likely to guess the item is a book. More subtle 
differences include Toran misclassifying audio items as videos and text items as 
software more often than MVL. 
Figure 57 extends the above analysis by providing confusion matrices for DS120 
set for humans, MVL and Toran, which allows us to look into human 
misclassification habits. Humans classify most items correctly, however they 
misclassify many items of different categories as videos. This may be due to a 
strong prior humans have for an arbitrary item to be a video. They also seem to 
misclassify “Audio: Other”, perhaps due to poor naming of such items and 
confusion of audio books with text books and radio shows with TV shows. 
A proportion of “Image” is confused with “Video: Other”, perhaps, due to 
mistaking a collection of porn pictures for a porn video. “Image” is also sometimes 
confused to “Software: Other” in cases of 3D modelling or image processing 
software. 
“Text: Book” can sometimes be misclassified as “Audio: Music” in cases of lyrics 
collections, or with “Image” in case of comic books. “Text: Magazine” is generally 
difficult for classification as the file name may simply contain a title of the 
magazine or a part of it. 
“Video: Movie” is sometimes confused with “Video: Other”, especially in cases of 
porn movies which may not necessarily be listed on databases like IMDb, yet are 
released as full-length movies. “Video: TV”, on the other hand, may be confused 
with “Video: Other” in cases of TV periodic show being misclassify as a one-off 
programme. 
Confusion matrices in Figure 57 show that humans are less likely to misclassify 
items compared to MVL or Toran. Visually, the diagonal produced by humans is 
more intensive and Toran’s diagonal is visually more complete than MVL’s due to 
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being more likely to correctly classify soundtrack, software applications and 
magazines, so Toran is less likely to misclassify items than MVL. 
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Figure 57: Medium Confusion Matrices for DS120 
It has to be noted though that this analysis may not allow us to draw very strong 
conclusions due to the small size of DS120, but still provides valuable insight into 
capabilities of the three classifying agents. 
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6.3. Evaluation in Terms of Accuracy 
In this section we consider the relative accuracy of the different agents when they 
are forced to provide an explicit decision about an item. A simple approach to 
select a hard prediction is to pick the top predicted category out of the whole 
prediction vector. We can calculate values of true positives (TP), true negatives (TN), 
false positives (FP) and false negatives (FN) and derive from them the associated 
values 𝜌, 𝜋, α, F1, and 𝑀𝐶𝐶 as described in Section 2.6.3. 
Each category has its own TP, FP, TN and FN counters. The following procedure 
is applied to determine these values for a single item: 
1) All categories that are not the true state of the item 𝑆𝑅 nor are the highest 
predicted category 𝑆𝑃, have their TN incremented. 
2) If the true state of the item 𝑆𝑅 matches 𝑆𝑃, category 𝑆𝑅 has is TP value 
incremented. 
3) If 𝑆𝑅 does not match 𝑆𝑃, then 𝑆𝑅 has FN and 𝑆𝑃 has FP values incremented. 
4) If 𝑆𝑃 is a set of equally predicted top categories, then they all have FP 
incremented, except for 𝑆𝑅 ∈ 𝑆𝑃 when 𝑆𝑅 has TP incremented instead. 
If 𝑆𝑅 ∉ 𝑆𝑃 then 𝑆𝑅 has FN incremented. 
We effectively reduce the multiclass classification problem down to a binary 
classification for each individual category. However, we also combine the results 
by summing up TP, FP, TN and FN values per each agent to calculate average 
performance metric on the complete data set. 
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 Accuracy Metrics 
Due to the multi-class nature of medium category being predicted, FP is always 
equal to FN in this section. A single correct classification results in 1 TP and 12 TN, 
while a misclassification is 1 FP, 1 FN and 11 TN. This can be illustrated by Table 
76. This in turn means that recall 𝜌 is equal to precision 𝝅 and also equal to F1 score. 
Set Agent TP FP TN FN 
DS2500 
MVL 1,254 775 23,573 775 
Toran T 1,425 604 23,744 604 
DS120 
HP 97 24 1,428 24 
MVL 68 53 1,399 53 
Toran T 80 41 1,411 41 
Table 76: Data for Average Accuracy on DS2500 and DS120 
We can reason about the results in a basic way by looking at the absolute number 
of correctly predicted actual categories (TP) and those that were failed to be 
correctly predicted (FN), which is equal to recall (see Table 77). 
  Accuracy Metrics 
Set Agent 𝝆 𝝅 𝜶 𝑭𝟏 𝑴𝑪𝑪 
DS2500 
MVL 0.62 0.62 0.94 0.62 0.59 
Toran T 0.70 0.70 0.95 0.70 0.68 
DS120 
HP 0.80 0.80 0.97 0.80 0.79 
MVL 0.56 0.56 0.93 0.56 0.53 
Toran T 0.66 0.66 0.95 0.66 0.63 
Table 77: Average Accuracy on DS2500 and DS120 
Interestingly, accuracy 𝛼 seems to be quite strong according to these metrics, but 
this is due to an extremely large number of TNs. In these conditions it may be 
sensible to judge performance by 𝑀𝐶𝐶, which is specifically balanced to deal with 
classes of considerably different sizes. Toran seems to perform better than MVL 
but worse than humans according to accuracy metrics. However, one of the 
primary objectives of MVL was to quantify the uncertainty associated with 
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classification, so it is unsurprising that it performs relatively poorly when forced 
to provide a ‘certain’ classification. 
 Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) 
A popular method of assessing performance of a classifier is via the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve graphs (Fawcett 2006), which are created by 
plotting the True Positive Rate (TPR) against the False Positive Rate (FPR), which 
are defined in Equation 48. 
𝑇𝑃𝑅 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 +  𝐹𝑁
 
𝐹𝑃𝑅 =
𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑃 +  𝑇𝑁
 
(48) 
For each curve on the ROC graph, TPR and FPR are calculated given a specific 
threshold 𝜏 of confidence of the classifier’s decision. For example, with 𝜏 = 0.7 only 
a class with predicted probability of 0.7 or stronger would be accepted as a positive 
classification, while with 𝜏 = 0.1 there can be many labels accepted as positives. 
We calculate points for values of 𝜏 from 0 to 1 in increments of 0.001. The bottom-
left corner of the graph corresponds to 𝜏 = 1, which means that only predictions of 
100% confidence are taken as positives, hence low number of TP and FP. The top-
right corner corresponds to 𝜏 = 0 where any prediction is taken as a positive; 
therefore all possible classes are either TP or FP. 
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Figure 58: ROC Curves for Medium in DS2500, DS480 and DS120 by All Agents 
Figure 58 demonstrates ROC curves for medium in DS2500 and DS120. The 
‘Random’ line dividing the graph in half represents an agent classifying items at 
random. The further a ROC curve is from this line the better are the predictive 
qualities. In this figure, for example, the best predictor is the humans on the DS120 
sample. In general, the results reflected by the ROC graphs correspond with other 
metrics – humans perform the best, closely followed by Toran and then MVL. 
The sharpness of the MVL curve is due to low granularity of possible levels of 
confidence, where each verdict is one of the following: unknown, partial and full 
medium. When translated into a probability vector as per Section 5.2, it results in 
a limited possible number. 
An additional use of ROC graphs is that we may find a point for each agent that is 
furthest from the ‘Random’ line. The threshold value associated with this point 
would be optimal. In our application, the optimal threshold happens to be the 
same as if we always picked the top predicted category as the hard choice. 
However, it is possible to devise more complex rules for selecting the top category, 
based on some utility value, for example. 
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The area under the ROC curve (AUROC or AUC) is a popular assessment metric 
(Flach et al. 2011), which is an aggregated measure of classification performance 
and combines all possible decision thresholds. It estimates the probability that the 
classifier will rank a random positive item higher than a random negative item – 
for example, the chance that a random porn video is classified as porn with a 
higher confidence than a random non-porn video. Essentially, AUC equal to 1 
means perfect classification and 0.5 means no better than random. AUC less than 
0.5 means worse than random, but for binary classification may allow the 
classifier’s decisions to be inversed and thus achieve better prediction quality. 
Though AUC is normally calculated by integration, in our case we may use the 
trapezoidal rule as per Equation 49 to approximate such definite integral. 
𝐴𝑈𝐶 =
ℎ
2
∑(𝑓(𝑥𝑖+1) + 𝑓(𝑥𝑖))
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (49) 
where 𝑁 is the number of points and ℎ is the increments of 𝑥. Variable 𝑥 refers to 
FPR and 𝑓(𝑥) refers to TPR.  
 
 Agent 
 HP MVL Toran T 
Data Set 
DS120 0.97 ±0.09 0.88 ±0.09 0.95 ±0.09 
DS2500 - 0.89 ±0.03 0.94 ±0.03 
Table 78: AUC for Porn and Medium for All Agents on all Data Sets 
Table 78 shows AUC calculated for medium predictions on DS2500 and DS120 for 
all agents and margin of error shown is based on sample sizes, uniform sample 
proportion and confidence interval of 95%. In medium classification Toran 
provides results better than MVL and only slightly worse than humans. We 
believe that, in combination with other metrics, AUC can serve as an additional 
indicator of results quality. 
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6.4. BitSnoop Experiment 
The BitSnoop data set is very important to us for two reasons. Firstly, it is 
sufficiently large to be able to make strong conclusions from it, and secondly it 
draws items from a source, independent from MovieLabs, and its data was not 
involved in building Toran in the first place. 
Table 79 provides average error for Toran and MVL on DSBS. Note that margin of 
error is considerably smaller than for other sets. Both classifiers have a much 
smaller error than for other sets, which is due to DSBS being composed of mostly 
movies and TVs, with a much smaller proportion of music, books and software. 
Items belonging to these categories normally have sufficient evidence in the name 
string, and are therefore easier for Toran and MVL to classify than items of other 
categories that lack such an abundance of category-specific evidence. 
  Error 
  BS BST MAE MAET 
Agent 
MVL 0.384 ±0.006 0.337 ±0.005 0.298 ±0.004 0.285 ±0.004 
Toran 0.269 ±0.005 0.209 ±0.004 0.231 ±0.003 0.218 ±0.003 
Toran T 0.268 ±0.005 0.208 ±0.004 0.217 ±0.003 0.205 ±0.003 
Table 79: Average Error Metrics per Agent in BitSnoop Data Set 
We can see from the difference between 𝐵𝑆 and 𝐵𝑆𝑇 that agents misclassify some 
items within the correct super-categories, giving a strong probability to the wrong 
sub-category. However, judging by a smaller difference between 𝑀𝐴𝐸 and 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑇, 
we may conclude that it does not happen too often (otherwise the error would 
likely be higher). A possible reason for this is that most items are named in a way 
that there is sufficient evidence to make a strong prediction rather than a spread of 
weaker probabilities. In general, Toran performs better than MVL by at least 7% 
according to 𝑴𝑨𝑬𝑻 difference between lowest MVL and highest Toran T error. 
We can also see clearly that title matching further improves Toran results (0.218 
±0.003 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑇 without and 0.205 ±0.003 with title matching). Note that the effect of 
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title matching is virtually insignificant according to 𝐵𝑆𝑇, because  most items in 
the data set contain a lot of secondary medium information in the torrent names, 
which is sufficient to correctly classify an item with a strong probability (e.g. 0.9). 
However, such a prediction may return a very small 𝐵𝑆𝑇 error when other 
categories are distributed more or less evenly, while 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑇 would return a value 
close to 0.1. Yet, enabling title matching may result in a much stronger prediction 
(i.e. closer to 1), thus dramatically reducing 𝑀𝐴𝐸𝑇. 
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Audio: Music                  
Image                  
Software: Game                  
Software: Other                  
Text: Book                  
Video: Movie                  
Video: Other                  
Video: TV                  
Figure 59: Confusion Matrices for BitSnoop Data Set 
Figure 59 show confusion matrices for BitSnoop data set. Note that only relevant 
categories are displayed. Both MVL and Toran seem to be good at classifying 
music, movies and TVs. Toran misclassifies some images as TVs and many games 
as applications. However, unlike MVL, Toran misclassifies fewer “Video: Other” 
as movies or TVs. MVL misclassifies a lot of items as movies and, to a smaller 
extent, TVs, which is likely due to its prior. Both Toran and MVL misclassify some 
games, movies and other videos as TVs. In general, Toran’s confusion matrix is 
visually closer to a diagonal than the one produced by MVL, but it is evident that 
there is ample room for improvement. 
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Agent AUC 
MVL 0.940 ±0.005 
Toran T 0.975 ±0.005 
 
Figure 60: ROC Graph and AUC for BitSnoop Data Set 
According to the ROC graph from Figure 60, Toran clearly shows better 
performance than MVL. According to AUC, Toran’s performance is better by at 
least 2.5%. 
The results achieved on an independent data set for which Toran was not attuned 
to, demonstrate that the methodology provides a feasible coherent framework and 
can work outside of the laboratory environment. 
The BitSnoop study conclusively demonstrates that our classification framework 
can successfully rival contemporary industrial standards and may be used on data 
that it was not specifically designed to work with.  
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6.5. Porn Detection 
Porn detection is a binary problem, so it is best suited to be evaluated in terms of 
accuracy. However, 𝑀𝐴𝐸 is also a viable option. 
Set Agent TP FP TN FN 
DS2500 
MVL 112 6 1,885 169 
Toran T 205 13 1,878 76 
DS120 
HP 34 1 84 2 
MVL 11 0 85 25 
Toran T 22 2 83 14 
Table 80: Data for Porn Detection Accuracy 
Table 80 shows the raw observations about porn detection assuming the top 
predicted category as a hard verdict. We notice that Toran picks up around twice 
as many porn items as MVL. Both agents are very accurate about the items picked, 
but fail to detect a lot of items. 
  Accuracy Error 
Set Agent 𝝆 𝝅 𝜶 𝑭𝟏 𝑴𝑪𝑪 𝑴𝑨𝑬 
DS2500 
MVL 0.57 0.84 0.75 0.68 0.51 0.38 ±0.08 
Toran T 0.30 0.64 0.60 0.41 0.19 0.29 ±0.08 
DS120 
HP 0.94 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.13 ±0.03 
MVL 0.31 1.00 0.79 0.47 0.49 0.21 ±0.07 
Toran T 0.61 0.92 0.87 0.73 0.67 0.19 ±0.07 
Table 81: Porn Detection Accuracy and Error 
Table 81 shows accuracy metrics and mean absolute error for porn detection in 
DS2500 and DS120. Note that a normal version of 𝑀𝐴𝐸 is used because there are 
no category levels involved. It is coherent with Table 80 in Toran having a lot 
higher recall than MVL (1.8 times in DS2500 and almost 2 times in DS120). 𝑀𝐴𝐸 
is relatively high compared to accuracy values in DS120, which suggests that some 
correct predictions were not very confident. Based on the metrics above (e.g. 𝐹1, 
or 𝑀𝐶𝐶), humans are very good in identifying porn items, followed by Toran, 
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which is better than MVL (almost twice better TP and FN, 𝐹1 and 𝑀𝐶𝐶 being 
higher by more than 0.2). While the size of DS120 limits the strength of conclusions, 
we may still be confident that Toran is a viable porn detection system, albeit with 
room for improvement. 
6.6. Fakes and Malware 
Detecting fakes and malware is also a binary problem, so we evaluate it in terms 
of accuracy and 𝑀𝐴𝐸. 
 Agent TP FP TN FN 
Fakes 
HP 14 8 46 32 
Toran T 26 5 49 20 
Malware 
HP 7 1 76 16 
Toran T 6 2 83 14 
Table 82: Data for Fake and Malware Detection Accuracy 
Table 82 shows the raw observations about fake and malware detection assuming 
the top predicted category as a hard verdict. Humans and Toran seem to have a 
similar rate of false positives, but Toran identifies almost twice as many fakes 
as humans and about the same number of malware items. A large proportion of 
items remain undetected by both agents (more than two thirds for humans and 
about half fakes and two thirds malware for Toran), so there is a considerable room 
for improvement. We believe that a well maintained list of titles, as well as the risk 
group, may further improve results demonstrated in this section. 
  Accuracy Error 
 Agent 𝝆 𝝅 𝜶 𝑭𝟏 𝑴𝑪𝑪 𝑴𝑨𝑬 
Fakes 
HP 0.30 0.64 0.60 0.41 0.19 0.38 ±0.08 
Toran T 0.57 0.84 0.75 0.68 0.51 0.29 ±0.08 
Malware 
HP 0.26 1.00 0.83 0.41 0.46 0.17 ±0.07 
Toran T 0.30 0.88 0.83 0.45 0.45 0.18 ±0.07 
Table 83: Fake and Malware Detection Accuracy and Error 
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Table 83 shows accuracy metrics and mean absolute error for DSFM set. We note 
that recall is poor for both agents, although precision is better, especially for 
malware. Although the size of this set does not allow us to draw very strong 
conclusions, the potential is clear for Toran to operate on par with or even better 
than humans in fake and malware detection. 
6.7. Summary 
This chapter concluded the classification and evaluation parts of the thesis and 
presented a detailed evaluation of classification and identification results. We 
showed that Toran generally matches and sometimes outperforms MVL in 
medium classification and porn identification and is closer in results to humans 
than to MVL. Unlike MVL, Toran is capable of predicting fakes and malware in 
addition to its primary functionality. 
We applied a range of assessment techniques and metrics to the results to ensure 
that our conclusions are not biased towards a particular accuracy measurement 
method. We measured error by Brier score and mean absolute error, including our 
proposed extension to these error metrics that allow capturing the proportion of a 
prediction assigned to a wrong sub-category within a correct super-category. We 
used confusion matrices to show in detail how different agents misclassify 
categories. We also evaluated accuracy in terms of recall, precision, accuracy, 𝐹1 
score, and Matthews correlation coefficient, based on the number of true and false 
positives and negatives, having the top predicted category of a classifying agent 
taken as a hard verdict. We used ROC graphs to compare performance of different 
classifying agents given different thresholds of verdict confidence acceptance and 
gave relevant AUC values. We provided margin of error for applicable metrics for 
confidence level of 95%. 
Smaller test sets are unsuitable to making strong conclusions but they provide us 
with a proof of viability of the Toran prototype system and demonstrate that it has 
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a solid potential. The bigger BitSnoop data set allows making strong conclusions 
and we observe that Toran, in fully autonomous mode, is able to outperform the 
benchmark MVL system in medium classification (see Table 79 and Figure 60). 
Note that MVL combines analysis of file name and size with title information, 
meta-data at the torrent publication source and is also able to scan the torrent 
content’s manifest, which may provide a deeper understanding of the file’s 
content. These capabilities require regular maintenance yet a fully unsupervised 
Bayesian Toran system was able to compete with MVL. 
In summary, we used DS2500 and DS480 for preliminary testing and to prove the 
method’s viability. DSFM was used to demonstrate that Toran can compete with 
human classifiers in identifying fakes and malware. BitSnoop data set provided us 
with an opportunity to definitively conclude that Toran can perform on par or 
better than a commercial benchmark system, with a very small margin of error 
(below 0.005). 
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Chapter 7  
Summary and Conclusions 
In this thesis we addressed the problem of identifying and classifying generic 
Internet media content in the absence of informative data such as meta-tags. In 
Chapter 1 we explained the important need for such identification and 
classification in the context of BitTorrent files that contribute a large proportion of 
global Internet traffic, yet are mostly analysed in terms of general volume. The 
sharing and downloads of BitTorrent files has major financial, legal and security 
implications, and there is an urgent need for different organisations and users to 
learn about the content of the files, but typically only the file name and size are 
available. Being able to process ill-formed user-generated file names is the key to 
enabling richer analysis of torrent data. 
In this context, and also taking account of a virtual absence of sufficient verified 
data samples for training, validation and testing in a classical frequentist approach, 
we argued that a Bayesian framework of identification and classification should be 
used, because it allows us to incorporate expert judgment with limited data in 
order to characterise the inherent uncertainty of such classification. 
Section 7.1 provides an example of the complete methodology applied to a torrent 
item, including how we would logically reason about evidence in the name string, 
how the evidence is translated into BN observations and the final results calculated 
by the model. In Section 7.2 we review the progress made in terms of research 
objectives and give a summary of various sections and chapters addressing these 
objectives. Section 7.3 lays out the prospects for future work, focusing not only on 
improving the framework in general and Toran implementation in particular, but 
also on possible ways of improving evaluation of multi-category hierarchical 
classification solutions. In Section 7.4 we reflect on the work described in this thesis 
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and gives a few examples of instantiating our general framework in other 
application domains. 
7.1. Methodology 
We approached the problem by developing a comprehensive Bayesian Network 
model (see Chapter 3) that relies on: 
 Torrent size 
 Detection of a movie, game or TV series title in the file name 
 Detection of medium-specific and other evidence in the file name 
We collected and studied a large sample of torrent files that, together with domain 
experts, informed the model structure and parameters including prior 
probabilities. We used several other samples for validation and testing (see 
Section 2.5). While building the model we conducted several studies into the 
online content in order to refine our prior beliefs and domain knowledge.  
We applied a range of information retrieval and string processing techniques to 
extract evidence from file names, involving sequence alignment, n-gram and 
regular expression matching (see Chapter 4). We defined a flexible framework that 
allows updating and modification of the current configuration, such that new 
knowledge may be incorporated easily (see Sections 3.13 and 4.5). 
To illustrate how our methodology is applied to classify a torrent item, and what 
reasoning goes into the process consider the example shown in Figure 61. 
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Figure 61: Interpretation of Evidence in CSI.Miami.S10.WEB-DLRIP Torrent 
This illustrates a torrent with name CSI.Miami.S10.WEB-DLRIP of size 
5,800MB and demonstrates a human thought-process of identifying and 
classifying this torrent. Our method attempts to mimic such reasoning. 
The main task is to extract as much evidence from the torrent and use it as 
observations in the classifier BN model defined in Chapter 3 . We begin by entering 
the file size into the model. The size 5,800MB is a size most expected for “Video: 
Movie” or to a lesser degree for “Software: Game” (as explained in Section 3.8 for 
conditional priors of file size).  Other evidence we enter into the BN will refine our 
posterior belief about this. We run the torrent name through our list of signatures 
which are associated with one or more medium category (as was explained in 
Section 4.3). Each detected signature has semantical meaning and we enter 
cumulative strength of signatures detected for each medium category into the 
relevant BN node (as explained in Section 3.9). 
 
Association Strength to 
Category 
Sub-String Captured by Signatures Video: Movie Video: TV 
S10  2.95 
WEB-DLRIP 0.15 0.7 
Total 0.15 3.65 
Table 84: Evidence Strength for Prikolisty.UNRATED.2009.HDRip.MP3.700MB.avi Torrent 
Table 84 shows sub-strings captured by signatures and associated category 
strengths. Substring WEB-DLRIP refers to a video ripped from an online streaming 
CSI.Miami.S10.WEB-DLRIP
CSI: Miami (2002–2012)
5,800mb
Whole TV Season
TV
Video
+
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service. S10 denotes the 10th season in the series. Both these signatures are 
removable, so we filter them out of the file name. The cumulative strengths are 
entered as observations into the nodes “Video: Movie” Signature Found and “Video: 
TV” Signature Found respectively. 
The remaining file name string is CSI.Miami and it does not correspond to any 
signature, therefore we suppose that it may be a part of a title. Using the method 
described in Section 4.4.3 we gain a single match to a title “CSI: Miami (2002)”, 
which is a TV series with a score of 1. We enter a hard observation “TV” into the 
node Found in DB (which is described Section 3.11). 
 
Figure 62: Complete Example for CSI.Miami.S10.WEB-DLRIP Torrent 
Figure 62 illustrates the BN with observations entered and shows the result of 
evidence propagation through the model. Nodes with no new evidence are 
omitted. The combination of evidence suggests the item is almost certainly a TV 
series, not fake and not malware. 
7.2. Research Objectives 
Our main research hypothesis was that such an approach could provide improved 
accuracy over the current state-of-the-art systems such as that developed by 
MovieLabs – the organisation funded by the major Hollywood studios. 
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Throughout the project we defined and developed a framework that to build a 
Bayesian classification system that uses available domain knowledge and data. We 
explained our approach in detail such that it may be reproduced in the same or an 
alternative domain. 
We performed extensive evaluation of our prototype system Toran, the MovieLabs 
benchmark system MVL and a panel of human classifiers in Chapter 6. While our 
smaller data sets only allow us to establish viability of our approach in medium 
and porn classification, the bigger BitSnoop sample definitively shows that Toran 
successfully rivals MVL, even in fully autonomous mode. There is also a potential 
for Toran to perform on par or better compared to humans when detecting fakes 
and malware. Based on these findings, we can claim that the research hypothesis 
has been established. 
In addition the research hypothesis, the four research objectives from Section 1.2 
were fulfilled as follows: 
 Research objective 1 is addressed in Chapter 3 by demonstrating how a BN 
model was constructed for classification and identification, and in Chapter 
4 by explaining how evidence is extracted from file names to be used as 
observations in the model. 
 Research objective 2 is addressed in Sections 6.1 and 6.6 by showing that 
title matching improves classification results and allows automatically 
detecting fakes and malware on par or better than human experts. 
 Research objective 3 is addressed in Chapter 5 by creating a compatibility 
framework for results of different classification agents, and defining an 
extension to well-established error metrics that makes them compatible 
with a multi-label hierarchical class taxonomy. 
 Research objective 4 is addressed in Chapter 6 by providing assessment of 
the results in comparison between classifying agents on multiple data sets 
using a variety of metrics and evaluation techniques. 
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7.3. Future Work 
This section considers two broad directions that can be pursued as a result of this 
research. One relates to improvements of the current implementation of our Toran 
prototype, and the other puts a focus on validation of classifier systems in this (or 
similar) application domains. 
 Improving Toran 
We identify a number of potential extensions to the Toran prototype that may 
improve the classification results.  
Medium classification may be improved by: 
 Expanding the list of signatures associated with particular medium 
categories. 
 More accurate and reliable way of modelling file size, for example, by fitting 
data from a sufficiently large sample to distribution functions or applying 
parameter learning techniques. 
 More granularity could be added to the taxonomy by separating out new 
categories and introducing another level of hierarchy. 
Evidence detection may be improved by applying a range of machine learning 
techniques to identify keywords or patterns and link them to categories, prior to 
refining them with expert knowledge. 
The BN model may be expanded to include additional attributes, which are 
currently used as evidence but not attempted to be predicted, such as: 
 format (e.g. HD, low resolution, theatre recording) 
 content (e.g. animation, live action, anime, sport, news, documentary) 
 country 
 languages 
 subtitles 
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Torrent meta-data may be exploited by obtaining and reading the torrent manifest 
and analysing download dynamics. 
Additional meta-data may be obtained by performing search engine or large 
database queries, or attempting to search torrent trackers and obtain their 
classifications for torrents. It could be possible to look up a hash code of a torrent 
and try to extract any informative metadata found. 
Title, fake and malware identification may be dramatically improved by: 
 Improving the quality of the title database and exploring the possibility of 
including a small number of high impact titles. 
 Adding translations into languages commonly found in torrents, such as 
Russian, Japanese, Korean and Chinese, including their English 
transliteration. 
 Adding music, books, software and game titles and brands. 
Peers is an indicator of how many clients are downloading or uploading the content 
of a torrent and could be used as an indicator of current popularity of the torrent. 
The rate at which the torrent’s popularity falls or grows could reveal if the torrent 
is a fake or a legitimate item. A fake torrent is characteristic of a very short 
popularity span when it grows very fast in the beginning. However, as users finish 
downloading and realise it was a fake, they remove the torrent and its content from 
their machine, and its popularity starts falling rapidly. Unfortunately, this piece of 
evidence is not always available and requires monitoring to be exploited 
effectively. 
A Bayesian approach may be used instead of sequence alignment to estimate title 
match scores. 
More accurate classification of porn could be achieved by expanding the list of 
porn actresses and studios, as well as importing more porn movie titles and adding 
more porn-related signatures. 
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 Further Contribution to Validation 
One of the key problems with validation of a system like Toran is the lack of a 
sufficiently large data set of verified items. We believe that it may be beneficial to 
the research field if a large data set is established (including items of rare classes), 
verified and made available for other researchers. This would also contribute to 
research in machine learning by enabling training on verified data, as opposed to 
human processed data. 
Another issue we noted in this thesis is the problem of evaluating predictions in a 
multi-label hierarchical set up. While the tiered scoring metric we proposed allows 
us, in principle, to address this issue, the topic may still need further research into 
the effects of prior distributions, used to interpret partial and “unknown” verdicts, 
on the usability of the tiered metric. For example, we use a scale of possible 
predictions to calibrate the tiered coefficient such that the metric scores these 
examples as expected. However, the desired ranking order of these example 
predictions is fundamental, as it impacts whether a metric is capable to be 
calibrated in such a way. It needs to be better established how a partial prediction 
relates to an “unknown” verdict, especially when the latter has a prior distribution 
strongly favouring a particular category. Depending on such a prior definition, an 
“unknown” verdict may attain a better score than a deliberate prediction.  
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7.4. Conclusions 
This project attempted to devise a general methodology to approach a problem of 
classification in a setting where popular machine learning or frequentist 
approaches may not be appropriate. The resulting framework draws on a number 
of techniques borrowed from various research areas, such as Bayesian networks, 
classification and sequence alignment. 
The domain we chose to demonstrate the application of methodology in practice 
may not be the obvious one. Some could argue that a classifier could just be trained 
on a set of human-processed items without the need to create an expert knowledge 
system. In our study we found out that even a panel of three trained human experts 
is far from ideal when it comes to classifying items like torrent files, and one must 
keep in mind that these human classifiers also had the power of Internet search 
engines at their hands. This important finding means that a system trained to 
perform like humans will make the same mistakes as humans. Unfortunately, it is 
very expensive to establish a sufficiently large sample of verified items. It took us 
several weeks and many man-hours to capture and verify a small sample of just 
120 items. Downloading multiple torrents for verification from an established 
torrent tracker is not a big problem, but it is quite a challenge to do the same for a 
bunch of torrents not indexed by any established tracker with a lot of sharing users. 
We do believe, however, that it would be highly beneficial to capture a larger 
sample of verified items, to allow for strong conclusions when testing a classifier 
system. One of the drawbacks of a small sample is that margin of error is quite 
large and may be an issue when two classifiers need to be compared and both seem 
to perform on a somewhat similar level. 
We are happy, however, that several samples created as part of this project will 
now be available to other researchers, including those who are seeking to improve 
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classification methods or those who may want to study reasons for worse than 
expected human performance. 
Through our existing contacts and the sophistication of the Toran system 
developed we hope that the methodology finds its way into a widely available 
implementation that may help the public by adding transparency to estimating 
composition of content downloaded around the world. This would help address 
the issue of regularly overestimated financial losses due to privacy. 
We are also confident that the general framework described in the thesis will allow 
other researchers to develop classification systems in applicable domains. We 
highlight three such application domains already being considered for this work: 
1. A new project that is focused on attribution of artworks and can reuse much 
of the framework presented in the thesis (except for string processing). The 
BN model is strongly related to the one we described in Chapter 3 and 
various analyses of imagery are easily incorporated into the concept of 
evidence associated with nodes in the BN. 
2. A system that analyses a user’s query to an online retailer and figures out 
the desired shopping category; and a closely related system that classifies 
generic online shop item pages into a particular taxonomy. The latter may 
be especially relevant for services that aim to aggregate online shopping 
experience from different retailers. 
3. A very different example, proposed by a colleague who works in cyber 
security, was that this framework may be helpful in creating a system that 
classifies and monitors risk of sensitive data leaving corporate premises. 
The range of components involved in the final system produced by our suggested 
framework means that, depending on the application domain, some components 
may be more relevant than others. For example, Toran uses signature associations 
to filter the torrent name and then sequence alignment to match titles, and the 
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evidence produced by this process is useful but not critical to the classification 
system, so in its current state it has a lot of unrealised potential. For a different 
application, such as the above cyber security example, sequence alignment may be 
used to detect parts of sensitive data obfuscated by surrounding noise. For such a 
system, evidence signatures may be of lesser importance compared to an efficient 
and effective sequence alignment component, so it may be sensible to concentrate 
on refining it at the cost of underused signature definitions. 
It may be possible to extend the BN we made to predict many other features, such 
as video/image quality, languages, genres etc. It would then be viable to apply the 
methodology to developing a real-time recommender system that could take into 
account items the user downloaded in the past, and highlighting suggested items 
on the webpages the user visits. 
We believe that the project was a success in the sense that we defined a general 
framework and demonstrated how, following its steps, we create a sensible 
classification system that is capable of rivalling contemporary industrial 
applications.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A XML Data Structure 
The XML schema is available as part ‘Appendix A – Report Schema.xsd’ of the 
illustrative materials attached to this thesis. Alternatively, it is available online 
(Dementiev 2015). 
 
<torrent hash="6004b255e164d81a8b3b98990301b758d2f0fe1f"> 
 <attributes> 
  <size>700</size> 
  <name>Entrapment.mkv</name> 
 </attributes> 
 <observations> 
  <signature value="mkv"> 
   <association name="Video: Movie" value="0.55"/> 
   <association name="Video: TV" value="0.6"/> 
  </signature> 
  <associations_summary> 
   <association name="Video: Movie" value="0.55"/> 
   <association name="Video: TV" value="0.6"/> 
  </associations_summary> 
  <title score="0.95" year="2009" name="Entrapment" category="Video: Movie" risky="0" porn="1"/> 
 </observations> 
 <attributes_derived> 
  <name_filtered>ENTRAPMENT</name_filtered> 
 </attributes_derived> 
 <predictions> 
  <porn>0.684000</porn> 
  <fake>0.000000</fake> 
  <malware>0.000000</malware> 
  <medium_full> 
   <label name="Audio: Music" value="1.8508898210711777E-4"/> 
   <label name="Audio: OST" value="2.839702574419789E-6"/> 
   <label name="Audio: Other" value="9.687494184618117E-7"/> 
   <label name="Image" value="3.4726501780824037E-6"/> 
   <label name="Mixed" value="2.337589876333368E-6"/> 
   <label name="Software: Game" value="8.069046998571139E-6"/> 
   <label name="Software: Other" value="2.234982639492955E-5"/> 
   <label name="Text: Book" value="1.4067740039536147E-6"/> 
   <label name="Text: Magazine" value="2.003991312449216E-6"/> 
   <label name="Text: Other" value="1.0480264656109739E-8"/> 
   <label name="Video: Movie" value="0.9973332285881042"/> 
   <label name="Video: Other" value="4.506212717387825E-4"/> 
   <label name="Video: TV" value="0.0019875874277204275"/> 
  </medium_full> 
 </predictions> 
</torrent>  
 
Figure A.1: Processed Torrent XML Record Example #1 
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<torrent hash="60029033ab7dafb7aed1fbf1593e929d63107bd7"> 
    <attributes> 
        <size>617</size> 
        <name>How.I.Met.Your.Mother.S04E20.rus.eng.HDTV.720p.[Kuraj-Bambey.Ru].mkv</name> 
    </attributes> 
    <observations> 
        <signature value="S04E20"> 
            <association name="Video: TV" value="2.95"/> 
        </signature> 
        <signature value="mkv"> 
            <association name="Video: Movie" value="0.55"/> 
            <association name="Video: TV" value="0.6"/> 
        </signature> 
        <signature value="eng"> 
            <association name="Language" value="0.75"/> 
        </signature> 
        <signature value="rus"> 
            <association name="Language" value="0.75"/> 
        </signature> 
        <signature value="720p"> 
            <association name="Video: Movie" value="0.55"/> 
            <association name="Video: Other" value="0.5"/> 
            <association name="Video: TV" value="0.95"/> 
        </signature> 
        <signature value="HDTV"> 
            <association name="Video: Movie" value="0.2"/> 
            <association name="Video: TV" value="1.05"/> 
        </signature> 
        <associations_summary> 
            <association name="Language" value="1.5"/> 
            <association name="Video: Movie" value="1.3"/> 
            <association name="Video: TV" value="5.55"/> 
            <association name="Video: Other" value="0.5"/> 
        </associations_summary> 
        <title score="1.0" year="2005" name="How I Met Your Mother" category="Video: TV" risky="0" porn="0"/> 
    </observations> 
    <attributes_derived> 
        <name_filtered>HOW I MET YOUR MOTHER</name_filtered> 
    </attributes_derived> 
    <predictions> 
        <porn>0.001100</porn> 
        <fake>0.000000</fake> 
        <malware>0.000000</malware> 
        <medium_full> 
            <label name="Audio: Music" value="2.2832037649411774E-10"/> 
            <label name="Audio: OST" value="6.505318853045061E-12"/> 
            <label name="Audio: Other" value="2.2192536437010135E-12"/> 
            <label name="Image" value="8.00113274246339E-12"/> 
            <label name="Mixed" value="5.299763752852904E-11"/> 
            <label name="Software: Game" value="1.8332355078420903E-10"/> 
            <label name="Software: Other" value="1.1576479863606437E-7"/> 
            <label name="Text: Book" value="3.2573115212042314E-12"/> 
            <label name="Text: Magazine" value="4.5932949284399616E-12"/> 
            <label name="Text: Other" value="2.4008649140484263E-14"/> 
            <label name="Video: Movie" value="2.3076798242982477E-4"/> 
            <label name="Video: Other" value="2.5574213395884726E-6"/> 
            <label name="Video: TV" value="0.9997665286064148"/> 
        </medium_full> 
    </predictions> 
</torrent> 
 
Figure A.2: Processed Torrent XML Record Example #2 
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<torrent hash="d7eee31291dbf956b4821b1652185d5faa84c869"> 
    <attributes> 
        <size>2232</size> 
        <name>X-Men Days of Future Past 2014 720p WEB-Rip x264 AAC - KiNGDOM [S@BBIR].mp4</name> 
    </attributes> 
    <observations> 
        <signature value="2014"> 
            <association name="Year" value="1.0"/> 
        </signature> 
        <signature value="AAC"> 
            <association name="Video: Movie" value="0.35"/> 
            <association name="Video: TV" value="0.85"/> 
        </signature> 
        <signature value="mp4"> 
            <association name="Video: Movie" value="1.15"/> 
            <association name="Video: Other" value="1.5"/> 
            <association name="Video: TV" value="1.2"/> 
        </signature> 
        <signature value="x264"> 
            <association name="Video: Movie" value="0.6"/> 
            <association name="Video: TV" value="0.4"/> 
        </signature> 
        <signature value="720p"> 
            <association name="Video: Movie" value="0.55"/> 
            <association name="Video: Other" value="0.5"/> 
            <association name="Video: TV" value="0.95"/> 
        </signature> 
        <signature value="@"> 
            <association name="Porn" value="0.55"/> 
        </signature> 
        <signature value="Rip"> 
            <association name="Video: Movie" value="0.65"/> 
            <association name="Video: Other" value="0.3"/> 
            <association name="Software: Game" value="0.1"/> 
            <association name="Video: TV" value="0.35"/> 
        </signature> 
        <associations_summary> 
            <association name="Porn" value="0.55"/> 
            <association name="Video: Movie" value="3.3000000000000003"/> 
            <association name="Video: TV" value="3.7499999999999996"/> 
            <association name="Video: Other" value="2.3"/> 
            <association name="Software: Game" value="0.1"/> 
        </associations_summary> 
        <title score="1.0" year="2014" name="X-Men: Days of Future Past" category="Video: Movie" risky="0" 
        porn="0"/> 
    </observations> 
    <attributes_derived> 
        <name_filtered>X MEN DAYS OF FUTURE PAST 2014 WEB</name_filtered> 
    </attributes_derived> 
    <predictions> 
        <porn>0.021600</porn> 
        <fake>0.000100</fake> 
        <malware>0.000000</malware> 
        <medium_full> 
            <label name="Audio: Music" value="5.594980923007142E-9"/> 
            <label name="Audio: OST" value="2.1110850914607404E-11"/> 
            <label name="Audio: Other" value="1.9538912588573654E-12"/> 
            <label name="Image" value="4.5650245736328365E-12"/> 
            <label name="Mixed" value="1.1459589943640935E-9"/> 
            <label name="Software: Game" value="3.1275863676683E-8"/> 
            <label name="Software: Other" value="1.989615384445642E-6"/> 
            <label name="Text: Book" value="1.3232828027787136E-11"/> 
            <label name="Text: Magazine" value="4.420629660939479E-12"/> 
            <label name="Text: Other" value="1.3504762629359957E-13"/> 
            <label name="Video: Movie" value="0.9994342923164368"/> 
            <label name="Video: Other" value="3.533016424626112E-4"/> 
            <label name="Video: TV" value="2.1038689010310918E-4"/> 
        </medium_full> 
    </predictions> 
</torrent> 
Figure A.3: Processed Torrent XML Record Example #3 
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Appendix B Results in XML Format 
Note that the results in XML format are available as part ‘Appendix B – 
Results.xml’ of the illustrative materials attached to this thesis. Alternatively, they 
are available online (Dementiev 2015). 
Appendix C Databases of Titles, Actors and Studios 
Note that the following databases are available, including column headers, in tab-
separated value format as part of the illustrative materials attached to this thesis. 
Alternatively, they are available online (Dementiev 2015). 
C.1. Titles Database 
This data set is available as illustrative material ‘Appendix C.1 - Titles 
Database.tsv’. 
C.2. Porn Actor Database 
This data set is available as illustrative material ‘Appendix C.2 - Porn Actor 
Database.tsv’. 
C.3. Porn Studio Database 
This data set is available as illustrative material ‘Appendix C.3 - Porn Studio 
Database.tsv’. 
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Appendix D Data Sets 
Note that the following data sets are available, including column headers, in tab-
separated value format as part of the illustrative materials attached to this thesis. 
Alternatively, they are available online (Dementiev 2015). 
D.1. DS2500 
This data set is available as illustrative material ‘Appendix D.1 - DS2500.tsv’. 
D.2. DS480 
This data set is available as illustrative material ‘Appendix D.2 - DS480.tsv’. 
D.3. DS120 
This data set is available as illustrative material ‘Appendix D.3 - DS120.tsv’. 
D.4. Fakes and Malware Data Set 
This data set is available as illustrative material ‘Appendix D.4 - Fakes and 
Malware Data Set.tsv’. 
D.5. BitSnoop Data Set 
This data set is available as illustrative material ‘Appendix D.5 – BitSnoop Data 
Set.tsv’. 
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Appendix E Junction Tree BN Propagation Algorithm 
The major steps of the algorithm are: 
1) Moralise the BN into an undirected graph by adding an edge between every 
pair of nodes, which have a common child, and removing directions from edges. 
 
Figure E.1: Example of Graph Moralisation 
Figure E.1 (i) shows an example Bayesian network. Nodes A and E have a common 
child B, and nodes F and G have a common child H. To moralise the graph, these 
2 pairs of nodes are connected with an edge, and are then called ‘married’. Figure 
E.1 (ii) shows the new edges in red, and also demonstrates how edge direction was 
removed. 
2) Triangulate the moral graph to identify clusters. To do this, the following 
procedure should be repeated: 
a) Calculate weight for every node. The weight is equal to the number of edges 
that have to be added, such that the node forms a complete sub-graph in any 
combination with a pair of its neighbours. 
b) Pick the node that has the minimal weight, and add all the edges required. 
When the DAG is a BN, we use the product of the number of states in the node 
i) Directed acyclic graph (DAG)
A B
D EC
F G
H
ii) Corresponding moral graph
A B
D EC
F G
H
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and its neighbours as the secondary weight, which is required when there are 
multiple nodes with the same minimum weight. For our example we assume all 
nodes have an equal number of states, hence any minimum-weight node is 
acceptable. 
c) Record the node and its neighbours as a cluster. 
d) Remove the node from the graph. 
It is important to note that this step is not deterministic and there could be 
multiple junction trees created from the same DAG. For this example, the 
following procedure is used to create one of the possible sets of clusters: 
 
Figure E.2: Graph Triangulation Example 
Figure E.2 demonstrates how we identified clusters ABE, FGH, EFG, DEF, ACD, 
ADE, DE and E. 
3) Construct the junction tree from the clusters, identified earlier by following 
the process: 
a) Discard any clusters, which are contained in another cluster (e.g. DE and E). 
b) Identify 𝑛 − 1 separators between the remaining 𝑛 clusters such. A 
separator is a common subset between a pair of clusters. 
c) Build the junction tree by connecting clusters via separators, selecting first 
the biggest separators, then the ones with minimum weight, which is the product 
A
D EC
F G
A
D EC
F
A B
D EC
F G
H
i) B and H have weight of 0
Remove B (cluster ABE)
A
D EC
F G
H
ii) H has weight of 0
Remove H (cluster FGH)
iii) G has weight of 1
Remove G (cluster EFG)
iv) F has weight of 0
Remove F (cluster DEF)
A
D E
v) All nodes have weight of 1
Remove C (cluster ACD)
vi) All nodes have weight of 0
Remove A (cluster ADE)
A
D EC D E
vii) D and E have weight of 0
Remove D (cluster DE)
E
viii) E has weight of 0
Remove E (cluster E)
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of all states in all nodes within the separator. In our example, all separators are 2 
nodes big and all nodes have the same number of states, so the order is not 
important. 
 
Figure E.3: Clusters and Separators 
Note that the Figure E.3 identified that ADE is linked to 3 separators, so it will be 
a junction in the tree: 
 
Figure E.4: Junction Tree Example 
Figure E.4 presents the final junction tree for a BN from Figure E.1 (i). AgenaRisk 
uses the sum-product algorithm proposed in (Pearl 1982) for evidence propagation, 
which employs the idea of message passing. The abstract sequence is: 
a) Designate one cluster node as root. Each node that has only 1 connection is 
called a leaf. 
b) Evidence is collected, starting from the leaf nodes, toward the root node. 
c) Once the evidence from the whole tree is gathered at the root node, it is then 
distributed in the opposite direction until all leaf nodes receive an update. As a 
result, all nodes in the BN are updated to the exact marginal probabilities. See 
Figure E.5 for illustration of this sequence. 
ABE AE ADE ACD AD ADE ADE DE DEF
DEF EF EFG EFG FG FGH
ABE
AE
ADEACD AD DE DEF EF EFG FG FGH
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Figure E.5: Illustration of Evidence Collection and Distribution Sequence 
Messages being passed along the graph are updated with new evidence at every 
node they pass through, and a message cannot be sent until all prerequisites were 
received. For the purpose of this algorithm, the junction tree above is a factor graph 
(Kschischang et al. 2001). Generally, a message passed from a variable 𝑥 to a factor 
𝑦 is denoted as a function 𝜇𝑥→𝑦, and is defined as a product of messages from all 
other factor nodes to this variable: 
∀ 𝑆𝑖 ∈ 𝑥: 𝜇𝑥 → 𝑦(𝑆𝑖) = ∏ 𝜇𝑦′→𝑥
𝑦′∈ 𝑁(𝑥) \ 𝑦
(𝑆𝑖) (50) 
Where 𝑆𝑖 is a particular state of the variable 𝑥 and 𝑁(𝑥) is a set of all factor nodes 
neighbouring 𝑥. In leaf nodes the message is initialised as marginal distributions. 
The algorithm recognises the type of message passed from a factor 𝑦 to a variable 
𝑥 separately, and it is denoted as a function 𝜇𝑦→𝑥 and is defined as a product of all 
messages accumulated by the factor, marginalised over all other variables in the 
graph: 
∀ 𝑆𝑖 ∈ 𝑥: 𝜇𝑦 → 𝑥(𝑆𝑖) = ∑ 𝑓(𝑥
′′)
𝑥′′∈ 𝑋 \ 𝑥
∏ 𝜇𝑥′→𝑦
𝑥′∈ 𝑁(𝑦) \ 𝑥
(𝑆𝑖) (51) 
Where 𝑆𝑖 is a particular state of the variable 𝑥, 𝑋 is the set of all variables in the 
graph 𝑓(𝑥′′) is the marginal distribution of variable 𝑥′′ and 𝑁(𝑦) is a set of all 
variable nodes neighbouring 𝑦. 
The sum-product algorithm is best suited to computing exact marginal 
distributions on DAGs, but can also be approximated for general graphs (Pearl 
1988). 
ABE
AE
ADEACD AD DE DEF EF EFG FG FGH
1
2
345
6
7
8 9 10
1 Evidence Collection
6 Evidence Distribution
ADE Root node
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Appendix F BN Definition 
The Toran’s underlying classification model is available as illustrative material 
‘Appendix A - Toran.cmp’ attached to this thesis, or online (Dementiev 2015). It 
can be viewed and run with the free AgenaRisk software (Agena 2016b). Tables 
and figures below are related to the NPT definition of the File Size node. 
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10 15 3 0 12 4 78 47 1 4 0 0 6 
20 3 0 2 13 3 22 12 6 0 0 0 6 
30 8 0 2 3 1 7 4 4 0 0 0 5 
40 7 0 1 4 2 7 5 0 0 0 0 4 
50 7 1 2 5 0 6 0 5 0 1 1 7 
60 7 1 3 6 2 4 1 1 0 0 0 10 
70 13 2 3 4 2 5 2 1 0 0 2 4 
80 14 2 0 1 1 2 0 2 0 1 1 7 
90 18 1 2 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 2 3 
100 11 0 2 2 1 3 2 4 0 0 4 2 
200 75 3 8 15 6 11 2 1 0 1 50 43 
300 38 0 4 4 11 7 1 0 0 0 43 24 
400 30 2 0 1 4 7 0 0 0 12 77 24 
500 17 0 2 2 2 4 0 0 0 5 21 25 
600 8 0 1 1 2 6 1 1 0 8 27 17 
700 6 0 2 1 5 3 1 0 0 71 11 19 
800 5 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 0 128 25 34 
900 4 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 13 8 13 
1000 3 0 0 0 3 2 1 0 0 11 4 15 
2000 14 1 2 2 15 5 1 0 0 155 45 72 
3000 4 0 1 2 5 4 0 0 0 41 13 21 
4000 4 0 0 0 7 4 1 0 1 12 11 13 
5000 2 0 0 0 7 4 1 2 0 31 11 7 
6000 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 6 12 6 
7000 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 8 5 6 
8000 2 0 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 8 4 3 
9000 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 6 5 1 
10000 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 1 
20000 4 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 2 15 3 
30000 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 5 2 0 
40000 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 1 
50000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Table F.1: File Size Distribution in Medium Categories by Experts on 2500 Sample
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Figure F.1: File Size Distribution in Medium Categories by Experts on 2500 Sample
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MB 
Audio: 
Music 
Audio: 
OST 
Audio: 
Other 
Image Mixed 
Software: 
Game 
Software: 
Other 
Text: 
Book 
Text: 
Magazine 
Text: 
Other 
Video: 
Movie 
Video: 
Other 
Video: 
TV 
0 - 10 2.23E-02 5.86E-02 7.93E-02 1.42E-01 3.35E-05 2.35E-02 1.77E-01 3.28E-01 2.79E-02 3.60E-01 3.91E-10 1.62E-09 7.34E-10 
10 - 20 2.53E-02 6.15E-02 8.01E-02 1.13E-01 8.82E-05 1.64E-02 1.45E-01 2.21E-01 4.19E-02 2.30E-01 1.95E-09 2.11E-03 6.32E-04 
20 - 30 2.98E-02 6.46E-02 8.09E-02 9.43E-02 2.18E-04 1.15E-02 1.19E-01 1.48E-01 5.58E-02 1.48E-01 9.77E-09 3.51E-03 1.05E-03 
30 - 40 3.42E-02 6.79E-02 8.17E-02 7.55E-02 5.07E-04 4.06E-03 9.75E-02 9.98E-02 6.98E-02 9.43E-02 4.88E-08 5.85E-03 1.76E-03 
40 - 50 4.02E-02 7.13E-02 8.26E-02 6.60E-02 1.11E-03 5.80E-03 8.00E-02 6.71E-02 8.20E-02 6.04E-02 2.44E-07 9.75E-03 2.93E-03 
50 - 60 4.76E-02 7.48E-02 8.34E-02 6.13E-02 2.27E-03 8.29E-03 6.56E-02 4.51E-02 8.12E-02 3.87E-02 1.22E-06 1.63E-02 4.88E-03 
60 - 70 5.65E-02 7.85E-02 8.42E-02 6.13E-02 4.38E-03 1.18E-02 5.38E-02 3.03E-02 8.12E-02 2.48E-02 6.10E-06 2.71E-02 8.13E-03 
70 - 80 6.70E-02 8.20E-02 8.51E-02 6.60E-02 7.94E-03 1.69E-02 4.41E-02 2.04E-02 8.12E-02 1.58E-02 3.05E-05 4.51E-02 1.36E-02 
80 - 90 8.48E-02 8.61E-02 8.60E-02 7.08E-02 1.35E-02 2.42E-02 3.62E-02 1.37E-02 8.04E-02 1.01E-02 1.53E-04 7.52E-02 2.26E-02 
90 - 100 1.12E-01 9.23E-02 8.68E-02 8.02E-02 2.16E-02 3.45E-02 2.97E-02 9.19E-03 7.95E-02 6.48E-03 7.63E-04 1.25E-01 3.76E-02 
100 - 200 1.18E-01 9.48E-02 8.57E-02 8.49E-02 3.24E-02 4.93E-02 2.43E-02 6.17E-03 7.91E-02 4.17E-03 3.82E-03 9.24E-02 6.27E-02 
200 - 300 1.12E-01 6.07E-02 4.28E-02 4.25E-02 4.57E-02 7.05E-02 2.07E-02 3.94E-03 7.85E-02 2.66E-03 9.54E-03 7.92E-02 1.05E-01 
300 - 400 6.70E-02 3.88E-02 2.10E-02 2.12E-02 6.05E-02 5.48E-02 1.76E-02 2.56E-03 7.79E-02 1.73E-03 2.38E-02 5.28E-02 1.17E-01 
400 - 500 4.91E-02 2.48E-02 1.03E-02 1.06E-02 7.53E-02 3.91E-02 1.49E-02 1.64E-03 4.19E-02 1.08E-03 4.77E-02 3.96E-02 1.05E-01 
500 - 600 3.72E-02 1.58E-02 5.04E-03 5.31E-03 8.80E-02 1.96E-02 1.27E-02 1.05E-03 2.09E-02 7.20E-04 9.54E-02 2.97E-02 5.97E-02 
600 - 700 2.68E-02 1.02E-02 2.49E-03 2.65E-03 9.67E-02 1.57E-02 1.08E-02 6.56E-04 1.05E-02 4.32E-04 9.94E-02 2.97E-02 2.24E-02 
700 - 800 1.93E-02 6.44E-03 1.25E-03 1.33E-03 9.97E-02 1.96E-02 9.18E-03 3.94E-04 5.23E-03 2.88E-04 9.54E-02 3.96E-02 1.49E-02 
800 - 900 1.49E-02 4.10E-03 5.97E-04 6.63E-04 9.67E-02 2.74E-02 7.81E-03 2.63E-04 2.62E-03 2.16E-04 5.56E-02 8.25E-02 2.24E-02 
900 - 1k 1.04E-02 2.54E-03 2.71E-04 3.32E-04 8.80E-02 6.26E-02 6.63E-03 1.97E-04 1.31E-03 1.44E-04 4.77E-02 1.22E-01 5.53E-02 
1k - 2k 7.44E-03 1.56E-03 1.36E-04 1.66E-04 7.53E-02 9.40E-02 5.64E-03 1.12E-04 6.54E-04 7.20E-05 5.56E-02 6.10E-02 6.12E-02 
2k - 3k 5.21E-03 9.76E-04 6.51E-05 8.29E-05 6.05E-02 7.05E-02 4.78E-03 7.22E-05 3.27E-04 7.20E-05 1.19E-01 3.05E-02 5.53E-02 
3k - 4k 3.87E-03 6.25E-04 3.25E-05 4.15E-05 4.57E-02 5.48E-02 4.07E-03 4.59E-05 1.63E-04 7.20E-06 1.27E-01 1.53E-02 4.97E-02 
4k - 5k 2.83E-03 4.10E-04 1.63E-05 2.07E-05 3.24E-02 3.91E-02 3.45E-03 2.95E-05 8.17E-05 7.20E-06 1.19E-01 7.63E-03 3.88E-02 
5k - 6k 2.08E-03 2.54E-04 7.59E-06 1.04E-05 2.16E-02 3.13E-02 2.94E-03 1.84E-05 4.09E-05 7.20E-06 5.96E-02 3.82E-03 3.11E-02 
6k - 7k 1.49E-03 1.56E-04 5.42E-06 5.18E-06 1.35E-02 2.82E-02 2.50E-03 1.18E-05 2.04E-05 7.20E-06 2.38E-02 1.91E-03 2.49E-02 
7k - 8k 1.12E-03 9.76E-05 5.42E-06 2.59E-06 7.94E-03 2.54E-02 2.13E-03 6.56E-06 1.02E-05 7.20E-06 9.54E-03 9.54E-04 1.99E-02 
8k - 9k 7.44E-04 5.86E-05 5.42E-06 1.30E-06 4.38E-03 2.28E-02 1.06E-03 4.59E-06 5.11E-06 7.20E-06 3.82E-03 4.77E-04 1.59E-02 
9k - 10k 5.21E-04 1.95E-05 5.42E-06 6.48E-07 2.27E-03 3.13E-02 5.31E-04 2.63E-06 2.55E-06 7.20E-06 1.53E-03 2.38E-04 1.27E-02 
10k - 20k 3.87E-04 1.95E-05 5.42E-06 3.24E-07 1.11E-03 3.91E-02 2.65E-04 1.97E-06 1.28E-06 7.20E-06 6.10E-04 1.19E-04 1.02E-02 
20k - 30k 2.83E-04 1.95E-05 5.42E-06 1.62E-07 5.07E-04 2.35E-02 1.33E-04 6.56E-07 6.39E-07 7.20E-06 2.44E-04 5.96E-05 8.14E-03 
30k - 40k 2.08E-04 1.95E-05 5.42E-06 8.10E-08 2.18E-04 1.57E-02 6.63E-05 6.56E-07 3.19E-07 7.20E-06 9.77E-05 2.98E-05 6.52E-03 
40k - 50k 1.49E-04 1.95E-05 5.42E-06 4.05E-08 8.82E-05 7.83E-03 3.32E-05 6.56E-07 1.60E-07 7.20E-06 3.91E-05 1.49E-05 5.21E-03 
50k+ 1.49E-04 1.95E-05 5.42E-06 2.02E-08 3.35E-05 7.83E-04 3.32E-05 6.56E-07 7.98E-08 7.20E-06 1.56E-05 7.45E-06 4.17E-03 
Table F.2: NPT for File Size in Current Model
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Audio: Music 
 
Audio: OST 
 
Audio: Other 
 
Image 
 
Text: Book 
 
Text: Magazine 
 
Text: Other 
 
Software: Game 
 
Video: Movie 
 
Video: Other 
 
Video: TV 
 
Software: Other 
 
Figure F.2: File Size NPT Plots in Current Model 
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Appendix G Example Model Output for Different 
Signature Combinations 
Note that only the relevant fragment from the example is displayed. All other 
nodes which are supposed to have an observation entered can be assumed 
instantiated to “none”, “0”, “false” etc. as applicable. 
 
Figure G.1: Example – Movie (Audio and Video Signatures) 
 
Figure G.2: Example – Television or Radio Recording (Size and Date) 
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Figure G.3: Example – Movie and No OST Signatures 
 
Figure G.4: Example – Movie and OST Signatures, with File Size 
 
Figure G.5: Example – Movie and OST Signatures, but No File Size 
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Appendix H Signature and Keyword Configurations 
Note that the following configurations are available, including column headers, in 
tab-separated value format as part of the illustrative materials attached to this 
thesis. Alternatively, they are available online (Dementiev 2015). 
H.1. MovieLabs Keyword Configuration 
This data set is available as illustrative material ‘Appendix H.1 - MovieLabs 
Keyword Configuration.tsv’. 
H.2. Toran Signature Configuration 
This data set is available as illustrative material ‘Appendix H.2 - Toran Signature 
Configuration.tsv’. 
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Appendix I Pattern Parts of the TV Signature 
Part Options 
1 
(?!(19|20)[0-9]{2})[0-9]+(-[0-9]+)? 
full 
all 
[а-я]+[йе] 
вс е 
вес ь 
whole 
complet(e|a)? 
2 
saisons? 
sasong 
season[se]? 
seizoe?n 
cezon[iy]? 
seri[ae]s?(?!l) 
seri(ia|ja|ya|i|j|y) 
se[sz]on[iy]? 
с ез оны? 
episodes? 
с ери[яий] 
v[yu]p[uy]sk(i|ov)? 
temp(orad(a|es))? 
bölüm 
시즌 
화 
chapters? 
час т [ьи] 
[э е]п[иi]з од([ыи]|ов)? 
выпу с ки? 
3 
iz 
из 
from 
4 
(?!(19|20)[0-9]{2})[0-9]+(-[0-9]+)? 
one 
two 
three 
four 
five 
(I{1,3}|IV|V|VI{1,3}|IX|X) 
Table I.1: Complex TV Pattern Parts 
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Appendix J Torrent Name Filtering Examples 
Original Name Filtered Name 
Shutter Island [2010 leaked screening]DvDrip -wmv [new movie] SHUTTER ISLAND 
Bangor.Flying.Circus-Bangor.Flying.Circus.1969.FLAC.CUE.Lossless BANGOR FLYING CIRCUS BANGOR FLYING CIRCUS 1969 
Kopy.V.Glubokom.Zapase.2010.DVD-9 KOPY V GLUBOKOM ZAPASE 2010 
How.I.Met.Your.Mother.S04E20.rus.eng.HDTV.720p.[Kuraj-Bambey.Ru].mkv HOW I MET YOUR MOTHER 
Nas - Hip Hop Is Dead (Retail) (2006) (Malcko The Infamous) NAS HIP HOP IS DEAD 
[www.byte.to].Icarus.Uncut.German.2010.DVDRip.XviD-ViDEOWELT ICARUS 2010 
Hart.of.Dixie.2x11.mp4 HART OF DIXIE 
Shawn.Michaels.MacMillan.River.Adventures.S01E09.HDTV.XviD-ECT.avi SHAWN MICHAELS MACMILLAN RIVER ADVENTURES 
--==WINDOWS 7 X86 SP1 v.1.2012 ©SPA 2012(9.01.12)==-- WINDOWS 7 2012 
In the loop[DVDrip][AC3 5.1 Spanish][www.lokotorrents.com] IN THE LOOP 
[05,07] (7,3) The Misfits (1961) FR.avi THE MISFITS 
Auslogics.BoostSpeed.v5.0.5.240.Cracked-Kindly AUSLOGICS BOOSTSPEED 
Das_automatische_Gehirn_11.12.16_21-45_arte_45_TVOON_DE.mpg.mp4.otrkey DAS AUTOMATISCHE GEHIRN ARTE 45 
Man.From.Shaolin.2012.DVDRip.XviD-PTpOWeR MAN FROM SHAOLIN 2012 
Zero.2.2010.DVDRip.avi ZERO 2 2010 
The_Infinite_Vacation_03_(of_05)_(2011).cbz THE INFINITE VACATION 
Loft.Collection.1993-1996.MP3.320kbps.Paradise.Kinozal.TV LOFT COLLECTION 1993 1996 PARADISE 
Jack Reacher 2012 DutchReleaseTeam DVDRip[Xvid]AC3 5.1[FR] - YIFY JACK REACHER 2012 RELEASETEAM 
The.Hobbit.2012.DVDScr.XVID.AC3.HQ.Hive-CM8 THE HOBBIT 2012 
The Lonely Island - Incredibad [2009] FLAC THE LONELY ISLAND 
Saw VII (2010 Movie) DvdRip Xvid {1337x} X.avi SAW VII 
Ангел зла.2009.Blu-Ray.Remux.(1080p).mkv АНГЕЛ ЗЛА 2009 
The Sims 3 Pets [Multi21] Crack + Keygen - sLayer2013.rar THE SIMS 3 PETS 
Epic (2013).DVDRip.XVID.AC3.HQ.Hive-CM8 EPIC 
Wedding.Crashers[2005]DvDrip[Eng][Uncorked]-aXXo WEDDING CRASHERS 
Taken 2.2012.720p.BluRay.x264-playxd TAKEN 2 2012 
Criminal.Minds.Suspect.Behavior.S01.FRENCH.LD.DVDRip.XviD-JMT CRIMINAL MINDS SUSPECT BEHAVIOR 
Table J.1: Torrent Name Filtering Examples 
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